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Vittorio Gallese (2000). The Acting Subject: Toward the Neural Basis of Social Cognition.

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  1. Intersubjectivity in Perception.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - Continental Philosophy Review 41 (2):163-178.
    The embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended approaches to cognition explicate many important details for a phenomenology of perception, and are consistent with some of the traditional phenomenological analyses. Theorists working in these areas, however, often fail to provide an account of how intersubjectivity might relate to perception. This paper suggests some ways in which intersubjectivity is important for an adequate account of perception.
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    A Dual Mechanism Neural Framework for Social Understanding.Suresh D. Muthukumaraswamy & Blake W. Johnson - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):43 – 63.
    In this paper a theoretical framework is proposed for how the brain processes the information necessary for us to achieve the understanding of others that we experience in our social worlds. Our framework attempts to expand several previous approaches to more fully account for the various data on interpersonal understanding and to respond to theoretical critiques in this area. Specifically, we propose that social understanding must be achieved by at least two mechanisms in the brain that are capable of parallel (...)
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    The Emergence of a Shared Action Ontology: Building Blocks for a Theory.Thomas Metzinger & Vittorio Gallese - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):549-571.
    To have an ontology is to interpret a world. In this paper we argue that the brain, viewed as a representational system aimed at interpreting our world, possesses an ontology too. It creates primitives and makes existence assumptions. It decomposes target space in a way that exhibits a certain invariance, which in turn is functionally significant. We will investigate which are the functional regularities guiding this decomposition process, by answering to the following questions: What are the explicit and implicit assumptions (...)
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