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  1. Cognising With Others in the We-Mode: A Defence of ‘First-Person Plural’ Social Cognition.Joe Higgins - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    The theory of we-mode cognition seeks to expand our understanding of the cognition involved in joint action, and therein claims to explain how we can have non-theoretical and non-simulative access to the minds of others. A basic tenet of this theory is that each individual jointly intends to accomplish some outcome together, requiring the adoption of a “first-person plural perspective” that is neither strictly individualistic – in the sense that a we-mode state is enabled by the joint involvement of other (...)
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  • How Institutions Work in Shared Intentionality and ‘We-Mode’ Social Cognition.Jeppe Sinding Jensen - 2016 - Topoi 35 (1):301-312.
    The topics of social ontology, culture, and institutions constitute a problem complex that involves a broad range of human social and cultural cognitive capacities. We-mode social cognition and shared intentionality appear to be crucial in the formation of social ontology and social institutions, which, in turn, provide the bases for the social manifestation of collective and shared psychological attitudes. Humans have ‘hybrid minds’ that inhabit cultural–cognitive ecosystems. Essentially, these consist of social institutions and distributed cognition that afford the common grounds (...)
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