This article examines Re Imogen (No 6) (2020) 61 Fam LR 344, a decision of the Family Court of Australia, which held that an application to the Family Court is mandatory if a parent or a medical practitioner of a child or adolescent diagnosed with gender dysphoria disputes the diagnosis, the capacity to consent, or the proposed treatment. First, we explain the regulatory framework for the medical treatment of gender dysphoria in children and adolescents, including the development of the welfare (...) jurisdiction under Section 67ZC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). We then provide an overview of the Re Imogen decision, and discuss the balancing exercise involved in determining a child’s best interests in the medical treatment context. We challenge the Family Court’s conclusion that, in relation to a dispute about diagnosis or treatment, a finding that the child or adolescent is Gillick competent to consent to treatment is not determinative, and the Family Court must determine the dispute. We argue that this conclusion represents an unjustified incursion into the right of Gillick competent transgender children and adolescents to make decisions about their own bodies and identities, and that the protective role of parents and the Family Court cannot justify interfering with their bodily autonomy in this context. Finally, we propose an alternative regulatory framework that removes the Family Court from the medical treatment process for gender dysphoria in circumstances of dispute between a parent and their Gillick competent child. (shrink)

Adolescence is a valuable phase of life, not just because it is the phase of learning in school and preparing for a working life. During the COVID-19 pandemic it became clear that the rights, experiences, and lifeworlds of adolescents are considered less important than the needs of school, work, and productivity. However, there is an ethical claim for people to have a good adolescence, and this means that the losses of social contact, experiences, time, and space demanded of adolescents, in (...) order to protect older and vulnerable groups during the COVID-19 pandemic, should be taken seriously. A distinctive quality of adolescence is that it cannot be repeated, nor can these experiences be replicated as adults. First experiences of independence, friendship, love, informality, recklessness, and youthful exuberance are intrinsically valuable and cannot be substituted for later in life. It is therefore not surprising that adolescents have sought and found their own spaces during the pandemic, some of them forbidden, because lock downs and closed social spaces have relegated them to the confines of their childhood bedrooms. In this paper, I explore an ethic of a good adolescence, which was impacted on by the COVID-19 pandemic, and consider what can be learned from this situation. Adolescents are to be taken seriously, their experiences are no less valuable than those of adults, and the losses they have suffered for the benefit of others should be honored. As far as possible, young people should be supported to have a voice in public discourse and in finding spaces to be adolescents. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 2 Heft: 2 Seiten: 401-420.

My critical engagement with David Ingram’s book ‘World Crisis and Underdevelopment’ is divided into three parts. In the first part I will explore how experiences of misreognition are related to experiences of injustice. In the second part I will ask about the criteria that make experiences of non-recognition or misrecognition unjust. Finally, I will briefly discuss the ‘self-subordination social recognition paradox’.

ZusammenfassungIn diesem Text werde ich zwei Thesen entfalten: Erstens, dass romantische Liebe Teil einer guten Jugend ist. Liebe als Teil einer guten Jugend hat mehrere Bestandteile: Jugendliche sollten romantische Liebe erleben können, wenn sie es wollen. Sie sollten das Wissen und die Fähigkeiten erlangen, romantische Liebe zu verstehen und adäquat mit den positiven Potentialen und auch den Risiken umgehen zu können. Jugendliche sollten lernen, die möglichen Enttäuschungen, die mit romantischer Liebe verbunden sein können, adäquat zu verarbeiten und darin gegebenenfalls Unterstützung (...) erfahren. Jugendliche sollten darin befähigt werden, die sozialen und kulturellen Normen und Praktiken, die die Vorstellungen romantischer Liebe prägen, zu reflektieren und zu hinterfragen. Zweitens ist zu klären, welche moralischen Rechte und Pflichten die Eltern und staatliche Institutionen haben. Ich plädiere dafür, diese so zu verstehen, dass sie Jugendliche in der Erlangung und adäquaten Auslebung romantischer Liebe unterstützen und ihnen bei der Entwicklung dieser Fähigkeiten die notwendigen Ressourcen zur Verfügung stellen sollten. (shrink)

This introduction provides a brief overview of the field of childhood ethics. It briefly outlines current debates about children’s autonomy and vulnerability, children’s rights, the relationship between children and parents, and (social and global) justice for children.

