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Agreements, conventions, and language

Synthese 54 (3):375 - 407 (1983)

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  1. Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.
    The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an (...)
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  • Explaining Culture. A Constraint-Based Approach.Acosta Calvo Josu - 2017 - Dissertation, Universidad Del Pais Vasco
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  • Language Conventions Made Simple.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):161-180.
    At the start of Convention (1969) Lewis says that it is "a platitude that language is ruled by convention" and that he proposes to give us "an analysis of convention in its full generality, including tacit convention not created by agreement." Almost no clause, however, of Lewis's analysis has withstood the barrage of counter examples over the years,1 and a glance at the big dictionary suggests why, for there are a dozen different senses listed there. Left unfettered, convention wanders freely (...)
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  • Agreements, Undertakings, and Practical Reason.Oliver Black - 2004 - Legal Theory 10 (2):77-95.
    This paper argues for two models of agreement which develop the idea that there is an agreement where one party gives a conditional undertaking and the other responds with an unconditional undertaking. The models accommodate plausible justifications for making and complying with agreements.
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  • Game Theory Without Rationality.J. Maynard Smith - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):117.
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  • When Does Game Theory Model Reality?George C. Williams - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):117.
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  • Asymmetric Games and the Endowment Effect.Richard H. Thaler - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):117.
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  • It's All a Game.J. E. R. Staddon - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):116.
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  • Gaps in Harley's Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of “Tit for Tat”.Reinhard Selten & Peter Hammerstein - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):115.
  • Game Theory Without Rationality.Anatol Rapoport - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):114.
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  • Learning Rules and Learning Rules.Howard Rachlin - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):113.
  • Is Matching Behavior an Evolutionary Inevitability?James E. Mazur - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):112.
  • Evolutionary Game Theory: Suddenly It's 1960!John C. Malone - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):112.
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  • Is It Possible to Be Optimal?A. W. Logue - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):111.
  • Optimization and Flexibility.S. E. G. Lea & S. M. Dow - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):110.
  • Optimal Learning Rules.John R. Krebs & Alejandro Kacelnik - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):109.
  • Development and the Origin of Behavioral Strategies.Timothy D. Johnston - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):108.
  • Evolutionary and Behavioral Stability.R. J. Herrnstein & William Vaughan - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):107.
  • Evolutionary Game Theory and Human Social Structures.Thomas J. Fararo - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):104.
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  • Coordination Problems and the Evolution of Behavior.Margaret Gilbert - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):106.
  • Random Strategies and “Ran-Dumb” Behavior.Hillel J. Einhorn - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):104.
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  • Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Emotional Calculus.D. Caroline Blanchard, Robert J. Blanchard & Kevin J. Flannelly - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):103.
  • The Contribution of Game Theory to Animal Behavior.George W. Barlow & Thelma E. Rowell - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):101.
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  • Game Theory and the Evolution of Behaviour.J. Maynard Smith - 1984 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1):95.
  • Social Convention Revisited.Margaret Gilbert - 2008 - Topoi (1-2):5-16.
    This article will compare and contrast two very different accounts of convention: the game-theoretical account of Lewis in Convention, and the account initially proposed by Margaret Gilbert (the present author) in chapter six of On Social Facts, and further elaborated here. Gilbert’s account is not a variant of Lewis’s. It was arrived at in part as the result of a detailed critique of Lewis’s account in relation to a central everyday concept of a social convention. An account of convention need (...)
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  • Rationalising Conventions.Seumas Miller - 1990 - Synthese 84 (1):23 - 41.
    Conformity by an agent to a convention to which the agent is a party is rational only if the agent prefers to conform given the other parties conform and believes the others will conform. But this justification is inadequate; what, for example, is the justification for this belief? The required rational justification requires recourse to (a) preferences for general conformity (as opposed to merely conditional preferences for one's own conformity) and (b) procedures. An agent adopts a procedure when he chooses (...)
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  • Rationality, Coordination, and Convention.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Synthese 84 (1):1 - 21.
    Philosophers using game-theoretical models of human interactions have, I argue, often overestimated what sheer rationality can achieve. (References are made to David Gauthier, David Lewis, and others.) In particular I argue that in coordination problems rational agents will not necessarily reach a unique outcome that is most preferred by all, nor a unique 'coordination equilibrium' (Lewis), nor a unique Nash equilibrium. Nor are things helped by the addition of a successful precedent, or by common knowledge of generally accepted personal principles. (...)
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  • Social Habits and Enlightened Cooperation: Do Humans Measure Up to Lewis Conventions? [REVIEW]Eike Von Savigny - 1985 - Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):79 - 96.
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  • Conventions and Social Institutions.Paul Weirich - 1989 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 27 (4):599-618.
    This essay examines views of convention advanced by David Lewis and Margaret Gilbert.
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  • A Difference of Some Consequence Between Conventions and Rules.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2008 - Topoi 27 (1-2):87-99.
    Lewis’s view of the way conventions are passed on may have some especially interesting consequences for the study of language. I’ll start by briefly discussing agreements and disagreements that I have with Lewis’s general views on conventions and then turn to how linguistic conventions spread. I’ll compare views of main stream generative linguistics, in particular, Chomsky’s views on how syntactic forms are passed on, with the sort of view of language acquisition and language change advocated by usage-based or construction grammars, (...)
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  • Social Habits and Enlightened Cooperation: Do Humans Measure Up to Lewis Conventions? [REVIEW]Eike Savigny - 1985 - Erkenntnis 22 (1-3):79-96.