The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 2, Page 20-22, February 2012.

Ten years ago, Megan Shinal sought the care of neurosurgeon Steven Toms for the surgical treatment of a recurrent nonmalignant tumor in the pituitary region of her brain. In their twenty-minute meeting, Shinal did not make a final decision about which surgical approach she wished to pursue. Subsequently, she spoke with Tom's physician assistant once by phone and once in person, when she signed the consent form, which did not appear to designate which surgical approach she had chosen. During the (...) operation—a total resection—Toms perforated Shinal's carotid artery, resulting in hemorrhage, stroke, brain injury, and partial blindness. The jury found that Toms had fulfilled his informed-consent obligations prior to performing the resection; however, in June 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania overturned the decision, relying on the Pennsylvania Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act. The court found that the language of the act is unambiguous in its requirement that “a physician's duty to provide information to a patient sufficient to obtain her informed consent is non-delegable.” Presumably, this rule of nondelegation applies beyond the surgical theater to other major treatment decisions. And it is unclear whether it applies to other professionals in a subordinate position to the treating physician, such as residents and fellows. (shrink)

Placebos are arguably the most commonly prescribed drug, across cultures and throughout history. Nevertheless, today many would consider their use in the clinic unethical, since placebo treatment involves deception and the violation of patients’ autonomy. We examine the placebo's definition and its clinical efficacy from a biopsychosocial perspective, and argue that the intentional use of the placebo and placebo effect, in certain circumstances and under several conditions, may be morally acceptable. We highlight the role of a virtue-based ethical orientation and (...) its implications for the beneficent use of the placebo. In addition, the definitions of lying and deception are discussed, clarified and applied to the clinical placebo dilemma. Lastly, we suggest that concerns about patient autonomy, when invoked as a further argument against administering placebos, are extended beyond their reasonable and coherent application. (shrink)

Extreme intentional and deliberate violence against innocent people, including acts of terror and school shootings, poses various ethical challenges, some related to the practice of medicine. We discuss a dilemma relating to deliberate violence, in this case the aftermath of a terror attack, in which there are multiple injured individuals, including the terror perpetrator. Normally, the priority of medical treatment is determined based on need. However, in the case of a terror attack, there is reason to question this. Should the (...) perpetrator of extreme violence receive medical treatment on the scene before the victims if he or she is designated as the most seriously injured? Or rather, should victims receive medical care priority if they are also in some life-threatening danger, although not at the same level of severity as the perpetrator? We present two opposing approaches: the conventional ‘no-exceptions’ approach, which gives priority to the terrorist, and the justice-oriented ‘victim first’ approach, which gives priority to the victims. Invoking concepts of retributive justice, distributive justice and corrective justice, this latter approach suggests that ‘value-neutrality’ can lead to injustice. Perpetrators of terror-like violence should be treated as an act of humanism and good ethical medical practice. However, in clear and obvious terror-like situations, to treat the perpetrators of violence before their victims may be unjust. Thus, in some specific situations, the ‘victim first’ approach may be considered a legitimate alternative triage policy. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 2, Page 18-20, February 2012.

Physician-assisted death (PAD) of patients whose suffering does not stem from terminal conditions has become more prevalent during the last few decades. This paper is focused on decision-making competence for PAD, specifically in situations in which PAD is related solely to psychiatric illness. First, a theoretical analysis presents the premises for the argument that competence for physician-assisted death for psychiatric patients (PADPP) should be determined based on a higher threshold in comparison to the required competence for conventional medical interventions. Second, (...) the higher threshold for decision-making competence for PADPP is illustrated. Third, several real PADPP cases are critically discussed, as an illustration to decision-making competence evaluations that would not have met the higher standard. Finally, a short summary of practical suggestions regarding the assessment of decision-making competence for PADPP is presented. Psychiatrists are called to address the ethical, legal, societal and clinical challenges related to PADPP and should be prepared for its probable expansion. (shrink)