- How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Mark Walker & Sanford Goldberg (eds.), Philosophy with Attitude. OUP.details
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No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - forthcoming - Synthese.details
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Conciliatory Reasoning, Self-Defeat, and Abstract Argumentation.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):740-787.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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Problems with Publishing Philosophical Claims We Don't Believe.Işık Sarıhan - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):449-458.details
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Conciliatory views, higher-order disagreements, and defeasible logic.Aleks Knoks - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Publishing without (some) belief.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):237-246.details
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Intellectual courage and inquisitive reasons.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (4):1343-1371.details
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Fragmentation and Old Evidence.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):542-567.details
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Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements.Dunja Šešelja - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6143-6158.details
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Learning from Scientific Disagreement.Bruno Borge & Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2021 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 36 (3):375-398.details
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Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 217–231.details
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