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  1. Emotional Depth, Ambivalence, and Affective Propulsion.Francisco Gallegos - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 3 (2):35-43.
    Unpleasant emotions can be strongly “propulsive,” spurring us to make changes to our situation, perspective, values, and commitments. These changes are often positive, even crucial to our pursuit of the good life. But under what conditions are unpleasant emotions strongly propulsive? I argue that the source of affective propulsion should not be located in the mere unpleasantness of a given emotion, but, rather, in the emotional context in which the emotion arises. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s comparative analysis of “shallow” and (...)
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  • Why moods change: their appropriateness and connection to beliefs.Tatyana A. Kostochka - 2021 - Synthese 198 (12):11399-11420.
    There are many more philosophical discussions of emotions than of moods. One key reason for this is that emotions are said to have a robust connection to beliefs while moods are said to lack that connection. I argue that this view, though prevalent, is incorrect. It is motivated by examples that are not representative of how moods typically change. Indeed, once we examine the notion of belief-responsiveness and look at a wider range of examples, we can see that moods are (...)
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  • A perceptual theory of moods.Mauro Rossi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7119-7147.
    The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...)
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  • Moods, Colored Lenses, and Emotional Disconnection: A Comment on Gallegos.Bartek Chomanski - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):625-632.
    In “Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods” Francisco Gallegos presents a challenge to a popular view about the phenomenology of being in a mood that he calls “perceptualism”. In this essay, I offer a partial defense of perceptualism about moods and argue that perceptualism and Gallegos’s preferred Heideggerian alternative need not be viewed as in opposition to one another.
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