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Manuel García-Carpintero (2006). Two-Dimensionalism: A Neo-Fregean Interpretation.

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  1.  8
    Towards an Account of Epistemic Luck for Necessary Truths.James Henry Collin - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (4):483-504.
    Modal epistemologists parse modal conditions on knowledge in terms of metaphysical possibilities or ways the world might have been. This is problematic. Understanding modal conditions on knowledge this way has made modal epistemology, as currently worked out, unable to account for epistemic luck in the case of necessary truths, and unable to characterise widely discussed issues such as the problem of religious diversity and the perceived epistemological problem with knowledge of abstract objects. Moreover, there is reason to think that this (...)
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  2. Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and the Epistemic Argument.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):59 – 78.
    One of Kripke's fundamental objections to descriptivism was that the theory misclassifies certain _a posteriori_ propositions expressed by sentences involving names as _a priori_. Though nowadays very few philosophers would endorse a descriptivism of the sort that Kripke criticized, many find two-dimensional semantics attractive as a kind of successor theory. Because two-dimensionalism needn't be a form of descriptivism, it is not open to the epistemic argument as formulated by Kripke; but the most promising versions of two-dimensionalism are open to a (...)
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    Practice, Reasons, and the Agent's Point of View.George Pavlakos - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (1):74-94.
    Positivism, in its standard outlook, is normative contextualism: If legal reasons are content-independent, then their content may vary with the context or point of view. Despite several advantages vis-à-vis strong metaphysical conceptions of reasons, contextualism implies relativism, which may lead further to the fragmentation of the point of view of agency. In his Oxford Hart Lecture, Coleman put forward a fresh account of the moral semantics of legal content, one that lays claim to preserving the unity of agency while retaining (...)
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  4. Bivalence and What Is Said.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):167-190.
    On standard versions of supervaluationism, truth is equated with supertruth, and does not satisfy bivalence: some truth‐bearers are neither true nor false. In this paper I want to confront a well‐known worry about this, recently put by Wright as follows: ‘The downside... rightly emphasized by Williamson... is the implicit surrender of the T‐scheme’. I will argue that such a cost is not high: independently motivated philosophical distinctions support the surrender of the T‐scheme, and suggest acceptable approximations.
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