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A theory of the child's theory of mind

Cognition 44 (3):283-296 (1992)

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  1. True Belief Belies False Belief: Recent Findings of Competence in Infants and Limitations in 5-Year-Olds, and Implications for Theory of Mind Development.Joseph A. Hedger & William V. Fabricius - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):429-447.
    False belief tasks have enjoyed a monopoly in the research on children?s development of a theory of mind. They have been granted this status because they promise to deliver an unambiguous assessment of children?s understanding of the representational nature of mental states. Their poor cousins, true belief tasks, have been relegated to occasional service as control tasks. That this is their only role has been due to the universal assumption that correct answers on true belief tasks are inherently ambiguous regarding (...)
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  • Teleological Reasoning in Infancy: The Naı̈ve Theory of Rational Action.György Gergely & Gergely Csibra - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7):287-292.
  • Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading.Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
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  • Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading.Leon Bruin, Derek Strijbos & Marc Slors - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):499-517.
    According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make (...)
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  • Simulation, Simplicity, and Selection: An Evolutionary Perspective on High-Level Mindreading. [REVIEW]Armin Schulz - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):271 - 285.
    In this paper, I argue that a natural selection-based perspective gives reasons for thinking that the core of the ability to mindread cognitively complex mental states is subserved by a simulationist process—that is, that it relies on nonspecialised mechanisms in the attributer's cognitive architecture whose primary function is the generation of her own decisions and inferences. In more detail, I try to establish three conclusions. First, I try to make clearer what the dispute between simulationist and non-simulationist theories of mindreading (...)
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  • Solving Belief Problems: Toward a Task Analysis.Daniel Roth & Alan M. Leslie - 1998 - Cognition 66 (1):1-31.
  • Goal Attribution Without Agency Cues: The Perception of ‘Pure Reason’ in Infancy.Gergely Csibra, György Gergely, Szilvia Bı́ró, Orsolya Koós & Margaret Brockbank - 1999 - Cognition 72 (3):237-267.
  • Reading One's Own Mind: Self-Awareness and Developmental Psychology.Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):297-339.
  • Simulationist Models of Face-Based Emotion Recognition.Alvin I. Goldman & Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2005 - Cognition 94 (3):193-213.
    Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion (...)
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  • Can We Perceive Mental States?Eleonore Neufeld - forthcoming - Synthese:1-25.
    In this paper, I defend Non-Inferentialism about mental states, the view that we can perceive some mental states in a direct, non-inferential way. First, I discuss how the question of mental state perception is to be understood in light of recent debates in the philosophy of perception, and reconstruct Non-Inferentialism in a way that makes the question at hand – whether we can perceive mental states or not – scientifically tractable. Next, I motivate Non-Inferentialism by showing that under the assumption (...)
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  • Outcome Knowledge and False Belief.Siba E. Ghrear, Susan A. J. Birch & Daniel M. Bernstein - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • Can an Agent's False Belief Be Corrected by an Appropriate Communication? Psychological Reasoning in 18-Month-Old Infants.Cynthia Fisher Hyun-joo Song, Kristine H. Onishi, Renée Baillargeon - 2008 - Cognition 109 (3):295.
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  • The Many Faces of Belief: Reflections on Fodor's and the Child's Theory of Mind.Josef Perner - 1995 - Cognition 57 (3):241-269.
  • Shape Constancy and Theory of Mind: Is There a Link?Peter Mitchell & Laura M. Taylor - 1999 - Cognition 70 (2):167-190.
  • Two Sources of Evidence on the Non-Automaticity of True and False Belief Ascription.Elisa Back & Ian A. Apperly - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):54-70.
  • The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.
    According to agent-causal accounts of free will, agents have the capacity to cause actions, and for a given action, an agent could have done otherwise. This paper uses existing results and presents experimental evidence to argue that young children deploy a notion of agent-causation. If young children do have such a notion, however, it remains quite unclear how they acquire it. Several possible acquisition stories are canvassed, including the possibility that the notion of agent-causation develops from a prior notion of (...)
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  • Development of Theory of Mind and Executive Control.Josef Perner & Birgit Lang - 1999 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 3 (9):337-344.
  • Three- and Four-Year-Old Children's Ability to Use Desire- and Belief- Based Reasoning.Kimberly Wright Cassidy - 1998 - Cognition 66 (1):B1-B11.
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  • Social Systems.Heidi L. Maibom - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (5):557 – 578.
    It used to be thought that folk psychology is the only game in town. Focusing merely on what people do will not allow you to predict what they are likely to do next. For that, you must consider their beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. Recent evidence from developmental psychology and fMRI studies indicates that this conclusion was premature. We parse motion in an environment as behavior of a particular type, and behavior thus construed can feature in systematizations that we know. Building (...)
