So-called “social egg freezing” allows a woman to retain the possibility of trying to have a child with her own oocytes later in life, even after having become infertile in the strict sense of the word.There is a debate about whether it is morally permissible at all, the extent to which it should be permitted legally or even supported, and whether it is ethically desirable. This paper contributes some thoughts to the issue of ethical desirability. More precisely it deals with (...) the question of whether there is any valuable argument to be made on the basis of the idea of life phases and normative expectations related to them. So the question is: Is there a right time in life to have a child, and does this speak against or in favor of social freezing? This question is answered in three steps. First, I will give an overview of ethical arguments that are mostly put forward in favor or against the use of social egg freezing and show that and why the question of life phases should be taken into account. Second, I will sketch what I understand by phases of life, more precisely, what I understand by normatively conceptualized life stages, that are to be distinguished from other kinds of life phases, and how they relate to a good life. Third, I will present two arguments that rely on the idea of life stages and speak against social egg freezing. However, I will criticize them and instead show that from the perspective of life stages nothing speaks against using the technique within certain limits. (shrink)

The initial cause of Cotard delusion is pervasive dyshomeostasis (dysregulation of basic bodily function).This explanation draws on interoceptive active inference account of self‐representation. In this framework, the self is an hierarchical predictive model made by the brain to facilitate homeostatic regulation. The account I provide is an alternative to two factor accounts of the Cotard delusion that treat depersonalisation experience as the first factor in genesis of the Cotard delusion. I argue that depersonalisation experience and the Cotard delusion are produced (...) by different breakdowns in the process of self‐modelling. (shrink)

This article discusses two views associated with narrative conceptions of the self. The first view asserts that our whole life is reasonably regarded as a single unit of meaning. A prominent strand of the philosophical narrative account of the self is the representative of this view. The second view—which has currency beyond the confines of the philosophical narrative account—is that the meaning of a life story is dependent on what happens at the end of it. The article argues that the (...) connection between these two views is more tentative than often supposed: philosophical narrativists that see life as a single unit of value and meaning nonetheless provide grounds for arguing that the end of life is not the best and may be a particularly bad time to approach and intervene in the matter of how well one's life as a whole has gone. (shrink)