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  1. Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • How can representationalism accommodate degrees of belief? A dispositional representationalist proposal.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8943-8964.
    This paper argues that representationalism of a Fodorian variety can accommodate the fact that beliefs come in degrees. First, it responds to two key arguments to the contrary. Second, it builds upon these responses and outlines a novel representationalist theory of degrees of beliefs. I call this theory dispositional representationalism, as it involves direct appeal to our dispositions to form representations and propositional attitudes concerning them.
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  • What Is Ineffable?Jan Zwicky - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):197-217.
    In this essay, I argue, via a revision of Freud's notions of primary and secondary process, that experiences of resonant form lie at the root of many serious ineffability claims. I suggest further that Western European culture's resistance to the perception of resonant form underlies some of its present crises.
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  • Human and nonhuman systems are adaptive in a different sense.Tamás Zétényi - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):507-508.
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  • The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.
  • From the decline of development to the ascent of consciousness.Philip David Zelazo - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):731-732.
  • The normativity of the mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.
    I describe and defend the view in a philosophy of mind that I call 'Normative Essentialism', according to which propositional attitudes have normative essences. Those normative essences are 'horizontal' rational requirements, by which I mean the requirement to have certain propositional attitudes given other propositional attitudes. Different propositional attitudes impose different horizontal rational requirements. I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this doctrine and argue for the weaker version. I explore the consequences for knowledge of mind, and I (...)
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  • Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
  • Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.
  • Do Your Concepts Develop?Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 34:41-67.
    ‘Psychological structures may be shown to grow and differentiate throughout life. Correspondingly, the brain has a much more lengthy and involved development than any other mechanism of the body. We know little yet of how this uniquely complex process is determined, but it is certain that the principles of embryogenesis apply in all growth, including psychological growth, and not just to the morphogenesis of the body of the embryo.’.
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  • Representation redux.Hugh Wilder - 1988 - Metaphilosophy 19 (July-October):185-195.
  • Realization: Metaphysics, mind, and science.Robert A. Wilson - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):985-996.
    This paper surveys some recent work on realization in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science.
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  • Reviews. [REVIEW]Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (2):175-182.
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  • Meaning making and the mind of the externalist.Robert A. Wilson - 2010 - In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 167--188.
    This paper attempts to do two things. First, it recounts the problem of intentionality, as it has typically been conceptualized, and argues that it needs to be reconceptualized in light of the radical form of externalism most commonly referred to as the extended mind thesis. Second, it provides an explicit, novel argument for that thesis, what I call the argument from meaning making, and offers some defense of that argument. This second task occupies the core of the paper, and in (...)
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  • Lamarck, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and belief.Yorick Wilks - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):538-539.
    Nothing in McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) target article deals with the issue of how the adaptivity, or some other aspect, of beliefs might become a biological adaptation; which is to say, how the functions discussed might be coded in such a way in the brain that their development was also coded in gametes or sex transmission cells.
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  • Are there really two types of learning?Yorick Wilks - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):671-671.
  • Is economics still immersed in the old concepts of the Enlightenment era?Andrzej P. Wierzbicki - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):236-237.
  • The Revolution will not be Optimised: Radical Enactivism, Extended Functionalism and the Extensive Mind.Michael Wheeler - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):457-472.
    Optimising the 4E revolution in cognitive science arguably requires the rejection of two guiding commitments made by orthodox thinking in the field, namely that the material realisers of cognitive states and processes are located entirely inside the head, and that intelligent thought and action are to be explained in terms of the building and manipulation of content-bearing representations. In other words, the full-strength 4E revolution would be secured only by a position that delivered externalism plus antirepresentationalism. I argue that one (...)
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  • Natural pragmatics and natural codes.Tim Wharton - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):447–477.
    Grice (1957) drew a distinction between natural(N) and non–natural(NN) meaning, and showed how the latter might be characterised in terms of intentions and the recognition of intentions. Focussing on the role of natural signs and natural behaviours in communication, this paper makes two main points. First, verbal communication often involves a mixture of natural and non–natural meaning and there is a continuum of cases between showing and meaningNN. This suggests that pragmatics is best seen as a theory of intentional verbal (...)
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  • Negation in Skinner's system.N. E. Wetherick - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):606-607.
  • The creative mind versus the creative computer.Robert W. Weisberg - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):555-557.
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  • Concepts and the modularity of thought.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):107-130.
    Having concepts is a distinctive sort of cognitive capacity. One thing that conceptual thought requires is obeying the Generality Constraint: concepts ought to be freely recombinable with other concepts to form novel thoughts, independent of what they are concepts of. Having concepts, then, constrains cognitive architecture in interesting ways. In recent years, spurred on by the rise of evolutionary psychology, massively modular models of the mind have gained prominence. I argue that these architectures are incapable of satisfying the Generality Constraint, (...)
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  • The hard questions about noninductive learning remain unanswered.Eric Wanner - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):670-670.
  • Not “pain and behavior” but pain in behavior.Patrick D. Wall - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):73-73.
  • Is human language just another neurobiological specialization?Stephen F. Walker - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (4):649-650.
    One can disagree with Müller that it is neurobiologically questionable to suppose that human language is innate, specialized, and species-specific, yet agree that the precise brain mechanisms controlling language in any individual will be influenced by epigenesis and genetic variability, and that the interplay between inherited and acquired aspects of linguistic capacity deserves to be investigated.
