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Dutch Book Arguments

In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press (2008)

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  1. Being Realist About Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind.Matteo Colombo, Lee Elkin & Stephan Hartmann - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach (...)
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  • A Dutch Book for CDT Thirders.Theodore Korzukhin - forthcoming - Synthese.
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  • A Probabilistic Analysis of Argument Cogency.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2016 - Synthese 195 (4):1715-1740.
    This paper offers a probabilistic treatment of the conditions for argument cogency as endorsed in informal logic: acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency. Treating a natural language argument as a reason-claim-complex, our analysis identifies content features of defeasible argument on which the RSA conditions depend, namely: change in the commitment to the reason, the reason’s sensitivity and selectivity to the claim, one’s prior commitment to the claim, and the contextually determined thresholds of acceptability for reasons and for claims. Results contrast with, and (...)
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  • Logical Ignorance and Logical Learning.Richard G. Pettigrew - forthcoming - Synthese:1-30.
    According to certain normative theories in epistemology, rationality requires us to be logically omniscient. Yet this prescription clashes with our ordinary judgments of rationality. How should we resolve this tension? In this paper, I focus particularly on the logical omniscience requirement in Bayesian epistemology. Building on a key insight by Ian Hacking (1967), I develop a version of Bayesianism that permits logical ignorance. This includes an account of the synchronic norms that govern a logically ignorant individual at any given time, (...)
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  • Expressivism, Normative Uncertainty, and Arguments for Probabilism.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
    I argue that in order to account for normative uncertainty, an expressivist theory of normative language and thought must accomplish two things: Firstly, it needs to find room in its framework for a gradable conative attitude, degrees of which can be interpreted as representing normative uncertainty. Secondly, it needs to defend appropriate rationality constraints pertaining to those graded attitudes. The first task – finding an appropriate graded attitude that can represent uncertainty – is not particularly problematic. I tackle the second (...)
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  • Probability and Nonclassical Logic.Robert Williams - 2016 - In Alan Hajek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The oxford handbook of probability and philosophy. Oxford university press.
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  • Grading Modal Judgement.Nate Charlow - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):769-807.
    This paper proposes a new model of graded modal judgment. It begins by problematizing the phenomenon: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is impossible to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgments of probability targeting epistemically modal propositions. This paper considers two alternative models, on which modal operators are non-proposition-forming: (1) Moss (2015), in which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgments of probability targeting a “proxy” proposition, belief in which would underwrite belief (...)
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  • Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):49-80.
    A handful of well-known arguments (the 'diachronic Dutch book arguments') rely upon theorems establishing that, in certain circumstances, you are immune from sure monetary loss (you are not 'diachronically Dutch bookable') if and only if you adopt the strategy of conditionalizing (or Jeffrey conditionalizing) on whatever evidence you happen to receive. These theorems require non-trivial assumptions about which evidence you might acquire---in the case of conditionalization, the assumption is that, if you might learn that e, then it is not the (...)
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  • Interpretations of Probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Belief Without Credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.
    One of the deepest ideological divides in contemporary epistemology concerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. A prominent consideration in favor of credence-based epistemology is the ease with which it appears to account for rational action. In contrast, cases with risky payoff structures threaten to break the link between rational belief and rational action. This threat poses a challenge to traditional epistemology, which maintains the theoretical prominence of belief. The core problem, we suggest, is that belief may not be (...)
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  • Modus Ponens and the Logic of Decision.Nate Charlow - manuscript
  • Do Bets Reveal Beliefs?Jean Baccelli - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3393-3419.
    This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...)
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  • A Dutch Book Theorem for Quantificational Credences.Benjamin Lennertz - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.
    In this paper, I present an argument for a rational norm involving a kind of credal attitude called a quantificational credence – the kind of attitude we can report by saying that Lucy thinks that each record in Schroeder’s collection is 5% likely to be scratched. I prove a result called a Dutch Book Theorem, which constitutes conditional support for the norm. Though Dutch Book Theorems exist for norms on ordinary and conditional credences, there is controversy about the epistemic significance (...)
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  • On de Finetti’s Instrumentalist Philosophy of Probability.Joseph Berkovitz - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):25.
