Citations of work:

Martina Fürst (2014). A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.

Order:
Are we missing citations?

PhilPapers citations & references are currently in beta testing. We expect to add many more in the future.

Meanwhile, you can use our bibliography tool to import references for this or another work.

Or you can directly add citations for the above work:

Search for work by author name and title
Add directly by record ID

  1.  8
    Smells, Exemplars and Evidence: Smelling Knowledge of the External World.Keith Lehrer - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):611-631.
    Conscious experience of the sensation of smell provides exemplars of the sensation exhibiting to us what it is like. These exemplars of experiences can become vehicles or terms of representation and meaning. I call this exemplar representation and the process exemplarization. The notion of exemplarization is indebted to Hume and Goodman. I modify the notion here to apply to the sensation of smell. Exemplar representation differs from verbal representation because the exemplar, like a sample, exhibits what the represented items smell (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  95
    What Intentionality Is Like.Keith Lehrer - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):3-14.
    Intentionality is a mark of the mental, as Brentano (1874) noted. Any representation or conception of anything has the feature of intentionality, which informally put, is the feature of being about something that may or may not exist. Visual artworks are about something, whether something literal or abstract. The artwork is a mentalized physical object. Aesthetic experience of the artwork illustrates the nature of intentionality as we focus attention on the phenomenology of the sensory exemplar. This focus of attention on (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations