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Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification

In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. pp. 203--239 (2000)

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  1. Editorial: Schizophrenia and Other Pathologies of Self-Awareness Widening the Focus.Alexandre Billon - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):257-261.
  • What is It Like to Think About Oneself? De Se Thought and Phenomenal Intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):919-932.
    The topic of the paper is at the intersection of recent debates on de se thought and phenomenal intentionality. An interesting problem for phenomenal intentionality is the question of how to account for the intentional properties of de se thought-contents---i.e., thoughts about oneself as oneself. Here, I aim to describe and consider the significance of a phenomenological perspective on self-consciousness in its application to de se thought. I argue that having de se thoughts can be explained in terms of the (...)
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  • The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
    I can be aware of myself, and thereby come to know things about myself, in a variety of different ways. But is there some special way in which I—and only I—can learn about myself? Can I become aware of myself by introspecting? Do I somehow show up in my own conscious experiences? David Hume and most contemporary philosophers say no. They deny that the self shows up in experience. However, in this paper I appeal to research on schizophrenia—on thought insertion, (...)
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  • The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not (...)
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  • Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
    The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich (...)
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  • Real People and Virtual Bodies: How Disembodied Can Embodiment Be? [REVIEW]Monica Meijsing - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):443-461.
    It is widely accepted that embodiment is crucial for any self-aware agent. What is less obvious is whether the body has to be real, or whether a virtual body will do. In that case the notion of embodiment would be so attenuated as to be almost indistinguishable from disembodiment. In this article I concentrate on the notion of embodiment in human agents. Could we be disembodied, having no real body, as brains-in-a-vat with only a virtual body? Thought experiments alone will (...)
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  • Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.Shaun Gallagher & Francisco J. Varela - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):93-132.
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  • Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership.Timothy Lane - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.
    Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to searching (...)
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  • Which Immunity to Error?Joel Smith - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):273-83.
    A self-ascription is a thought or sentence in which a predicate is self-consciously ascribed to oneself. Self-ascriptions are best expressed using the first-person pronoun. Mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of mental predicates (predicates that designate mental properties), non-mental self-ascriptions are ascriptions to oneself of non-mental predicates (predicates that designate non-mental properties). It is often claimed that there is a range of self-ascriptions that are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM for short). What this means, (...)
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  • Reconstructing the Minimal Self, or How to Make Sense of Agency and Ownership.Sanneke de Haan & Leon de Bruin - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (3):373-396.
    We challenge Gallagher’s distinction between the sense of ownership and the sense of agency as two separable modalities of experience of the minimal self and argue that a careful investigation of the examples provided to promote this distinction in fact reveals that SO and SA are intimately related and modulate each other. We propose a way to differentiate between the various notions of SO and SA that are currently used interchangeably in the debate, and suggest a more gradual reading of (...)
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  • Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.
    Abstract: How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive (...)
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  • Schizophrenia and the Experience of Intersubjectivity as Threat.Paul Henry Lysaker, Jason K. Johannesen & John Timothy Lysaker - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):335-352.
    Many with schizophrenia find social interactions a profound and terrifying threat to their sense of self. To better understand this we draw upon dialogical models of the self that suggest that those with schizophrenia have difficulty sustaining dialogues among diverse aspects of self. Because interpersonal exchanges solicit and evoke movement among diverse aspects of self, many with schizophrenia may consequently find those exchanges overwhelming, resulting in despair, the sensation of fusion with another, and/or self-dissolution. In short, compromised dialogical capacities may (...)
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  • Thinking in the Cloud: The Cognitive Incorporation of Cloud-Based Technology.Robert Clowes - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):261-296.
    Technologies and artefacts have long played a role in the structure of human memory and our cognitive lives more generally. Recent years have seen an explosion in the production and use of a new regime of information technologies that might have powerful implications for our minds. Electronic-Memory, powerful, portable and wearable digital gadgetry and “the cloud” of ever-present data services allow us to record, store and access an ever-expanding range of information both about and of relevance to our lives. Already, (...)
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  • Can “I” Prevent You From Entering My Mind?Marc Champagne - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.
    Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive (...)
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  • Temporality and Psychopathology.Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):75-104.
    The paper first introduces the concept of implicit and explicit temporality, referring to time as pre-reflectively lived vs. consciously experienced. Implicit time is based on the constitutive synthesis of inner time consciousness on the one hand, and on the conative–affective dynamics of life on the other hand. Explicit time results from an interruption or negation of implicit time and unfolds itself in the dimensions of present, past and future. It is further shown that temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity are closely connected: (...)
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  • First-Person Perspective and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. Ontos Verlag. pp. 47--245.
  • On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
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  • Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency.Oliver Lukitsch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):955-975.
    Orthodox neurocognitive accounts of the bodily sense of agency suggest that the experience of agency arises when action-effects are anticipated accurately. In this paper, I argue that while successful anticipation is crucial for the sense of agency, the role of unsuccessful prediction has been neglected, and that inefficacy and uncertainty are no less central to the sense of agency. I will argue that this is reflected in the phenomenology of agency, which can be characterized both as the experience of efficacy (...)
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  • Cognitive Access and Cognitive Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Issues.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):188-204.
    The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...)
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  • “I Am the Original of All Objects”: Apperception and the Substantial Subject.Colin McLear - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (26):1-38.
    Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or “pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity for apperception, but on the (...)
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  • Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.
    It’s a familiar fact that there is something it is like to see red, eat chocolate or feel pain. More recently philosophers have insisted that in addition to this objectual phenomenology there is something it is like for me to eat chocolate, and this for-me-ness is no less there than the chocolatishness. Recognizing this subjective feature of consciousness helps shape certain theories of consciousness, introspection and the self. Though it does this heavy philosophical work, and it is supposed to be (...)
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  • Schizophrenia: A Disorder of Intersubjectivity : A Phenomenological Analysis.Van Duppen Zeno - unknown
    This dissertation combines two scientific disciplines and research fields, namely philosophy and psychopathology. Within such a wide field of investigation, two precise perspectives are to be adopted in this inquiry: stemming from the first field, the phenomenological perspective on subjectivity and intersubjectivity; stemming from the second, the psychopathological perspective on schizophrenia. The combination of philosophy and psychopathology has often proven fruitful. Moreover, the main motivation for such combined approach is justified by the strong belief that, when critically used, phenomenology offers (...)
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  • For-Me-Ness: What It is and What It is Not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology. Routledge. pp. 36-53.
    The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive of it.
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  • Thinking of Oneself as the Same.Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.
    What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own (...)
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  • Subjectivity as Self-Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4):88-111.
    Subjectivity is that feature of consciousness whereby there is something it is like for a subject to undergo an experience. One persistent challenge in the study of consciousness is to explain how subjectivity relates to, or arises from, purely physical brain processes. But, in order to address this challenge, it seems we must have a clear explanation of what subjectivity is in the first place. This has proven challenging in its own right. For the nature of subjectivity itself seems to (...)
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  • Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.
    According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...)
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  • The Case for the Comparator Model as an Explanation of the Sense of Agency and its Breakdowns.Glenn Carruthers - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):30-45.
    I compare Frith and colleagues’ influential comparator account of how the sense of agency is elicited to the multifactorial weighting model advocated by Synofzik and colleagues. I defend the comparator model from the common objection that the actual sensory consequences of action are not needed to elicit the sense of agency. I examine the comparator model’s ability to explain the performance of healthy subjects and those suffering from delusions of alien control on various self-attribution tasks. It transpires that the comparator (...)
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  • Agency in Schizophrenia From a Control Theory Viewpoint.Joëlle Proust - unknown
    Experience of agency in patients with schizophrenia involves an interesting dissociation; these patients demonstrate that one can have a thought or perform an action consciously without being conscious of thinking or acting as the motivated agent, author of that thought or of that action. This chapter examines several interesting accounts of this dissociation, and aims at showing how they can be generalized to thought insertion phenomena. It is argued that control theory allows such a generalization; three different comparators need to (...)
     
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  • Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):14-21.
    Although philosophical approaches to the self are diverse, several of them are relevant to cognitive science. First, the notion of a 'minimal self', a self devoid of temporal extension, is clarified by distinguishing between a sense of agency and a sense of ownership for action. To the extent that these senses are subject to failure in pathologies like schizophrenia, a neuropsychological model of schizophrenia may help to clarify the nature of the minimal self and its neurological underpinnings. Second, there is (...)
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  • Being Someone.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    My discussion will focus on what is arguable the main claim of Being No One: That no such things as selves exist in the world and that nobody ever was or had a self. In discussing to what extent Metzinger can be said to argue convincingly for this claim, I will also comment on his methodological use of pathology and briefly make some remarks vis-à-vis his understanding and criticism of phenomenology.
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  • Which-Object Misidentification.Max Seeger - 2014 - Abstracta 8 (1):75-82.
    James Pryor distinguishes two varieties of error through misidentification, de re misidentification and which-object misidentification, and two corresponding varieties of immunity to error through misidentification. This paper examines the relation between de re and which-object misidentification. I argue that the most natural reading of which-object misidentification, according to which the two kinds of error are mutually exclusive, is in tension with Pryor’s claim that immunity to which-object misidentification implies immunity to de re misidentification. To resolve the tension, Pryor should construe (...)
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  • Causation and the Awareness of Agency.Holly Andersen - unknown
    I criticize the tendency to address the causal role of awareness in agency in terms of the awareness of agency, and argue that this distorts the causal import of experimental results in significant ways. I illustrate, using the work of Shaun Gallagher, how the tendency to focus on the awareness of agency obscures the role of extrospective awareness by considering it only in terms of what it contributes to the awareness of agency. Focus on awareness of agency separates awareness from (...)
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  • On the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts: A Critique of Shaun Gallagher’s Neurophenomenological Account of Thought Insertion.Steve Schofield - 2006 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 6 (2):1-10.
    This paper explores the phenomenon of thought insertion, an experience reported by some schizophrenics where it is believed that other persons or forces are inserting thoughts into their minds. This relatively circumscribed symptom of schizophrenia raises difficult questions concerning our sense of agency for our thoughts. How is it possible that persons can think that their thoughts are not their own? Gallagher, drawing on Husserl’s early work on timeconsciousness, provides a subtle and sophisticated answer to this problem, suggesting that protention (...)
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  • Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness. [REVIEW]Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491.
    This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based account. We argue that an agent's narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible for action-production.
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  • Misattribution of Agency in Schizophrenia: An Exploration of Historical First-Person Accounts.Jpma Maes & A. R. Van Gool - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):191-202.
    This paper provides a concise description and discussion of bottom–up and top–down approaches to misattribution of agency in schizophrenia. It explores if first-person accounts of passivity phenomena can provide support for one of these approaches. The focus is on excerpts in which the writers specifically examine their experiences of external influence. None of the accounts provides arguments that fit easily with only one of the possible approaches, which is in line with current attempts to theoretical integration.
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  • Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control?Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Tim Bayne - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...)
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  • Pathologies in Narrative Structures.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60:203-224.
    Per Aage Brandt, commenting on a passage from Merlin Donald, suggests that there is ‘a narrative aesthetics built into our mind.’ In Donald, one can find an evolutionary account of this narrative aesthetics. If there is something like an innate narrative disposition, it is also surely the case that there is a process of development involved in narrative practice. In this paper I will assume something closer to the developmental account provided by Jerome Bruner in various works, and Dan Hutto's (...)
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  • Reply to Cole, Sacks and Waterman.Shaun Gallagher - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (5):167-168.
  • The Natural Philosophy of Agency.Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):347–357.
    A review of several theories and brain-imaging experiments shows that there is no consensus about how to define the sense of agency. In some cases the sense of agency is construed in terms of bodily movement or motor control, in others it is linked to the intentional aspect of action. For some theorists it is the product of higher-order cognitive processes, for others it is a feature of first-order phenomenal experience. In this article I propose a multiple aspects account of (...)
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  • The “Minimal Self” in Psychopathology: Re-Examining the Self-Disorders in the Schizophrenia Spectrum☆.Michel Cermolacce, Jean Naudin & Josef Parnas - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):703-714.
    The notion of minimal, basic, pre-reflective or core self is currently debated in the philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences and developmental psychology. However, it is not clear which experiential features such a self is believed to possess. Studying the schizophrenic experience may help exploring the following aspects of the minimal self: the notion of perspective and first person perspective, the ‘mineness’ of the phenomenal field, the questions of transparency, embodiment of point of view, and the issues of agency and ownership, (...)
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  • A Model of the Synchronic Self.Glenn Carruthers - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):533-550.
    The phenomenology of the self includes the sense of control over one’s body and mind, of being bounded in body and mind, of having perspective from within one’s body and mind and of being extended in time. I argue that this phenomenology is to be accounted for by a set of five dissociable cognitive capacities that compose the self. The focus of this paper is on the four capacities that compose the synchronic self: the agentiveB self, which underlies the sense (...)
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  • Having a Body Versus Moving Your Body: How Agency Structures Body-Ownership.Manos Tsakiris, Gita Prabhu & Patrick Haggard - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):423-432.
    We investigated how motor agency in the voluntary control of body movement influences body awareness. In the Rubber Hand Illusion , synchronous tactile stimulation of a rubber hand and the participant’s hand leads to a feeling of the rubber hand being incorporated in the participant’s own body. One quantifiable behavioural correlate of the illusion is an induced shift in the perceived location of the participant’s hand towards the rubber hand. Previous studies showed that the induced changes in body awareness are (...)
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  • On Agency and Body-Ownership: Phenomenological and Neurocognitive Reflections.Manos Tsakiris, Simone Schütz-Bosbach & Shaun Gallagher - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):645-660.
    The recent distinction between sense of agency and sense of body-ownership has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical interest. The respective contributions of central motor signals and peripheral afferent signals to these two varieties of body experience remain unknown. In the present review, we consider the methodological problems encountered in the empirical study of agency and body-ownership, and we then present a series of experiments that study the interplay between motor and sensory information. In particular, we focus on how multisensory signals (...)
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  • The Nature of Representation and the Experience of Oneself: A Critical Notice on Gottfried Vosgerau's Mental Representation and Self-Consciousness.Glenn Carruthers - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):411 - 425.
  • Kant and the Phenomenon of Inserted Thoughts.Garry Young - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):823-837.
    Phenomenally, we can distinguish between ownership of thought (introspective awareness) and authorship of thought (an awareness of the activity of thinking), a distinction prompted by the phenomenon of thought insertion. Does this require the independence of ownership and authorship at the structural level? By employing a Kantian approach to the question of ownership of thought, I argue that a thought being my thought is necessarily the outcome of the interdependence of these two component parts (ownership and authorship). In addition, whilst (...)
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  • On How a Child’s Awareness of Thinking Informs Explanations of Thought Insertion.Garry Young - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):848-862.
    Theories of thought insertion have tended to favour either the content of the putatively alien thought or some peculiarity within the experience itself as a means of explaining why the subject differentiates one thought from another in terms of personal ownership. There are even accounts that try to incorporate both of these characteristics. What all of these explanations share is the view that it is unexceptional for us to experience thought as our own. The aim of this paper is to (...)
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  • Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    -/- Human beings are conscious not only of the world around them but also of themselves: their activities, their bodies, and their mental lives. They are, that is, self-conscious (or, equivalently, self-aware). Self-consciousness can be understood as an awareness of oneself. But a self-conscious subject is not just aware of something that merely happens to be themselves, as one is if one sees an old photograph without realising that it is of oneself. Rather a self-conscious subject is aware of themselves (...)
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  • Does Consciousness Entail Subjectivity? The Puzzle of Thought Insertion.Alexandre Billon - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):291 - 314.
    (2013). Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion. Philosophical Psychology: Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 291-314. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.625117.
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