Frangeskou’s point of departure in his juxtaposition of Levinas and Kant is the problem of transcenden- tal schematism but not the tension between autonomy and heteronomy as it is common for most of the published literature. Thus, the middle ground between Levinas and Kant is occupied by Heidegger, but also by Franz Rosenzweig with his “biblical” version of ecstatic temporality. Levinassian diachrony is described by Frangeskou as a new form of ecstatic temporality, different from the interpretations given by Heidegger and (...) Rosenzweig. It is analogous to transcendental schematism of reason. We briefly com- pare Frangeskou’s interpretation with Marc Richir’s notion of transcendental schematism which also goes back to Levinassian diachronic temporality. Richir’s schematism functions as a medium joining together heterogenous elements such as the layer of “phenomenological”, i.e., the unstable and flick- ering sense, and the layer of “symbolic”, i.e., the organised and stabilised sense. In a similar way, for Frangeskou, diachronic temporality provides a synthesis (though, not a synchronisation) of God, the world and a man. (shrink)

The project behind this and the following1 special issue of Angelaki first assumed concrete form in the shape of a three-day international conference, “Continental Philosophy and the Sciences,” hel...

This essay traces the development of Levinas’s conception of Judaism from 1928 to1947 with an aim to reveal how Levinas’s postwar conceptions of Jewish election and anti-historicism derive from his early treatments of the Heideggerian themes of Geworfenheit (thrownness) and historicality. In the process, I show how the similarities that Levinas perceived between Heidegger and Rosenzweig allowed him to recast Heideggerian categories in Jewish terms. Finally the essay considers the potential political implications and tensions that follow from Levinas’s concern after (...) World War II to maintain Rosenzweig’s contention that Judaism stands outside of History. (shrink)

The Star of Redemption is proposed as a criticism of Hegel’s thought and its logic of the Aufhebung, but Rosenzweig does not deny the truth of Hegel’s system, only the idea that it is absolute. From this point of view, Rosenzweig takes up “another” Hegel: that of his early writings—from which he draws Hegel’s conception of love—and that of The Phenomenology of Spirit—in which he searches for a system that is linked to experience. Based on these particular aspects of Hegel’s (...) philosophy, and moving beyond them, Rosenzweig builds a relational philosophy, whose elements are not sublated, but coexist with each other. We will analyze the fracture of Totality in the triad God-Mad-World to study their effective relationship through love, and the necessary link between Judaism and Christianity as a way of aniticipating Redemption. Having this link in mind, and against Hegel’s conception, Rosenzweig maintains that both religions share a common content, and that their relation is symbolized by the word “and”. (shrink)

In this article, the relation between crisis, dying, and apocalypse is examined from the vantage point of Franz Rosenzweig's philosophy of revelation. Following Rosenzweig's suggestion that truth-for finite and temporal beings like us-can only be found in time, the article suggests that there exists an intrinsic relation between truth and death. Truth is not only or even primarily logical or mathematical truth according to Rosenzweig. Truth is the reality of our finite lives and implies an eschatological understanding of death as (...) that which gives life unity by eternalising it as that which it forever was in the past. Life, Rosenzweig argues, is polytheistic by entailing manifold perspectives and possibilities, while death is monotheistic by endowing living beings with the unity and completion they lack in life. All death, even the most horrid death, is, if not a completion, at least an end, which gives the living the possibility to judge and verify the meaning of the past once and for all. Yet, if we believe Rosenzweig, the dead are not gone in the past but rather the eternal ground that makes present and future time possible. The dead, by literally being the past, reveal that all time exists after itself, as something that already was, and that the world is nothing but a world with many ends by dying away into the "life outside life" that Rosenzweig called God. (shrink)