Artificial devices that functionally replace internal organs are likely to be more common in the future. They are becoming more and more technologically feasible, increases in chronic diseases that can compromise various organs are anticipated, and donor organs will remain necessarily limited. More people in the future may have bodies that are partly nonorganic. How might artificial organs affect how we experience and conceptualize our bodies and how we understand the relation of the body to the experiencing, acting subject, or (...) self? Here, I focus on artificial heart devices (AHDs), including total artificial hearts (TAHs) and ventricular assist devices (VADs). While other devices, such as pacemakers and implantable cardiac defibrillators, assist the heart, I focus on devices that replace rather than assist organic function. AHDs, I argue, may have two opposing effects. On the one hand, having an AHD could alter experience, seemingly confirming that selves are shaped by the specifics of embodiment. On the other hand, AHDs are likely to encourage people to regard bodies as machines that are separable from the self. AHDs thus both confirm and undermine a body-self dualism. People with these devices may come to regard their bodies as machinelike even while having an artificial part alters their subjective experience. (shrink)

It has been argued that organs should be treated as individual tradable property like other material possessions and assets, on the basis that this would promote individual freedom and increase efficiency in addressing the shortage of organs for transplantation. If organs are to be treated as property, should they be inheritable? This paper seeks to contribute to the idea of organs as inheritable property by providing a defence of a default of the family of a dead person as inheritors of (...) transplantable organs. In the course of discussion, various succession rules for organs and their justifications will be suggested. We then consider two objections to organs as inheritable property. Our intention here is to provoke further thought on whether ownership of one's body parts should be assimilated to property ownership. (shrink)

Ownership of the body, its organs, tissues, marrow, fluids, secretions, and other component parts and products must always be contested, for what appears to belong to the individual may instead be turned into property at the expense of the individual and to the benefit of the social collectivity. Legal discourse relies upon and supports scientific discourse. Both are the product and the producer of utilitarian commercial interests. Collectively, they displace the individual self with a ‘body’ of social interest, encouraging entrepreneurship (...) over the interests of the individual, and quieting social and philosophical discussions concerning self and its location. (shrink)

Opposition to `ownership' of cells and tissues often depends on arguments about the special or sacred nature of human bodies and other living things. Such arguments are not very helpful in dealing with the patenting of DNA fragments. Two arguments undergird support for patenting: the notion that an author has a `right' to an invention resulting from his/her labor, and the utilitarian argument that patents are needed to support medical inventiveness. The labor theory of ownership rights is subject to critique, (...) though it may still have enduring value. The more important argument is that deriving from the common good. If patents on DNA are supported on the basis of their contributions to the common good, then they can also be limited based on considerations of the common good. (shrink)

Opposition to `ownership' of cells and tissues often depends on arguments about the special or sacred nature of human bodies and other living things. Such arguments are not very helpful in dealing with the patenting of DNA fragments. Two arguments undergird support for patenting: the notion that an author has a `right' to an invention resulting from his/her labor, and the utilitarian argument that patents are needed to support medical inventiveness. The labor theory of ownership rights is subject to critique, (...) though it may still have enduring value. The more important argument is that deriving from the common good. If patents on DNA are supported on the basis of their contributions to the common good, then they can also be limited based on considerations of the common good. (shrink)

Much international debate over access to medicines focuses on whether patent law accords with international human rights law. This article argues that this is the wrong question to ask. Following an analysis of both patent and human rights law, this article suggests that the better approach is to focus on national debates over the best calibration of patent law to achieve national objectives.

Patents and free trade make strange bedfellows. For most of their history, patents have been instruments deployed to resist trade with other countries, not to enhance it. Whether one looks at Venetian laws that punished citizens who practiced local crafts outside the city, the Mercantilist uses to which patents were put in Elizabethan England, or the cartels of the 19th and 20th centuries created on a foundation of interlocking patent rights, patents have had a distinctly protectionist function. It is thus (...) ironic that it is intellectual property rights in general, and patents in particular, that have been held up in recent years as the poster child of much that is wrong with globalization and free trade. Nowhere is this more so than in debates concerning international human rights law and patents, in particular the position that patents violate an international right to health. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Does genetic relatedness define who is a mother or father and who incurs obligations towards or entitlements over children? While once the answer to this question may have been obvious, advances in reproductive technologies have complicated our understanding of what makes a parent. In a recent publication Bayne and Kolers argue for a pluralistic account of parenthood on the basis that genetic derivation, gestation, extended custody and sometimes intention to parent are sufficient (but not necessary) grounds for parenthood.1 Bayne (...) and Kolers further suggest that definitions of parenthood are underpinned by the assumption that ‘being causally implicated in the creation of a child is the key basis for being its parent’.2 This paper examines the claim that genetic relatedness is sufficient grounds for parenthood based on a causal connection between genetic parents and their offspring. I argue that parental obligations are about moral responsibility and not causal responsibility because we are not morally accountable for every consequence to which we causally contribute. My account includes the conditions generally held to apply to moral responsibility, i.e. freedom and foreseeability. I argue that parental responsibilities are generated whenever the birth of a child is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of voluntary actions. I consider the implications of this account for third parties involved in reproductive technologies. I argue that under some conditions the obligations generated by freely and foreseeably causing a child to exist can be justifiably transferred to others. (shrink)

There is an urgent need for reconstructing models of property to make them more women-friendly. However, we need not start from scratch: both ‘canonical’ and feminist authors can sometimes provide concepts which we can refine and apply towards women’s propertylessness. This paper looks in particular at women’s alienation from their reproductive labour, building on Marx and Delphy. Developing an economic and political rather than a psychological reading of alienation, it then considers how the refined and revised concept can be applied (...) to concrete examples in global justice for women: in particular, the commercialisation of embryonic and fetal tissue in the new stem cell technologies. (shrink)

As the sciences of biotechnology, synthetic biology, and nanotechnology develop, questions about liability for harms caused by self-replicating inventions will arise increasingly often. Although negligence, nuisance, and other torts may be relevant in such circumstances, trespass may be the more appropriate cause of action. First, the author explores doctrinal hurdles facing plaintiffs alleging biotrespass. To overcome concerns about the metaphysicality of molecular biotrespass, the author draws analogies to “cybertrespass.” To confront the problem of suing patent licensors for the actions of (...) their licensees, the author makes reference to principles of landlord-tenant law. Well-established laws concerning wandering animals shed light on the policies underlying biotrespass. In the second part, the author examines such policies in further detail and considers the purpose of transporting property metaphors into bio/nanospace. The article concludes that biotrespass can be a viable cause of action, if crafted carefully and understood properly. (shrink)