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  • The Origins of Folk Psychological Concepts.David E. Ohreen - 2006 - Facta Philosophica 8 (1/2):41-51.
  • The Role of Control Functions in Mentalizing: Dual-Task Studies of Theory of Mind and Executive Function.Rebecca Bull, Louise H. Phillips & Claire A. Conway - 2008 - Cognition 107 (2):663-672.
  • Belief Files in Theory of Mind Reasoning.Ágnes Kovács - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):509-527.
    Humans seem to readily track their conspecifics’ mental states, such as their goals and beliefs from early infancy. However, the underlying cognitive architecture that enables such powerful abilities remains unclear. Here I will propose that a basic representational structure, the belief file, could provide the foundation for efficiently encoding, and updating information about, others’ beliefs in online social interactions. I will discuss the representational possibilities offered by the belief file and the ways in which the repertoire of mental state reasoning (...)
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  • Two Reasons to Abandon the False Belief Task as a Test of Theory of Mind.Paul Bloom - 2000 - Cognition 77 (1):25-31.
  • Moderately Massive Modularity.Peter Carruthers - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-89.
    This paper will sketch a model of the human mind according to which the mind’s structure is massively, but by no means wholly, modular. Modularity views in general will be motivated, elucidated, and defended, before the thesis of moderately massive modularity is explained and elaborated.
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  • On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity.John M. Collins - 2004 - Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.
    Jerry Fodor argues that the massive modularity thesis – the claim that (human) cognition is wholly served by domain specific, autonomous computational devices, i.e., modules – is a priori incoherent, self-defeating. The thesis suffers from what Fodor dubs the input problem: the function of a given module (proprietarily understood) in a wholly modular system presupposes non-modular processes. It will be argued that massive modularity suffers from no such a priori problem. Fodor, however, also offers what he describes as a really (...)
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  • Children's Theory of Mind: Fodor's Heuristics Examined.Heinz Wimmer & Viktor Weichbold - 1994 - Cognition 53 (1):45-57.
  • How We Know Our Own Minds: The Relationship Between Mindreading and Metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121.
  • Acquired `Theory of Mind' Impairments Following Stroke.Francesca Happé, Hiram Brownell & Ellen Winner - 1999 - Cognition 70 (3):211-240.
  • Universal Belief-Desire Psychology? A Dilemma for Theory Theory and Simulation Theory.Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):744-764.
    In this article we take issue with theory theory and simulation theory accounts of folk psychology committed to (i) the belief-desire (BD) model and (ii) the assumption of universality (AU). Recent studies cast doubt on the compatibility of these commitments because they reveal considerable cross-cultural differences in folk psychologies. We present both theory theory and simulation theory with the following dilemma: either (i) keep the BD-model as an account of the surface properties of specific explicit folk psychologies and give up (...)
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  • A Constructivist Connectionist Model of Transitions on False-Belief Tasks.Vincent G. Berthiaume, Thomas R. Shultz & Kristine H. Onishi - 2013 - Cognition 126 (3):441-458.
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  • Perceptual Access Reasoning: Developmental Stage or System 1 Heuristic?Joseph Hedger - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):207-226.
    In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained (...)
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  • Limits on Theory of Mind Use in Adults.Boaz Keysar, Shuhong Lin & Dale J. Barr - 2003 - Cognition 89 (1):25-41.
  • Do Early Body Ornaments Prove Cognitive Modernity? A Critical Analysis From Situated Cognition.Duilio Garofoli - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):803-825.
    The documented appearance of body ornaments in the archaeological record of early anatomically modern human and late Neanderthal populations has been claimed to be proof of symbolism and cognitive modernity. Recently, Henshilwood and Dubreuil (Current Anthropology 52:361–400, 2011) have supported this stance by arguing that the use of beads and body painting implies the presence of properties typical of modern cognition: high-level theory of mind and awareness of abstract social standards. In this paper I shall disagree with this position. For (...)
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  • Social Cognitive Abilities in Infancy: Is Mindreading the Best Explanation?Marco Fenici - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (3):387-411.
    I discuss three arguments that have been advanced in support of the epistemic mentalist view, i.e., the view that infants' social cognitive abilities manifest a capacity to attribute beliefs. The argument from implicitness holds that SCAs already reflect the possession of an “implicit” and “rudimentary” capacity to attribute representational states. Against it, I note that SCAs are significantly limited, and have likely evolved to respond to contextual information in situated interaction with others. I challenge the argument from parsimony by claiming (...)
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  • The Extended Body: A Case Study in the Neurophenomenology of Social Interaction. [REVIEW]Tom Froese & Thomas Fuchs - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):205-235.