    De Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjective school of probability. He held that probabilities are subjective, coherent degrees of expectation, and he argued that none of the objective interpretations of probability make sense. While his theory has been influential in science and philosophy, it has encountered various objections. I argue that these objections overlook central aspects of de Finetti’s philosophy of probability and are largely unfounded. I propose a new interpretation of de Finetti’s theory that highlights (...)
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  • Hybrid Vigor.Patricia Rich - 2018 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 11 (1):1-30.
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  • Incoherence Without Exploitability.Brian Hedden - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):482-495.
  • Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
    According to the traditional Bayesian view of credence, its structure is that of precise probability, its objects are descriptive propositions about the empirical world, and its dynamics are given by conditionalization. Each of the three essays that make up this thesis deals with a different variation on this traditional picture. The first variation replaces precise probability with sets of probabilities. The resulting imprecise Bayesianism is sometimes motivated on the grounds that our beliefs should not be more precise than the evidence (...)
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  • Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.
    Traditional procedures for rational updating fail when it comes to self-locating opinions, such as your credences about where you are and what time it is. This paper develops an updating procedure for rational agents with self-locating beliefs. In short, I argue that rational updating can be factored into two steps. The first step uses information you recall from your previous self to form a hypothetical credence distribution, and the second step changes this hypothetical distribution to reflect information you have genuinely (...)
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  • A Dutch Book Theorem and Converse Dutch Book Theorem for Kolmogorov Conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - unknown
    This paper discusses how to update one’s credences based on evidence that has initial probability 0. I advance a diachronic norm, Kolmogorov Conditionalization, that governs credal reallocation in many such learning scenarios. The norm is based upon Kolmogorov’s theory of conditional probability. I prove a Dutch book theorem and converse Dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov Conditionalization. The two theorems establish Kolmogorov Conditionalization as the unique credal reallocation rule that avoids a sure loss in the relevant learning scenarios.
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  • An Offer You Can't Refuse: Systematically Exploiting Utility-Maximisers with Malicious Gambles.Chalmers Adam - unknown
    Decision theory aims to provide mathematical analysis of which choice one should rationally make in a given situation. Our current decision theory norms have been very successful, however, several problems have proven vexing for standard decision theory. In this paper, I show that these problems all share a similar structure and identify a class of problems which decision theory overvalues. I demonstrate that agents who follow current standard decision theory can be exploited and have their preferences reordered if offered decision (...)
     
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  • Stakes and Beliefs.Brad Armendt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.
    The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant (...)
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  • Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.
    Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is false. In certain (...)
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  • Two Forms of Inconsistency in Quantum Foundations.Jeremy Steeger & Nicholas Teh - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Recently, there has been some discussion of how Dutch Book arguments might be used to demonstrate the rational incoherence of certain hidden variable models of quantum theory. In this paper, we argue that the 'form of inconsistency' underlying this alleged irrationality is deeply and comprehensively related to the more familiar 'inconsistency' phenomenon of contextuality. Our main result is that the hierarchy of contextuality due to Abramsky and Brandenburger corresponds to a hierarchy of additivity/convexity-violations which yields formal Dutch Books of different (...)
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  • The Bayesian Boom: Good Thing or Bad?Ulrike Hahn - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • Belief Without Credence.Katherine Rubin, Benjamin Jarvis & J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.
    One of the deepest ideological divides in contemporary epistemology concerns the relative importance of belief versus credence. A prominent consideration in favor of credence-based epistemology is the ease with which it appears to account for rational action. In contrast, cases with risky payoff structures threaten to break the link between rational belief and rational action. This threat poses a challenge to traditional epistemology, which maintains the theoretical prominence of belief. The core problem, we suggest, is that belief may not be (...)
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  • Dutch Book Arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.
    According to an increasingly popular epistemological view, people need outright beliefs in addition to credences to simplify their reasoning. Outright beliefs simplify reasoning by allowing thinkers to ignore small error probabilities. What is outright believed can change between contexts. It has been claimed that thinkers manage shifts in their outright beliefs and credences across contexts by an updating procedure resembling conditionalization, which I call pseudo-conditionalization (PC). But conditionalization is notoriously complicated. The claim that thinkers manage their beliefs via PC is (...)
