Internal and External Questions. The most profound questions in ethics, social philosophy, and the philosophy of law are foundational; i.e., they are questions that call the entire framework of our ordinary evaluations into doubt in order to determine to what degree, if at all, that framework can be rationally defended. Such questions, called “external” by Rudolf Carnap, are currently dominating my own philosophical reflections and are forcing me to rethink a variety of positions I have in the past defended.

RESUMEN En el presente trabajo se aborda el proyecto político hobbesiano a la luz de las críticas realizadas por Kant en Teoría y praxis. Específicamente, se considera en detalle la objeción contra el Gobierno despótico, según la cual, el soberano sitúa la felicidad del pueblo como la principal finalidad del Estado y, por ello, acaba fomentando involuntariamente la rebelión. Al respecto, se sostendrá que el planteamiento de Hobbes en el Leviatán evade el foco de los reproches kantianos, justamente porque su (...) particular noción de felicidad impide que esta pueda ser constituida como el objetivo de la sociedad política. A su vez, se arguye que existe una sugestiva modificación terminológica con relación al De Cive, que lleva a considerar la posibilidad de que Hobbes haya prefigurado las críticas reseñadas. ABSTRACT The article addresses Hobbes' political project in the light of Kant's critique as set forth in Theory and Praxis. Specifically, it carries out a detailed discussion of the objection to despotic government, in which the sovereign establishes the happiness of the people as the main objective of the State and, consequently, ends up involuntarily fostering rebellion. In this respect, the article argues that Hobbes' formulation in Leviathan manages to circumvent Kant's reproaches precisely because its peculiar notion of happiness prevents it from being construed as the objective of political society. Likewise, we argue that there is a significant modification of terminology with respect to De Cive, which leads us to consider the possibility that Hobbes may have anticipated the objections discussed. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se aborda el proyecto político hobbesiano a la luz de las críticas realizadas por Kant en Teoría y praxis. Específicamente, se considera en detalle la objeción contra el Gobierno despótico, según la cual, el soberano sitúa la felicidad del pueblo como la principal finalidad del Estado y, por ello, acaba fomentando involuntariamente la rebelión. Al respecto, se sostendrá que el planteamiento de Hobbes en el Leviatán evade el foco de los reproches kantianos, justamente porque su particular (...) noción de felicidad impide que esta pueda ser constituida como el objetivo de la sociedad política. A su vez, se arguye que existe una sugestiva modificación terminológica con relación al De Cive, que lleva a considerar la posibilidad de que Hobbes haya prefigurado las críticas reseñadas. (shrink)

In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant's categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions that are necessary (...) to implement the derived principle. The analysis demonstrates the moral significance of the weak principle of universalization and its epistemic advantage over the categorical imperative. (shrink)

Nuclear War, edited by Fox and Groarke, is one of five recent anthologies containing new essays by philosophers on the subject of nuclear war. The Blake and Pole volumes, containing essays mainly by British philosophers, are distinguished by unrelenting and comprehensive opposition to British and American policy, and by the fame of the contributors, which include Anthony Kenny, Michael Dummett, and Bernard Williams. The Chicago volume contains a number of excellent papers by philosophers and the added bonus of nine papers (...) by established specialists in national security issues; it attempts, with partial success, to cover the full range of strategic nuclear options. The Cohen and Lee and the Fox and Groarke volumes consist largely of papers by strategic outsiders far from the centres of political power; the debate in these volumes is not between the principal versions of nuclear deterrence but between nuclear deterrence in any form and some scheme that transcends the present arrangement of mutually deterring superpowers. Of these last two books, Cohen and Lee contains relatively longer and more detailed essays. (shrink)

Difficult moral issues in economic life, such as evaluating the impact of hostile takeovers and plant relocations or determining the obligations of business to the environment, constitute the raison d'etre of business ethics. Yet, while the ultimate resolution of such issues clearly requires detailed, normative analysis, a shortcoming of business ethics is that to date it has failed to develop an adequate normative theory.1 The failing is especially acute when it results in an inability to provide a basis for fine-grained (...) analyses of issues. Both general moral theories and stakeholder theory seem incapable of expressing the moral complexity necessary to provide practical normative guidance for many business ethics contexts. (shrink)

InMorals by Agreement, David Gauthier (1986) argues that it is rational to intend to cooperate, even in single-play Prisoner's Dilemma games, provided (1) your co-player has a similar intention; (2) both intentions can be revealed to the other player. To this thesis four objections are made. (a) In a strategic decision the parameters on which the argument relies cannot be supposed to be given. (b) Of each pair ofa-symmetric intentions at least one is not rational. But it is impossible to (...) form symmetric intentions to cooperate conditionally. For the condition on which the decision depends cannot be fulfilled without deciding. (c) If one's intention has to be ascertained on the basis of information about one's past performance, it is straightforwardly rational to intend to cooperate, but there is no reason to do so in a single-play PD. (d) The argument cannot be extended ton-person games which are Gauthier's principal concern. (shrink)

Resumen: En este trabajo, presento e intento resolver un problema que la oposición de Kant al eudaimonismo podría plantear al segundo deber de virtud. Tras analizarlo, propondré que el deber de la felicidad ajena consigue disolver al menos uno de los obstáculos para alcanzar la felicidad en la Tierra. El motivo de esto es que el deber de promover los fines de los demás logra reubicar la felicidad hedónica en el plano de la moralidad, algo que la noción intelectual de (...) felicidad como componente del bien supremo no consigue hacer y en esto consiste el rol que el deber de la felicidad ajena cumple en el sistema ético kantiano.: The aim of this paper is to introduce and try to solve a problem Kant’s opposition to eudemonism could pose to the second duty of virtue. After analysing this problem, I hold that the duty to promote the happiness of others dissolves at least one of the obstacles one faces when striving to achieve one’s own happiness on Earth, which we naturally desire as finite rational beings. Unlike the intellectual notion of happiness implied by the concept of the highest good, the duty to promote the happiness of others places hedonic happiness within the realm of morality. This is, I propose, the fundamental role the second duty of virtue plays in Kant’s ethical system. (shrink)