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  1. The Set-Theoretic Multiverse.Joel David Hamkins - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (3):416-449.
    The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the enormous range of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe (...)
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  • The Modal Logic of Set-Theoretic Potentialism and the Potentialist Maximality Principles.Joel David Hamkins & Øystein Linnebo - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (1):1-35.
    We analyze the precise modal commitments of several natural varieties of set-theoretic potentialism, using tools we develop for a general model-theoretic account of potentialism, building on those of Hamkins, Leibman and Löwe [14], including the use of buttons, switches, dials and ratchets. Among the potentialist conceptions we consider are: rank potentialism, Grothendieck–Zermelo potentialism, transitive-set potentialism, forcing potentialism, countable-transitive-model potentialism, countable-model potentialism, and others. In each case, we identify lower bounds for the modal validities, which are generally either S4.2 or S4.3, (...)
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  • Bi-Interpretation in Weak Set Theories.Alfredo Roque Freire & Joel David Hamkins - 2021 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 86 (2):609-634.
    In contrast to the robust mutual interpretability phenomenon in set theory, Ali Enayat proved that bi-interpretation is absent: distinct theories extending ZF are never bi-interpretable and models of ZF are bi-interpretable only when they are isomorphic. Nevertheless, for natural weaker set theories, we prove, including Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory $\mathrm {ZFC}^{-}$ without power set and Zermelo set theory Z, there are nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation. Specifically, there are well-founded models of $\mathrm {ZFC}^{-}$ that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic—even $\langle H_{\omega _1},\in (...)
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  • Universism and Extensions of V.Carolin Antos, Neil Barton & Sy-David Friedman - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-50.
    A central area of current philosophical debate in the foundations of mathematics concerns whether or not there is a single, maximal, universe of set theory. Universists maintain that there is such a universe, while Multiversists argue that there are many universes, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Often model-theoretic constructions that add sets to models are cited as evidence in favour of the latter. This paper informs this debate by developing a way for a Universist to interpret talk that (...)
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  • Зеркало Клио: Метафизическое Постижение Истории.Алексей Владиславович Халапсис - 2017 - Днипро, Днепропетровская область, Украина, 49000:
    В монографии представлены несколько смысловых блоков, связанных с восприятием и интерпретацией человеком исторического бытия. Ранние греческие мыслители пытались получить доступ к исходникам (началам) бытия, и эти интенции легли в основу научного знания, а также привели к появлению метафизики. В классической (и в неклассической) метафизике за основу была принята догма Пифагора и Платона о неизменности подлинной реальности, из чего следовало отрицание бытийного характера времени. Автор монографии отказывается от этой догмы и предлагает стратегию обновления метафизики и перехода ее к новому — постнеклассическому (...)
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  • Naive Infinitism: The Case for an Inconsistency Approach to Infinite Collections.Toby Meadows - unknown
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  • Models as Universes.Brice Halimi - 2017 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 58 (1):47-78.
    Kreisel’s set-theoretic problem is the problem as to whether any logical consequence of ZFC is ensured to be true. Kreisel and Boolos both proposed an answer, taking truth to mean truth in the background set-theoretic universe. This article advocates another answer, which lies at the level of models of set theory, so that truth remains the usual semantic notion. The article is divided into three parts. It first analyzes Kreisel’s set-theoretic problem and proposes one way in which any model of (...)
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  • Naive Infinitism: The Case for an Inconsistency Approach to Infinite Collections.Toby Meadows - 2015 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (1):191-212.
    This paper expands upon a way in which we might rationally doubt that there are multiple sizes of infinity. The argument draws its inspiration from recent work in the philosophy of truth and philosophy of set theory. More specifically, elements of contextualist theories of truth and multiverse accounts of set theory are brought together in an effort to make sense of Cantor’s troubling theorem. The resultant theory provides an alternative philosophical perspective on the transfinite, but has limited impact on everyday (...)
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  • WHAT CAN A CATEGORICITY THEOREM TELL US?Toby Meadows - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic (3):524-544.
    f The purpose of this paper is to investigate categoricity arguments conducted in second order logic and the philosophical conclusions that can be drawn from them. We provide a way of seeing this result, so to speak, through a first order lens divested of its second order garb. Our purpose is to draw into sharper relief exactly what is involved in this kind of categoricity proof and to highlight the fact that we should be reserved before drawing powerful philosophical conclusions (...)
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