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  • Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.
    This paper argues that several leading theories of subjunctive conditionals are incompatible with ordinary intuitions about what credences we ought to have in subjunctive conditionals. In short, our theory of subjunctives should intuitively display semantic humility, i.e. our semantic theory should deliver the truth conditions of sentences without pronouncing on whether those conditions actually obtain. In addition to describing intuitions about subjunctive conditionals, I argue that we can derive these ordinary intuitions from justified premises, and I answer a possible worry (...)
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  • Rationality of Belief Or: Why Savage’s Axioms Are Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Rationality. [REVIEW]Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):11-31.
    Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing (...)
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  • Satan, Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg: Decision Theory and Discontinuity at Infinity.Paul Bartha, John Barker & Alan Hájek - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):629-660.
    We examine a distinctive kind of problem for decision theory, involving what we call discontinuity at infinity. Roughly, it arises when an infinite sequence of choices, each apparently sanctioned by plausible principles, converges to a ‘limit choice’ whose utility is much lower than the limit approached by the utilities of the choices in the sequence. We give examples of this phenomenon, focusing on Arntzenius et al.’s Satan’s apple, and give a general characterization of it. In these examples, repeated dominance reasoning (...)
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  • Measuring the Overall Incoherence of Credence Functions.Julia Staffel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1467-1493.
    Many philosophers hold that the probability axioms constitute norms of rationality governing degrees of belief. This view, known as subjective Bayesianism, has been widely criticized for being too idealized. It is claimed that the norms on degrees of belief postulated by subjective Bayesianism cannot be followed by human agents, and hence have no normative force for beings like us. This problem is especially pressing since the standard framework of subjective Bayesianism only allows us to distinguish between two kinds of credence (...)
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  • The Interference Problem for the Betting Interpretation of Degrees of Belief.Lina Eriksson & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):809-830.
    The paper’s target is the historically influential betting interpretation of subjective probabilities due to Ramsey and de Finetti. While there are several classical and well-known objections to this interpretation, the paper focuses on just one fundamental problem: There is a sense in which degrees of belief cannot be interpreted as betting rates. The reasons differ in different cases, but there’s one crucial feature that all these cases have in common: The agent’s degree of belief in a proposition A does not (...)
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  • Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), MIT Handbook of Rationality. MIT Press.
    This chapter is a philosophical survey of some leading approaches in formal epistemology in the so-called ‘Bayesian’ tradition. According to them, a rational agent’s degrees of belief—credences—at a time are representable with probability functions. We also canvas various further putative ‘synchronic’ rationality norms on credences. We then consider ‘diachronic’ norms that are thought to constrain how credences should respond to evidence. We discuss some of the main lines of recent debate, and conclude with some prospects for future research.
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  • Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):665-683.
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  • Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.
    Recently many have argued that agents must sometimes have credences that are imprecise, represented by a set of probability measures. But opponents claim that fans of imprecise credences cannot provide a decision theory that protects agents who follow it from foregoing sure money. In particular, agents with imprecise credences appear doomed to act irrationally in diachronic cases, where they are called to make decisions at earlier and later times. I respond to this claim on behalf of imprecise credence fans. Once (...)
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  • Total Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Permissiveness.Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):12-38.
    This article explores the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and epistemic permissiveness. If the suggestion that all epistemic notions are interest-relative is viable , then it seems that a certain species of epistemic permissivism must be viable as well. For, if all epistemic notions are interest relative then, sometimes, parties in paradigmatic cases of shared evidence can be maximally rational in forming competing basic doxastic attitudes towards the same proposition. However, I argue that this total pragmatic encroachment is not tenable, and, (...)
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  • Should I Pretend I'm Perfect?Julia Staffel - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):301-324.
    Ideal agents are role models whose perfection in some normative domain we try to approximate. But which form should this striving take? It is well known that following ideal rules of practical reasoning can have disastrous results for non-ideal agents. Yet, this issue has not been explored with respect to rules of theoretical reasoning. I show how we can extend Bayesian models of ideally rational agents in order to pose and answer the question of whether non-ideal agents should form new (...)
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