This paper is concerned with child poverty from an ethical perspective and applies the normative concept of vulnerability for this purpose. The first part of the paper will briefly outline children’s particular vulnerability and distinguish important aspects of this. Then the concept will be applied to child poverty and it will be shown that child poverty is a corrosive situational vulnerability, with many severe consequences. In this part of the paper normative reasoning and empirical literature will be brought together. Then, (...) the next section will establish why this increased vulnerability of poor children and the harm to their well-being and well-becoming, which they suffer for this reason, are of ethical concern. It will be discussed that child poverty is a structural problem based on social, political and economic factors. The concluding section will then briefly outline why it is imperative to protect children from the vulnerabilities associated with poverty. (shrink)

Beschäftigt man sich systematisch mit der Konzeption von Gerechtigkeit für Kinder bzw. während der Kindheit, ist es hilfreich, drei verschiedene Fragen zu klären, die normalerweise in Hinblick auf Erwachsene diskutiert werden, doch auch für eine genauere Analyse der Ansprüche von Kindern relevant sind. Welche Güter sind für die Gerechtigkeitstheorie relevant? Nach welchen Prinzipien sollen diese Güter verteilt werden? Wer ist dafür verantwortlich, dass die angestrebte Güterverteilung verwirklicht wird? In dieser Einleitung umreißen wir kurz den gegenwärtigen Diskussionsstand, der in diesen drei (...) großen gerechtigkeitsrelevanten Themenfeldern hinsichtlich von Kindern besteht. Zunächst analysieren wir Ressourcen und Fähigkeiten als angemessene Metrik der Gerechtigkeit für Kinder. Hinsichtlich der Verteilungsprinzipien lassen sich vor allem egalitäre und suffizienztheoretische Herangehensweisen unterscheiden. Schließlich werden in Bezug auf die Frage nach den relevanten „Akteuren der Gerechtigkeit“ für Kinder hauptsächlich die Familie bzw. die Eltern und der Staat diskutiert. (shrink)

In philosophy, there are two competitor views about the nature and value of childhood: The first is the traditional, deficiency, view, according to which children are mere unfinished adults. The second is a view that has recently become increasingly popular amongst philosophers, and according to which children, perhaps in virtue of their biological features, have special and valuable capacities, and, more generally, privileged access to some sources of value. This article provides a conceptual map of these views and their possible (...) interpretations, and notes their bearing on issues of population ethics and on the duties that we are owed during childhood. (shrink)

The question of the basis of human equality has recently gained increasing attention. However, much of the literature has focused on whether persons—understood as fully competent adults—have equal moral status, while relatively less attention has been devoted to the analysis of what grounds the equal moral status of those human beings who are not fully competent adults. This paper contributes to this debate by addressing the question of the equality of moral status between adults and children. Specifically, this paper has (...) three aims. First, it provides a conceptual map of this complex issue. Second, it argues that the challenges that have been raised against standard accounts of persons’ equal moral status are even more forceful when applied to the question of adults and children’s moral equality. Finally, it examines what a commitment to adults and children’s moral _inequality_ entails and what it does not, thereby showing that the justificatory role of the principle of moral equality is not as far-reaching as commonly assumed. (shrink)