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  • Reductionism's demise: Cold comfort.Donald H. Wacome - 2004 - Zygon 39 (2):321-337.
    . Nonreductive physicalism, as opposed to reductionism, enjoys wide popularity by virtue of being regarded as comporting with the traditional image of human beings as free and ontologically unique without the difficulties of mind-body dualism. A consideration of reasons, both good and bad, for which reductionism is rejected suggests instead that the move to nonreductive physicalism does nothing to mitigate the implications of a physicalist account of human nature.
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  • The Social Origin of the Concept of Truth – How Statements Are Built on Disagreements.Till Nikolaus von Heiseler - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    This paper proposes a social account for the origin of the truth value and the emergence of the first declarative sentence. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. The first is known as the social intelligence hypothesis: that the cognitive evolution of humans is first and foremost an adaptation to social demands. The second is the function-first approach to explaining the evolution of traits: before a prototype of a new trait develops and the adaptation process begins, something already existing (...)
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  • Extended mathematical cognition: external representations with non-derived content.Karina Vold & Dirk Schlimm - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3757-3777.
    Vehicle externalism maintains that the vehicles of our mental representations can be located outside of the head, that is, they need not be instantiated by neurons located inside the brain of the cogniser. But some disagree, insisting that ‘non-derived’, or ‘original’, content is the mark of the cognitive and that only biologically instantiated representational vehicles can have non-derived content, while the contents of all extra-neural representational vehicles are derived and thus lie outside the scope of the cognitive. In this paper (...)
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  • Is there an implicit level of representation?Annie Vinter & Pierre Perruchet - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):730-731.
  • Locking on to the language of thought.Christopher David Viger - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):203-215.
    I demonstrate that locking on, a key notion in Jerry Fodor's most recent theory of content, supplemented informational atomism (SIA), is cashed out in terms of asymmetric dependence, the central notion in his earlier theory of content. I use this result to argue that SIA is incompatible with the language of thought hypothesis because the constraints on the causal relations into which symbols can enter imposed by the theory of content preclude the causal relations needed between symbols for them to (...)
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  • Clusters: On the structure of lexical concepts.Agustín Vicente - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):79-106.
    The paper argues for a decompositionalist account of lexical concepts. In particular, it presents and argues for a cluster decompositionalism, a view that claims that the complexes a token of a word corresponds to on a given occasion are typically built out of a determinate set of basic concepts, most of which are present on most other occasions of use of the word. The first part of the paper discusses some explanatory virtues of decompositionalism in general. The second singles out (...)
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  • The egg revealed.William S. Verplanck - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (4):605-606.
  • Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • Embodied Situationism.Somogy Varga - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):271-286.
    Drawing on empirical material from social psychology, ‘situationism’ argues that the astonishing susceptibility of moral behaviour to situational influences undermines certain conceptions of character. The related, albeit more limited, thesis proposed in this paper, ‘embodied situationism’, engages a larger number of empirical sources from different fields of study and sheds light on the mechanisms responsible for particular, seemingly puzzling, situational judgments and behaviours. It is demonstrated that the empirical material supports the claims of ES and that ES is immune to (...)
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  • Intentional system theory and experimental psychology.Michael H. Van Kleeck - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):533.
  • Compositionality and Sandbag Semantics.Elmar Geir Unnsteinsson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3329-3350.
    It is a common view that radical contextualism about linguistic meaning is incompatible with a compositional explanation of linguistic comprehension. Recently, some philosophers of language have proposed theories of 'pragmatic' compositionality challenging this assumption. This paper takes a close look at a prominent proposal of this kind due to François Recanati. The objective is to give a plausible formulation of the view. The major results are threefold. First, a basic distinction that contextualists make between mandatory and optional pragmatic processes needs (...)
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  • Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):204-227.
    Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
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  • The reign of pain fails mainly in the brain.Dennis C. Turk & Peter Salovey - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):72-73.
  • Intentionally: A problem of multiple reference frames, specificational information, and extraordinary boundary conditions on natural law.M. T. Turvey - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1):153-155.
  • Computational resources do constrain behavior.John K. Tsotsos - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):506-507.
  • Creativity: myths? mechanisms.Michel Treisman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):554-555.
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  • Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.
  • Rejecting induction: Using occam's razor too soon.J. T. Tolliver - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):669-670.
  • The human being as a bumbling optimalist: A psychologist's viewpoint.Masanao Toda - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (2):235-235.
  • Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.
  • Neural Representations Observed.Eric Thomson & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (1):191-235.
    The historical debate on representation in cognitive science and neuroscience construes representations as theoretical posits and discusses the degree to which we have reason to posit them. We reject the premise of that debate. We argue that experimental neuroscientists routinely observe and manipulate neural representations in their laboratory. Therefore, neural representations are as real as neurons, action potentials, or any other well-established entities in our ontology.
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  • The pragmatics of induction.Paul Thagard - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (4):668-669.
  • Parallel computation and the mind-body problem.Paul Thagard - 1986 - Cognitive Science 10 (3):301-18.
    states are to be understood in terms of their functional relationships to other mental states, not in terms of their material instantiation in any particular kind of hardware. But the argument that material instantiation is irrelevant to functional..
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  • What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.
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  • Why reasons may not be causes.Julia Tanney - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (1-2):103-126.