Citations of work:

G. W. Fitch (1994). Singular Propositions in Time.

4 found
Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

  1. Thisnesses, Propositions, and Truth.David Ingram - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):442-463.
    Presentists, who believe that only present objects exist, should accept a thisness ontology, since it can do considerable work in defence of presentism. In this paper, I propose a version of presentism that involves thisnesses of past and present entities and I argue this view solves important problems facing standard versions of presentism.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  77
    The Virtues of Thisness Presentism.David Ingram - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2867-2888.
    Presentists believe that only present things exist. But opponents insist this view has unacceptable implications: if only present things exist, we can’t express singular propositions about the past, since the obvious propositional constituents don’t exist, nor can we account for temporal passage, or the openness of the future. According to such opponents, and in spite of the apparent ‘common sense’ status of the view, presentism should be rejected on the basis of these unacceptable implications. In this paper, I present and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  3. Presentism and Fatalism.Michael C. Rea - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):511 – 524.
    It is widely believed that presentism is compatible with both a libertarian view of human freedom and an unrestricted principle of bivalence. I argue that, in fact, presentists must choose between bivalence and libertarianism: if presentism is true, then either the future is open or no one is free in the way that libertarians understand freedom.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  4.  24
    Strongde Re Belief.Torin Alter - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):223-232.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography