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The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy

Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press (1987)

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  1. Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
    A discussion of epistemic reasons, theoretical rationality, and the relationship between them. Discusses the ontology of reasons and evidence, the relationship between reasons (motivating, normative, possessed, apparent, genuine, etc.) and rationality, the relationship between epistemic reasons and evidence, the relationship between rationality, justification, and knowledge, and many other related topics.
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  • Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.
    The data reviewed in Barresi & Moore's treatment of social understanding is recast in terms of a model of social intelligence that was advanced some time ago (Gallup 1982). When it comes to their analysis of the behavior of other individuals, most primates (and humans younger than 18 months of age) appear to function as radical behaviorists, whereas chimpanzees and older infants show evidence of becoming primitive cognitive psychologists.
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  • Epistemological Aspects of Hope.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Hope: An Introduction (The Moral Psychology of the Emotions). Rowman & Littlefield International. pp. 135-151.
    Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. So I consider cases of second-order (...)
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  • Constitutivism, belief, and emotion.Larry A. Herzberg - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.
    Constitutivists about one's cognitive access to one's mental states often hold that for any rational subject S and mental state M falling into some specified range of types, necessarily, if S believes that she has M, then S has M. Some argue that such a principle applies to beliefs about all types of mental state. Others are more cautious, but offer no criterion by which the principle's range could be determined. In this paper I begin to develop such a criterion, (...)
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  • Émotions et intelligence émotionnelle dans les organisations.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2020 - Drobeta Turnu Severin: MultiMedia Publishing.
    Une argumentation pour l'importance dualiste des émotions dans la société, individuellement et au niveau communautaire. La tendance actuelle à la prise de conscience et au contrôle des émotions grâce à l'intelligence émotionnelle a un effet bénéfique dans les affaires et pour le succès des activités sociales mais, si nous n'y prenons pas garde, elle peut conduire à une aliénation irréversible au niveau individuel et social. L'essai est composé de trois parties principales: Émotions (Modèles d'émotions, Le processus des émotions, La bonheur, (...)
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  • Emotions and Emotional Intelligence in Organizations.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2020 - Drobeta Turnu Severin: MultiMedia Publishing.
    An argumentation for the dualistic importance of emotions in society, individually and at community level. The current tendency of awareness and control of emotions through emotional intelligence has a beneficial effect in business and for the success of social activities but, if we are not careful, it can lead to irreversible alienation at individual and social level. The paper consists of three main parts: Emotions (Emotional models, Emotional processing, Happiness, Philosophy of emotions, Ethics of emotions), Emotional intelligence (Models of emotional (...)
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  • Emoțiile și inteligența emoțională în organizații.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2020 - Drobeta Turnu Severin: MultiMedia Publishing.
    O argumentare a importanței dualiste a emoțiilor în societate, individual și la nivel de comunitate. Tendința actuală de conștientizare și control al emoțiilor prin inteligența emoțională are un efect benefic în afaceri și pentru succesul activităților sociale dar, dacă nu suntem atenți, poate duce la o alienare ireversibilă la nivel individual și social. Lucrarea se compune din trei părți principale: Emoții (Modele ale emoțiilor, Procesarea emoțiilor, Fericirea, Filosofia emoțiilor, Etica emotiilor), Inteligența emoțională (Modele ale inteligenței emoționale, Inteligența emoțională în cercetare (...)
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  • Classifying emotions: Prospects for a psychoevolutionary approach.Charles Starkey - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (6):759 – 777.
    One of the most significant developments in the area of emotion theory in recent years is the revival of the psychoevolutionary approach to classification. This essay appraises the prospects for such an approach. The first contention is that the supposed advantages of psychoevolutionary classification over functional classification in scientific psychological research is less than presumed , particularly with respect to the utility of the classification , which is the basis of the argument for the superiority of psychoevolutionary classification. The second (...)
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  • What's the stimulus?G. E. Zuriff - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):664-664.
  • Classifying emotion: A developmental account.Alexandra Zinck & Albert Newen - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):1 - 25.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for (...)
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  • The assessment of intentionality in animals.Thomas R. Zentall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):663-663.
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  • Development of social emotions and constructive agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124-125.
    The psychology of emotions illuminates the questions of intentional capacities raised by Barresi & Moore (B&M). Complex emotions require the development of a sense of self and are based on social comparisons between mainly imagined objects. The fourth level in B&M's framework requires something like a constructive agent rather than a mental agent.
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  • Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional states.Bill Wringe - 2003 - European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):353-374.
    In this paper I argue that there is a viable simulationist account of emotion attribution. However, I also try to say something specific about the form that this account ought to take. I argue that someone who wants to give by a simulationist account of emotion attribution should focus on similarities between emotions and perceptual judgments.
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  • Emotions, Actions and Inclinations to Act.Christiana Werner - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2571-2588.
    Emotional responses to fiction are part of our experience with art and media. Some of these responses (“fictional emotions”) seem to be directed towards fictional entities—entities that we believe do not exist. Some philosophers argue that fictional emotions differ in nature from other emotional responses. (cf. Walton in J Philos 75(1):5–27, 1978, Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990, Walton, in: Hjort, Laver (ed.) Emotion and the arts, Oxford University, New York, 1997; Currie in The nature of fiction, Cambridge (...)
