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Non-analytic conceptual knowledge

Mind 105 (418):249-268 (1996)

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  1. Conhecimento A Priori.Célia Teixeira - 2014 - In João Branquinho & Ricardo Santos (eds.), Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Lisbon, Portugal: pp. 1-33.
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  • Analiticidade.Célia Teixeira - 2015 - In João Branquinho & Ricardo Santos (eds.), Compêndio em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica. Lisbon, Portugal: pp. 1-21.
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  • Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
    Given the fundamental role that concepts play in theories of cognition, philosophers and cognitive scientists have a common interest in concepts. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of controversy regarding what kinds of things concepts are, how they are structured, and how they are acquired. This chapter offers a detailed high-level overview and critical evaluation of the main theories of concepts and their motivations. Taking into account the various challenges that each theory faces, the chapter also presents a novel approach (...)
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  • Understanding the Revisability Thesis.Célia Teixeira - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):180-195.
    W. V. Quine famously claimed that no statement is immune to revision. This thesis has had a profound impact on twentieth century philosophy, and it still occupies centre stage in many contemporary debates. However, despite its importance it is not clear how it should be interpreted. I show that the thesis is in fact ambiguous between three substantially different theses. I illustrate the importance of clarifying it by assessing its use in the debate against the existence of a priori knowledge. (...)
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  • Should We Trust Our Intuitions? Deflationary Accounts of the Analytic Data.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):299-323.
    At least since W. V. O. Quine's famous critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction, philosophers have been deeply divided over whether there are any analytic truths. One line of thought suggests that the simple fact that people have ' intuitions of analyticity' might provide an independent argument for analyticities. If defenders of analyticity can explain these intuitions and opponents cannot, then perhaps there are analyticities after all. We argue that opponents of analyticity have some unexpected resources for explaining these intuitions and (...)
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  • How Not to Reject the a Priori.Célia Teixeira - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):365-384.
    According to one influential argument against the existence of a priori knowledge, there is no a priori knowledge because (i) no belief is immune to revision, and (ii) if there were a priori knowledge, at least some beliefs would be unrevisable. The aim of this paper is to examine and reject this argument against the a priori. It is given special attention to premise (ii) of the argument. Philip Kitcher has famously defended a version of this premise. His arguments are (...)
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