    There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature (...)
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  • Non-Interpretative Metacognition for True Beliefs.Ori Friedman & Adam R. Petrashek - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):146-147.
    Mindreading often requires access to beliefs, so the mindreading system should be able to self-attribute beliefs, even without self-interpretation. This proposal is consistent with Carruthers' claim that mindreading and metacognition depend on the same cognitive system and the same information as one another; and it may be more consistent with this claim than is Carruthers' account of metacognition.
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  • Contamination in Reasoning About False Belief: An Instance of Realist Bias in Adults but Not Children.P. Mitchell, E. J. Robinson, J. E. Isaacs & R. M. Nye - 1996 - Cognition 59 (1):1-21.
  • Functional Imaging of 'Theory of Mind'.H. L. Gallagher & C. D. Frith - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):77-83.
  • The Basis for Understanding Belief.Paul E. Newton & Vasudevi Reddy - 1995 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (4):343–362.
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  • Mindreading Underlies Metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):164-182.
    This response defends the view that human metacognition results from us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves, and that our access to our own propositional attitudes is through interpretation rather than introspection. Relevant evidence is considered, including that deriving from studies of childhood development and other animal species. Also discussed are data suggesting dissociations between metacognitive and mindreading capacities, especially in autism and schizophrenia.
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  • Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default.Paula Rubio‐Fernández - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (1):218-241.
    It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false-belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist. Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false-belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the (...)
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  • Rethinking the Ontogeny of Mindreading.Maurizio Tirassa, Francesca M. Bosco & Livia Colle - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):197-217.
    We propose a mentalistic and nativist view of human early mental and social life and of the ontogeny of mindreading. We define the mental state of sharedness as the primitive, one-sided capability to take one's own mental states as mutually known to an i nteractant. We argue that this capability is an innate feature of the human mind, which the child uses to make a subjective sense of the world and of her actions. We argue that the child takes all (...)
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  • Action Understanding as Inverse Planning.Chris L. Baker, Rebecca Saxe & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2009 - Cognition 113 (3):329-349.
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  • Representation and Desire: A Philosophical Error with Consequences for Theory-of-Mind Research.Eric Schwitzgebel - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):157-180.
    This paper distinguishes two conceptions of representation at work in the philosophical literature. On the first, "contentive" conception (found, for example, in Searle and Fodor), something is a representation, roughly, if it has "propositional content". On the second, "indicative" conception (found, for example, in Dretske), representations must not only have content but also have the function of indicating something about the world. Desire is representational on the first view but not on the second. This paper argues that philosophers and psychologists (...)
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  • The Idea of Different Folk Psychologies.Stephen Mills - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):501 – 519.
    The idea of different folk psychologies is the idea that among the world's cultures there are those whose folk, or commonsense, psychologies differ in theoretically significant ways from each other and from western folk psychology. This challenges the claim that folk psychology is a 'cultural universal'. The paper looks first of all at what are called 'opulent' accounts of folk psychology, which employ a wide-ranging and more complex set of psychological concepts, and 'core' accounts, which employ a much more restricted (...)
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  • Meaning, Belief, and Language Acquisition.Mark Risjord - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):465-475.
    A very plausible and common view of meaning supposes that linguistic meaning is to be understood in terms of speakers' intentions. This program proposes to analyse the meaning of a sentence in terms of what speakers mean by or in uttering it; and this speaker meaning in turn is to be analysed in terms of the speaker's intentions. This essay argues that intention-based semantics cannot provide an adequate analysis of linguistic meaning: not because of contrived counterexamples, nor because it conflicts (...)
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  • Dynamic Embodied Cognition.Leon de Bruin & Lena Kästner - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):541-563.
    Abstract In this article, we investigate the merits of an enactive view of cognition for the contemporary debate about social cognition. If enactivism is to be a genuine alternative to classic cognitivism, it should be able to bridge the “cognitive gap”, i.e. provide us with a convincing account of those higher forms of cognition that have traditionally been the focus of its cognitivist opponents. We show that, when it comes to social cognition, current articulations of enactivism are—despite their celebrated successes (...)
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  • Realism and Children's Early Grasp of Mental Representation: Belief-Based Judgements in the State Change Task.Rebecca Saltmarsh, Peter Mitchell & Elizabeth Robinson - 1995 - Cognition 57 (3):297-325.
  • Dedre Gentner and Susan Goldin-Meadow (Eds): Language in Mind: Advances in␣the Study of Language and Thought. [REVIEW]Pritha Chandra - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (2):225-230.
  • An Association Account of False Belief Understanding.L. C. De Bruin & Albert Newen - 2012 - Cognition 123 (2):240-259.
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