- Response classes, operants, and rules in problem solving.Jan G. Rein - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):602-602.details
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Level of analysis is not a central issue.James A. Reggia - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (2):406-407.details
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The demise of mental representations.Edward S. Reed - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):297-298.details
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Questions raised by the reinforcement paradigm.Anatol Rapoport - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):601-602.details
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How to pass a Turing test: Syntactic semantics, natural-language understanding, and first-person cognition.William J. Rapaport - 2000 - Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 9 (4):467-490.details
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Computers Are Syntax All the Way Down: Reply to Bozşahin.William J. Rapaport - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):227-237.details
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Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: A Course Outline.William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Teaching Philosophy 9 (2):103-120.details
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Minds as connoting systems: Logic and the language of thought. [REVIEW]V. Rantala & Tere Vaden - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (3):315-334.details
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The Hard Problem of Content is Neither.William Max Ramsey - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.details
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Do connectionist representations earn their explanatory keep?William Ramsey - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):34-66.details
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Do Connectionist Representations Earn Their Explanatory Keep?William Ramsey - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):34-66.details
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Tolerant enactivist cognitive science.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):226-244.details
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Passionate Descartes: A reinterpretation of the body's role in cartesian thought.Vicente Raga-Rosaleny - 2020 - Manuscrito 43 (2):54-94.details
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Mental, yes. Private, no.Howard Rachlin - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):566.details
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Is there such a thing as a problem situation?Kjell Raaheim - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):600-601.details
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Polysemy and thought: Toward a generative theory of concepts.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (1):158-185.details
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Beyond modularity: Neural evidence for constructivist principles in development.Steven R. Quartz & Terrence J. Sejnowski - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):725-726.details
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What’s in a Mind?Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1987 - Synthese 70 (January):97-122.details
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Imagery theory: not mysterious – just wrong.Zenon Pylyshyn - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):561-563.details
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Elusive thoughts: The limited accessibility of indexical beliefs.Peter E. Pruim - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (2):171 - 190.details
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The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness.Simon Prosser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349.details
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The implications of an externalist theory of rule-following behavior for robot cognition.Diane Proudfoot - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):283-308.details
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Intentionality: How to tell Mae West from a crocodile.David Premack - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):522.details
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Behaviorism and mentalism: Is there a third alternative?Beth Preston - 1994 - Synthese 100 (2):167-96.details
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Intentionality: No mystery.William T. Powers - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):152-153.details
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The Case against Stephen Stich's Syntactic Theory of Mind.Kevin Possin - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 49 (3):405 - 418.details
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Phenomenology and functional analysis. A functionalist reading of Husserlian phenomenology.Marek Pokropski - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (5):869-889.details
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Logic, reference, and mentalism.Ullin T. Place - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):565.details
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The Mark of the Cognitive and the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy: A Defense of the Extended Mind Hypothesis.Giulia Piredda - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Two kinds of methodological solipsism.Sami Pihlström - 2000 - SATS 1 (2):73-90.details
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Why cognitive science is not formalized folk psychology.Martin Pickering & Nick Chater - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):309-337.details
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Functionalism, computationalism, and mental contents.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):375-410.details
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Computation without representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.details
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Coordinating with the future: The anticipatory nature of representation. [REVIEW]Giovanni Pezzulo - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (2):179-225.details
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Methodological empiricism and the choice of measurement models in social sciences.Clayton Peterson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):831-854.details
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Mentalese syntax: Between a rock and two hard places. [REVIEW]Andrew Pessin - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 78 (1):33-53.details
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Is knowledge a natural kind?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):371 - 386.details
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Intentionality as internality.Don Perlis & Rosalie Hall - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):151-152.details
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Belief-level way stations.Donald Perlis - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):639.details
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Content, Computation and Externalism.Christopher Peacocke - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6:227-264.details
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The semantic view of computation and the argument from the cognitive science practice.Alfredo Paternoster & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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I—The Presidential Address: Sensory Experience and Representational Properties.David Papineau - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):1-33.details
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Against representationalism.David Papineau - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):324-347.details
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Computational versus operational approaches to imagery.Allan Paivio - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (4):561-561.details
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Taxonomy is older than thinking: Epigenetic decisions.Andrew Packard - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):296-297.details
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Synonymy and the nonindividualistic model of the mental.Joseph Owens - 1986 - Synthese 66 (3):361 - 382.details
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Psychophysical supervenience: Its epistemological foundation.Joseph Owens - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):89-117.details
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Where redescriptions come from.David R. Olson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):725-725.details
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Representational change, generality versus specificity, and nature versus nurture: Perennial issues in cognitive research.Stellan Ohlsson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):724-725.details
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Units “of” selection: The end of “of”?F. J. Odling-Smee & H. C. Plotkin - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (2):295-296.details
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