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  • Emotion and Value.Cain Todd - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (10):702-712.
    The nature of the general connection between emotion and value, and of the various connections between specific emotions and values, lies at the heart of philosophical discussion of the emotions. It is also central to some accounts of the nature of value itself, of value in general but also of the specific values studied within particular philosophical domains. These issues all form the subject matter of this article, and they in turn are all connected by two main questions: (i) How (...)
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  • Are some mental states public events?Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):662-663.
  • Blameless, constructive, and political anger.Lucas A. Swaine - 1996 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 26 (3):257–274.
    Scholars of the emotions maintain that all anger requires an object of blame. In order to be angry, many writers argue, one must believe than an actor has done serious damage to something that one values. Yet an individual may be angered without blaming another. This kind of emotion, called situational anger, does not entail a corresponding object of blame. Situational anger can be a useful force in public life, enabling citizens to draw attention to the seriousness of social or (...)
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  • Moral Shock.Katie Stockdale - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (3):496-511.
    This paper defends an account of moral shock as an emotional response to intensely bewildering events that are also of moral significance. This theory stands in contrast to the common view that shock is a form of intense surprise. On the standard model of surprise, surprise is an emotional response to events that violated one's expectations. But I show that we can be morally shocked by events that confirm our expectations. What makes an event shocking is not that it violated (...)
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  • Cross-fertilization between research on interpersonal communication and drug discrimination.I. P. Stolerman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):661-662.
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  • A formal model of emotion triggers: an approach for BDI agents.Bas R. Steunebrink, Mehdi Dastani & John-Jules Ch Meyer - 2012 - Synthese 185 (S1):83-129.
    This paper formalizes part of a well-known psychological model of emotions. In particular, the logical structure underlying the conditions that trigger emotions are studied and then hierarchically organized. The insights gained therefrom are used to guide a formalization of emotion triggers, which proceeds in three stages. The first stage captures the conditions that trigger emotions in a semiformal way, i.e., without committing to an underlying formalism and semantics. The second stage captures the main psychological notions used in the emotion model (...)
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  • Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.
    Barresi & Moore's account predicts that infants deprived of visual input will be delayed in achieving social understanding, a hypothesis that receives some support from studies of language use. by blind children. It is proposed that recently developed false belief and appearance/reality tasks be used to explore this issue further. Three possibly distracting conceptual issues are also discussed.
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  • What feelings can't do.Laura Sizer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):108-135.
    Arguments over whether emotions and moods are feelings have demonstrated confusion over the concept of a feeling and, in particular, what it is that feelings can—and cannot—do. I argue that the causal and explanatory roles we assign emotions and moods in our theories are inconsistent with their being feelings. Sidestepping debates over the natures of emotions and moods I frame my arguments primarily in terms of what it is emotions, moods and feelings do. I provide an analysis that clarifies the (...)
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  • Lying, liars and language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.
    This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to themselves, to language, and to those to whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth-tellers.
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  • Being Good and Feeling Well.James Sias - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (4):785-804.
    This paper attempts to clarify the relation between moral virtue and the emotions, but with an ulterior motive: I want an account of this relation that is not only plausible on its own, but also, one that helps to explain when, and how, our emotions might contribute to the justification of moral beliefs formed on their basis.
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  • Humanistic art.Warren Shibles - 1994 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 8 (3):371-392.
    The cognitive theory of emotion (also called the rational?emotive theory) clarifies the notion of aesthetic emotion and evaluation, and when combined with Dewey's humanism and a naturalistic theory of valuation provides a basis for a holistic theory of aesthetics. From the holistic perspective, no act is moral unless it is also aesthetic. On this view, the aesthetic is no longer reduced to atomistic or quantitative perspectives, but becomes a part of our total purposive life experience. It expresses itself in gentleness (...)
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  • How do we know when private events control behavior?Kurt Salzinger - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):660-661.
  • Emotions in Continental Philosophy.Robert C. Solomon - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (5):413-431.
    Although the topic of emotions was long ignored in British and American analytic philosophy and psychology, it remained a rich and exciting subject in Continental Philosophy. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche celebrated the passionate life. In phenomenology Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean‐Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, Gabriel Marcel, and Paul Ricoeur all made major contributions. Heidegger pursued a highly original thesis concerning the vital role of moods in human life, notably angst and boredom. Jean‐Paul Sartre added the tantalizing thesis that our (...)
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  • On irrational guilt.Juha Räikkä - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):473 - 485.
    A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare, but they are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed, and in my paper I aim to give such an explanation. In particular, I will first provide (...)
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  • Omitting the second person in social understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.
    Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.
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  • William James on emotion and intentionality.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2005 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
    William James's theory of emotion is often criticized for placing too much emphasis on bodily feelings and neglecting the cognitive aspects of emotion. This paper suggests that such criticisms are misplaced. Interpreting James's account of emotion in the light of his later philosophical writings, I argue that James does not emphasize bodily feelings at the expense of cognition. Rather, his view is that bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. In reconceptualizing the relationship between cognition and affect, James (...)
