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Ronald N. Giere (1970). An Orthodox Statistical Resolution of the Paradox of Confirmation.

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  1.  46
    Carnap and Achinstein on Evidence.Frederick M. Kronz - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):151 - 167.
    Two notions of evidence are focused on in this essay, Carnap's positive-relevance notion of evidence (1962, pp. 462 ff.), and Achinstein's notion of potential evidence (1978; and 1983, pp. 322–350). Achinstein creates several interesting examples in his attempt to find faults in Carnap's notion of evidence; his motive, ultimately, is to impel us towards potential evidence. The purpose of this essay is to show that positive relevance is significantly more promising than potential evidence with respect to capturing the scientific sense (...)
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    Reviews. [REVIEW]Ilkka Niiniluoto & Ronald Giere - 1975 - Synthese 31 (1):161-199.
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    Inductivism and Probabilism.Roger Rosenkrantz - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2-3):167 - 205.
    I I set out my view that all inference is essentially deductive and pinpoint what I take to be the major shortcomings of the induction rule.II The import of data depends on the probability model of the experiment, a dependence ignored by the induction rule. Inductivists admit background knowledge must be taken into account but never spell out how this is to be done. As I see it, that is the problem of induction.III The induction rule, far from providing a (...)
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