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  1. Amending the Revisionist Model of the Capgras Delusion: A Further Argument for the Role of Patient Experience in Delusional Belief Formation.Garry Young - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):89-112.
  • Beliefs, Experiences and Misplaced Being: An Interactionist Account of Delusional Misidentification. [REVIEW]Garry Young - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):195-215.
    This paper contrasts an interactionist account of delusional misidentification with more traditional one- and two-stage models. Unlike the unidirectional nature of these more traditional models, in which the aetiology of the disorder is said to progress from a neurological disruption via an anomalous experience to a delusional belief, the interactionist account posits the interaction of top-down and bottom-up processes to better explain the maintenance of the delusional belief. In addition, it places a greater emphasis on the patient’s underlying phenomenal experience (...)
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  • Cognitive Phenomenology and Metacognitive Feelings.Santiago Arango‐Muñoz - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (2):247-262.
    The cognitive phenomenology thesis claims that “there is something it is like” to have cognitive states such as believ- ing, desiring, hoping, attending, and so on. In support of this idea, Goldman claimed that the tip-of-the-tongue phe- nomenon can be considered as a clear-cut instance of non- sensory cognitive phenomenology. This paper reviews Goldman's proposal and assesses whether the tip-of-the- tongue and other metacognitive feelings actually constitute an instance of cognitive phenomenology. The paper will show that psychological data cast doubt (...)
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  • Sad People Are More Accurate at Face Recognition Than Happy People.Peter J. Hills, Magda A. Werno & Michael B. Lewis - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1502-1517.
    Mood has varied effects on cognitive performance including the accuracy of face recognition . Three experiments are presented here that explored face recognition abilities in mood-induced participants. Experiment 1 demonstrated that happy-induced participants are less accurate and have a more conservative response bias than sad-induced participants in a face recognition task. Using a remember/know/guess procedure, Experiment 2 showed that sad-induced participants had more conscious recollections of faces than happy-induced participants. Additionally, sad-induced participants could recognise all faces accurately, whereas, happy- and (...)
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