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  • Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.
    Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.
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  • Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.
    Barresi & Moore assume an equivalence between ontogenetic and evolutionaiy transformations of social understanding. The mechanisms of evolution allow for novel structures to arise, both through terminal addition and through the onset of novel pathways at time points that precede the end points of ancestral pathways. Terminal addition may not be the appropriate model for the evolution of human object-directed imitation, intermodal equivalence, or joint attention.
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  • Animal models of human communication.S. Plous - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):660-660.
  • Irrational blame.Hanna Pickard - 2013 - Analysis 73 (4):613-626.
    I clarify some ambiguities in blame-talk and argue that blame's potential for irrationality and propensity to sting vitiates accounts of blame that identify it with consciously accessible, personal-level judgements or beliefs. Drawing on the cognitive psychology of emotion and appraisal theory, I develop an account of blame that accommodates these features. I suggest that blame consists in a range of hostile, negative first-order emotions, towards which the blamer has a specific, accompanying second-order attitude, namely, a feeling of entitlement—a feeling that (...)
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  • Communicative acts and drug-induced feelings.Irene M. Pepperberg - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):659-660.
  • Social relations and understanding the intentional self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136-136.
    Although Barresi & Moore could have grounded their framework more explicitly in existing models, they offer a provocative testbed for the assumptions of symbolic interactionism and further thinking about self-regulation, especially in autistics.
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  • Understanding that looking causes knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.
    Barresi & Moore provide an impressive account of how the coordination of first and third person information about the self and other could produce an account of intentional relations. They are less explicit as to how the child comes to understand the basic epistemic relation between experience and knowledge, that is, how informational access causes belief. We suggest one route.
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  • On the Suffering of Compassion.Peter Nilsson - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):125-144.
    Compassion is often described in terms of suffering. This paper investigates the nature of this suffering. It is argued that compassion involves suffering of a particular kind. To begin with a case is made for the negative claim that compassion does not involve an ordinary, or afflictive, suffering over something. Secondly, it is argued that the suffering of compassion is a suffering for someone else’s sake: If you feel compassion for another person, P, then you suffer over P:s suffering for (...)
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  • Emotion Recognition as Pattern Recognition: The Relevance of Perception.Albert Newen, Anna Welpinghus & Georg Juckel - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (2):187-208.
    We develop a version of a direct perception account of emotion recognition on the basis of a metaphysical claim that emotions are individuated as patterns of characteristic features. On our account, emotion recognition relies on the same type of pattern recognition as is described for object recognition. The analogy allows us to distinguish two forms of directly perceiving emotions, namely perceiving an emotion in the absence of any top-down processes, and perceiving an emotion in a way that significantly involves some (...)
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  • Four-year-old humans are different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.
    The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.
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  • Emotions and aesthetics: An inevitable trade‐off.Stephen Mumford - 2012 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 39 (2):267-279.
    Sport is a producer of both emotional and aesthetic experiences. But how do these relate? Does a spectator’s emotional engagement in sport enhance or hinder it as an aesthetic experience? And does the aesthetic perception of sport enhance or hinder the emotional experiences? These questions will be addressed with particular reference to the distinction that can be drawn between partisan and purist watchers of sport, and making use of thinking in contemporary aesthetics and philosophy of emotion. There are some reasons (...)
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  • Allegiance and Identity.Stephen Mumford - 2004 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 31 (2):184-195.
  • Private states and animal communication.Chris Mortensen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):658-659.
  • Learning to live with emotion.Jeffrey Morgan - 1994 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 26 (2):67–81.
  • Emptiness and the Education of the Emotions.Jeffrey Morgan - 2015 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 47 (3):291-304.
    This article argues that Buddhist philosophy offers a plausible theory of the education of the emotions. Emotions are analyzed as cognitive feeling events in which the subject is passive. The education of the emotions is possible if and only if it is possible to evaluate one’s emotional life (the normative condition) and it is possible to satisfy the normative condition through learning (the pedagogical condition). Drawing on the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism, as well as the concepts of conditioned arising, (...)
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  • But what is the intentional schema?Adam Morton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-134.
    The intentional schema may not be sufficiently characterized to make questions about its role in individual and species development intelligible. The idea of metarepresentation may perhaps give it enough content. The importance of metarepresentation itself, however, can be called into question.
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  • The role of convention in the communication of private events.Chris Moore - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):656-657.
  • Behaviorism, introspection and the mind's I.Jay Moore - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):657-658.
  • Self-knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and kinesthetic-visual matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133.
    The “intentional schema” seems identical to or dependent upon kinesthetic–visual matching, both of which account for similar empirical findings. The intentional schema, however, fails to account for variability in children's understanding of false belief and differences in children's understanding of self and other in pretense.
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  • Pigeons as communicators and thinkers: Mon oncle d'Amerique deux?Robert W. Mitchell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):655-656.