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In Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper & J. D. Trout (eds.), The Philosophy of Science. MIT Press (1991)

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  1. Agent‐Based Computational Models and Generative Social Science.Joshua M. Epstein - 1999 - Complexity 4 (5):41-60.
  • A Priori Arguments for Reductionism.Jennifer Rea Susse - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Recently, several philosophers have argued that nonreductive physicalism is a false, unstable, and incoherent position. I argue that the position these critics are attacking is a straw one. To help explain why let us distinguish three issues about which nonreductive physicalists might plausibly be thought to have an opinion: ontological considerations about the types of things that exist at a world, issues involving the existence and nature of any dependency relationships between the types of things that exist at a world, (...)
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  • Can Analytical Sociology Do Without Methodological Individualism?Nathalie Bulle & Denis Phan - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (6):379-409.
    The explanatory power of structures in analytical sociologists’ agent-based models brings into question methodological individualism. We defend that from an explanatory point of view, the syntactic properties of models require semantic conditions of interpretation drawn from a conceptual research framework; in such a framework, social/relational structures have only partial, explanatory power ; and taking the explanation further through generative mechanism modeling necessitates calling upon methodological individualism’s generic framework of interpretation that relies on social actors’ rational capacity. According to this interpretive (...)
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  • Explanatory Unification and Natural Selection Explanations.Stefan Petkov, Wei Wang & Yi Lei - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (5):705-725.
    The debate between the dynamical and the statistical interpretations of natural selection is centred on the question of whether all explanations that employ the concepts of natural selection and drift are reducible to causal explanations. The proponents of the statistical interpretation answer negatively, but insist on the fact that selection/drift arguments are explanatory. However, they remain unclear on where the explanatory power comes from. The proponents of the dynamical interpretation answer positively and try to reduce selection/drift arguments to some of (...)
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