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Richard Gaskin (1995). Bradley's Regress, the Copula and the Unity of the Proposition.

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  1.  61
    Heidegger the Metaphysician: Modes‐of‐Being and Grundbegriffe.Howard D. Kelly - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):670-693.
    Modes-of-being figure centrally in Heidegger's masterwork Being and Time. Testimony to this is Heidegger's characterisation of two of his most celebrated enquiries—the Existential analytic and the Zeug analysis—as investigations into the respective modes-of-being of the entities concerned. Yet despite the importance of this concept, commentators disagree widely about what a mode-of-being is. In this paper, I systematically outline and defend a novel and exegetically grounded interpretation of this concept. Strongly opposed to Kantian readings, such as those advocated by Taylor Carman (...)
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    Modello riduzionistico o modello sistemico? Spunti per una riflessione.Aldo Stella - 2015 - Epistemologia 38 (1):81-98.
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  3.  51
    The Concept Horse with No Name.Robert Trueman - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1889-1906.
    In this paper I argue that Frege’s concept horse paradox is not easily avoided. I do so without appealing to Wright’s Reference Principle. I then use this result to show that Hale and Wright’s recent attempts to avoid this paradox by rejecting or otherwise defanging the Reference Principle are unsuccessful.
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  4.  31
    Peirce and the Unity of the Proposition. Bellucci - 2014 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (2):201.
    The problem of the unity of the proposition—what distinguishes a proposition from a mere list of constituents, so that the former is able to say something while the latter is not?—is as old as philosophy. It is evoked at the end of Plato’s Sophist, where the Stranger affirms that when one makes a statement “he does not merely give names, but he reaches a conclusion by combining (συμπλέκων) verbs with nouns” (262d, 2–3); and it is discussed by Aristotle in De (...)
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    Peirce and the Unity of the Proposition. Bellucci - 2014 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (2):201.
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  6.  79
    Is There a Problem About Propositional Unity?Howard Peacock - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):393-418.
    The problem of the ‘Unity of the Proposition’ is the problem of explaining the difference between a content-expressing declarative sentence and a ‘mere list’ of referents. The prevailing view is that such a problem is to be solved metaphysically, either by reducing our ontology to exclude propositions or universals, or by explaining how it is possible for a certain kind of complex entity – the ‘proposition’– to ‘unify’ its constituents. I argue that these metaphysical approaches cannot succeed; instead the only (...)
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  7. Bradley's Regress and Ungrounded Dependence Chains: A Reply to Cameron.Francesco Orilia - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):333-341.
    A version of Bradley's regress can be endorsed in an effort to address the problem of the unity of states of affairs or facts, thereby arriving at a doctrine that I have called fact infinitism . A consequence of it is the denial of the thesis, WF, that all chains of ontological dependence are well-founded or grounded. Cameron has recently rejected fact infinitism by arguing that WF, albeit not necessarily true, is however contingently true. Here fact infinitism is supported by (...)
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  8. Bradley's Regress and Ungrounded Dependence Chains: A Reply to Cameron.Francesco Orilia - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):333-341.
    A version of Bradley's regress can be endorsed in an effort to address the problem of the unity of states of affairs or facts, thereby arriving at a doctrine that I have called fact infinitism. A consequence of it is the denial of the thesis, WF, that all chains of ontological dependence are well‐founded or grounded. Cameron has recently rejected fact infinitism by arguing that WF, albeit not necessarily true, is however contingently true. Here fact infinitism is supported by showing (...)
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  9. Turtles All the Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):1-14.
    I address an intuition commonly endorsed by metaphysicians, that there must be a fundamental layer of reality, i.e., that chains of ontological dependence must terminate: there cannot be turtles all the way down. I discuss applications of this intuition with reference to Bradley’s regress, composition, realism about the mental and the cosmological argument. I discuss some arguments for the intui- tion, but argue that they are unconvincing. I conclude by making some suggestions for how the intuition should be argued for, (...)
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  10. Russell and the Unity of the Proposition.Graham Stevens - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):491–506.
    In this article I present a summary of Bertrand Russell's protracted attempts to solve the problem of the unity of the proposition, and explain the significance of the problem for Russell's philosophy. Unlike many other accounts which take the problem to be confined to Russell's early theories of propositional content, I argue that the problem (or variants of it) is a recurring theme throughout the whole of Russell's career.
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  11.  47
    Russell and Richard Brinkley on the Unity of the Proposition.Richard Gaskin - 1997 - History and Philosophy of Logic 18 (3):139-150.
    Between 1903 and 1918 Russell made a number of attempts to understand the unity of the proposition, but his attempts all foundered on his failure clearly to distinguish between different senses in which the relation R might be said to relate a and b in the proposition aRb: he failed to distinguish between the relation as truth-maker and the relation as unifier, and consequently committed himself again and again to the unacceptable consequence that only true propositions are genuinely unified. There (...)
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