This brief introduction frames a guest-edited collection of eleven contributed articles in the Journal of Global Ethics focused on global justice and childhood. On a general level, there is widespread consensus that there is a strong need for improvement in the lives of children around the globe. What global justice demands in this regard, however, has never been fleshed out in detail and there is only a little philosophical literature on this topic. Against this background, five aspects of the question (...) of global justice for children need to be addressed. First, one has to take into account the debate between cosmopolitanism and particularism, as well as the debate as to whether and to what extent individual, collective or institutional actors should be prioritized. Secondly, a theory of global justice for children must explain how the content of global justice for children is founded and justified, and what it comprises. Third, different principles can be used to assess global justice for children. Only two prominent alternatives are mentioned here: egalitarianism and sufficiency. Fourthly, the temporal dimension of global justice is of particular importance for children. Fifthly, an approach focusing on the examination of injustices is equally necessary. (shrink)

In recent years, many scholars have offered innovative accounts of social categories such as gender, race, and disability. By contrast, comparatively little work has been done on the category of children. The goal of our paper is to offer a new account of what children are. We start by discussing the two main accounts that have been put forward so far in the literature: naturalistic accounts and normative accounts. According to the former, to be a child is a matter of (...) possessing, or lacking, some ‘natural’ and ‘objective’ properties. According to the latter, to be a child is to possess a particular normative status. We argue that both naturalistic and normative accounts are subject to a variety of objections. We then propose our own social constructivist account. According to it, to be a child in any given society is to be regarded by the dominant ideology of that society as the target of a set of broadly paternalistic norms, in virtue of the possession of a cluster of natural properties such that, according to the dominant ideology of that society, it is justified to subject that individual to such norms. We conclude our paper by showing that our account meets the criteria of success for an account of what it is to be a child and by addressing some objections. (shrink)

Compared with children, adults are widely assumed to possess more mature moral understanding thus justifying deference to their moral authority and testimony. This paper examines philosophical discussions regarding this child-adult moral relation and its implications for moral education, particularly accounts suggesting that the moral status of children constitute grounds for treating them paternalistically. I contend that descriptions and justifications of this paternalistic attitude towards children are either unacceptably crude or mistaken. While certain instances justify paternalistic treatment towards children, in the (...) context of moral education the paternalistic attitude is largely irrelevant and even counterproductive. I make a case that children can readily meet minimal standards for moral understanding and engagement. Even when children have no final say, there is still a significant normative difference between deferring paternalistically to the adult's moral testimony and interacting with the child in moral conversation. These considered, I defend a social-contextualist account of moral education that incorporates a participatory (over a paternalistic) pedagogical attitude. Further, instead of portraying moral education in terms of stages (as argued by Kohlberg), moral education should be characterized more as a gradual appreciation of and sensitivity to normative demands that apply in various shared contexts and spheres of human concern. (shrink)

This article asks how people come to interpret themselves and others as autonomous given their multiple dependencies. We draw on a cross-case comparison of ethnographic studies with two populations for whom autonomy is both central and problematic: elderly patients in post-acute care, and young adults with disabilities in an independent living program. Analyzing the institutional efforts to make their clients “as independent as possible,” we find that staff members at each organization formulate autonomy as a temporal project through an ongoing (...) calibration of open futures, ideal pasts, and situational competence. Constantly adjusting and fine-tuning where in time autonomy “really” is, workers arrange present dependence so that the contours of the future remain open for their clients. In other words, they make use of temporal markers to produce recognizable autonomous subjects whose dependencies are momentary. Theorizing this temporal project enables us to see more clearly how all of us engage in the constant business of “doing” autonomy, and to better understand the role of institutions in producing autonomous selves. (shrink)

A teacher controls the release of materials in attempt to get students to appreciate the appeal of a popular yet wrongheaded argument before exposing them to its shortcomings. An instructor uses body language, tone of voice, and images in a Power-Point presentation that appeal to non-deliberative mechanisms in order to influence the students to pay more attention, maintain their focus, or to remember the content better. How do we draw the line between such innocuous educational practices and problematic manipulation, such (...) as deterring students from questioning certain views by instilling fear or shame? I help answering this question by illuminating one significant danger, which hasn’t been accurately identified in the relevant literature: the danger that manipulations in education—even when they’re non-deceptive and aim for the good of the students—will hinder the development or fulfillment of the students’ deliberative projects. (shrink)