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Irwin Goldstein (2000). Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States.

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  1.  30
    Unnatural Epistemology.John D. Greenwood - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (2):132-149.
    ‘Naturalized’ philosophers of mind regularly appeal to the empirical psychological literature in support of the ‘theory-theory’ account of the natural epistemology of mental state ascription (to self and others). It is argued that such appeals are not philosophically neutral, but in fact presuppose the theory-theory account of mental state ascription. It is suggested that a possible explanation of the popularity of the theory-theory account is that it is generally assumed that alternative accounts in terms of introspection (and simulation) presuppose a (...)
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    Neural Materialism, Pain's Badness, andA PosterioriIdentities.Irwin Goldstein - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):261-273.
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