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  1. Development and Validation of a Porous Theory of Mind Scale.Michiel van Elk, David Maij & Bastiaan Rutjens - 2020 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 20 (1-2):41-65.
    We report the results of an empirical investigation of the extent to which supernatural believers endorse a porous conception of the mind, i.e., the belief that one’s thoughts can be directly perceived by others. We developed a porous theory of mind scale, tested its factor structure by using both exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, and showed its relation with supernatural beliefs in three studies in the Netherlands and one study with North-American participants. We found that endorsement of a PToM is (...)
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  • The Two Sources of Moral Standing.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):303-324.
    There are two primary traditions in philosophical theorizing about moral standing—one emphasizing Experience (the capacity to feel pain and pleasure) and one emphasizing Agency (complexity of cognition and lifestyle). In this article we offer an explanation for this divide: Lay judgments about moral standing depend importantly on two independent cues (Experience and Agency), and the two philosophical traditions reflect this aspect of folk moral cognition. In support of this two-source hypothesis, we present the results of a series of new experiments (...)
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  • Intuitive And Reflective Responses In Philosophy.Nick Byrd - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Colorado
    Cognitive scientists have revealed systematic errors in human reasoning. There is disagreement about what these errors indicate about human rationality, but one upshot seems clear: human reasoning does not seem to fit traditional views of human rationality. This concern about rationality has made its way through various fields and has recently caught the attention of philosophers. The concern is that if philosophers are prone to systematic errors in reasoning, then the integrity of philosophy would be threatened. In this paper, I (...)
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  • Seeing Agents When We Need to, Attributing Experience When We Feel Like It.Ida Hallgren - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):369-382.
    Mind attribution may be divided into the subcategories of attribution of agency, associated with moral agency, and attribution of experience and emotion, associated with moral concern and moral patiency (Gray et al. Science 315(5812):619, 2007; Gray et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 108(2):477–479, 2011b; Robbins and Jack Philosophical Studies 127(1):59–85, 2006). In this paper I attend to social context and the different psychological needs influencing the different types of mind attribution. A (...)
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  • Two Minds Vs. Two Philosophies: Mind Perception Defines Morality and Dissolves the Debate Between Deontology and Utilitarianism. [REVIEW]Kurt Gray & Chelsea Schein - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):405-423.
    Mind perception is the essence of moral judgment. Broadly, moral standing is linked to perceptions of mind, with moral responsibility tied to perceived agency, and moral rights tied to perceived experience. More specifically, moral judgments are based on a fundamental template of two perceived minds—an intentional agent and a suffering patient. This dyadic template grows out of the universal power of harm, and serves as a cognitive working model through which even atypical moral events are understood. Thus, all instances of (...)
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  • The Eyes Are the Window to the Uncanny Valley: Mind Perception, Autism and Missing Souls.Chelsea Schein & Kurt Gray - 2015 - Interaction Studiesinteraction Studies Social Behaviour and Communication in Biological and Artificial Systems 16 (2):173-179.
    Horror movies have discovered an easy recipe for making people creepy: alter their eyes. Instead of normal eyes, zombies’ eyes are vacantly white, vampires’ eyes glow with the color of blood, and those possessed by demons are cavernously black. In the Academy Award winning Pan’s Labyrinth, director Guillermo del Toro created the creepiest of all creatures by entirely removing its eyes from its face, placing them instead in the palms of its hands. The unease induced by altering eyes may help (...)
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  • Cognitive Biases Explain Religious Belief, Paranormal Belief, and Belief in Life’s Purpose.Aiyana K. Willard & Ara Norenzayan - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):379-391.
  • Voices to Reckon With: Perceptions of Voice Identity in Clinical and Non-Clinical Voice Hearers.Johanna C. Badcock & Saruchi Chhabra - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
  • Deconstructing and Reconstructing Theory of Mind.Sara M. Schaafsma, Donald W. Pfaff, Robert P. Spunt & Ralph Adolphs - 2015 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 19 (2):65-72.
    Usage of the term ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) has exploded across fields ranging from developmental psychology to social neuroscience and psychiatry research. However, its meaning is often vague and inconsistent, its biologi- cal bases are a subject of debate, and the methods used to study it are highly heterogeneous. Most crucially, its original definition does not permit easy downward translation to more basic processes such as those stud- ied by behavioral neuroscience, leaving the interpreta- tion of neuroimaging results opaque. We (...)
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  • Attributes of God: Conceptual Foundations of a Foundational Belief.Andrew Shtulman & Marjaana Lindeman - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):635-670.
    Anthropomorphism, or the attribution of human properties to nonhuman entities, is often posited as an explanation for the origin and nature of God concepts, but it remains unclear which human properties we tend to attribute to God and under what conditions. In three studies, participants decided whether two types of human properties—psychological properties and physiological properties—could or could not be attributed to God. In Study 1, participants made significantly more psychological attributions than physiological attributions, and the frequency of those attributions (...)
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  • Do Emotions Play an Essential Role in Moral Judgments?William H. B. McAuliffe - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 25 (2):207-230.
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  • Why Did This Happen to Me? Religious Believers’ and Non-Believers’ Teleological Reasoning About Life Events.Konika Banerjee & Paul Bloom - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):277-303.
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  • Similar Impressions of Humanness for Human and Artificial Singing Voices in Autism Spectrum Disorders.Shinji Kuriki, Yuri Tamura, Miki Igarashi, Nobumasa Kato & Tamami Nakano - 2016 - Cognition 153:1-5.
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  • The Origins of Religious Disbelief.Ara Norenzayan & Will M. Gervais - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):20-25.
  • Feeling Robots and Human Zombies: Mind Perception and the Uncanny Valley.Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner - 2012 - Cognition 125 (1):125-130.
    The uncanny valley—the unnerving nature of humanlike robots—is an intriguing idea, but both its existence and its underlying cause are debated. We propose that humanlike robots are not only unnerving, but are so because their appearance prompts attributions of mind. In particular, we suggest that machines become unnerving when people ascribe to them experience, rather than agency. Experiment 1 examined whether a machine’s humanlike appearance prompts both ascriptions of experience and feelings of unease. Experiment 2 tested whether a machine capable (...)
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  • “Spiritual but Not Religious”: Cognition, Schizotypy, and Conversion in Alternative Beliefs.Aiyana K. Willard & Ara Norenzayan - 2017 - Cognition 165:137-146.
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