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  1. Bodily Desire and Imprisonment in the Phaedo.Travis Butler - 2017 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 20 (1):82-102.
    The ethics and moral psychology of the Phaedo crucially depend on claims made uniquely about bodily desire. This paper offers an analysis and defense of the account of bodily desire in the dialogue, arguing that bodily desires – desires with their source in processes or conditions of the body – are characterized by three features: motivational pull, assertoric force, and intensity. Desires with these features target the soul’s rational functions with distinctive forms of imprisonment. They target the soul’s capacity to (...)
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  • Socrates, Vlastos, Scanlon and the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue.Daniel Simão Nascimento - 2020 - Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental 30:e03009.
    This article offers a new formulation of the Socratic principle known as the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue. It is divided in three sections. In the first section I criticize Vlastos’ formulation of the PSV. In the second section I present the weighing model of practical deliberation, introduce the concepts of reason for action, simple reason, sufficient reason and conclusive reason that were offered by Thomas Scanlon in Being realistic about reasons, and then I adapt these concepts so as (...)
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  • Affect and Sensation: Plato’s Embodied Cognition.Ian McCready-Flora - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (2):117-147.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 2, pp 117 - 147 I argue that Plato, in the _Timaeus_, draws deep theoretical distinctions between sensation and affect, which comprises pleasure, pain, desire and emotion. Sensation is both ‘fine-grained’ and ‘immediate’. Emotions, by contrast, are mediated and coarse-grained. Pleasure and pain are coarse-grained but, in a range of important cases, immediate. The _Theaetetus_ assimilates affect to sensation in a way the _Timaeus_ does not. Smell frustrates Timaeus because it is coarse-grained, although unlike pleasure (...)
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