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Peter J. Graham (2006). Liberal Fundamentalism and its Rivals.

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  1. Etiology, Understanding, and Testimonial Belief.Andrew Peet - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1547-1567.
    The etiology of a perceptual belief can seemingly affect its epistemic status. There are cases in which perceptual beliefs seem to be unjustified because the perceptual experiences on which they are based are caused, in part, by wishful thinking, or irrational prior beliefs. It has been argued that this is problematic for many internalist views in the epistemology of perception, especially those which postulate immediate perceptual justification. Such views are unable to account for the impact of an experience’s etiology on (...)
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  2. Should Have Known.Sanford Goldberg - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2863-2894.
    In this paper I will be arguing that there are cases in which a subject, S, should have known that p, even though, given her state of evidence at the time, she was in no position to know it. My argument for this result will involve making two claims. The uncontroversial claim is this: S should have known that p when another person has, or would have, legitimate expectations regarding S’s epistemic condition, the satisfaction of these expectations would require that (...)
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  3.  58
    Risk, Doubt, and Transmission.Rachel Fraser - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2803-2821.
    Despite their substantial appeal, closure principles have fallen on hard times. Both anti-luck conditions on knowledge and the defeasibility of knowledge look to be in tension with natural ways of articulating single-premise closure principles. The project of this paper is to show that plausible theses in the epistemology of testimony face problems structurally identical to those faced by closure principles. First I show how Lasonen-Aarnio’s claim that there is a tension between single premise closure and anti-luck constraints on knowledge can (...)
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  4.  27
    Unreliable Testimony.Elizabeth Fricker - 2016 - In Brian McLaughlin & Hilary Kornblith (eds.), Goldman and HIs Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 88-120.
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  5.  34
    Testimonial Knowledge: A Unified Account.Peter J. Graham - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):172-186.
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  6.  39
    Counterfeit Testimony: Lies, Trust, and the Exchange of Information.Nicholas Tebben & John Philip Waterman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3101-3117.
    Most explanations of the rational authority of testimony provide little guidance when evaluating individual pieces of testimony. In practice, however, we are remarkably sensitive to the varying epistemic credentials of testimony: extending trust when it is deserved, and withholding it when it is not. A complete account of the epistemology of testimony should, then, have something to say about when it is that testimony is trustworthy. In the typical case, to judge someone trustworthy requires judging them to be competent and (...)
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  7.  69
    Interpersonal Epistemic Entitlements.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):159-183.
    In this paper I argue that the nature of our epistemic entitlement to rely on certain belief-forming processes—perception, memory, reasoning, and perhaps others—is not restricted to one's own belief-forming processes. I argue as well that we can have access to the outputs of others’ processes, in the form of their assertions. These two points support the conclusion that epistemic entitlements are “interpersonal.” I then proceed to argue that this opens the way for a non-standard version of anti-reductionism in the epistemology (...)
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  8.  22
    Benjamin McMyler: Testimony, Trust, and Authority. [REVIEW]Stephen Wright - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1213-1217.
  9. Stating and Insinuating.Elizabeth Fricker - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):61-94.
    An utterer may convey a message to her intended audience by means of an explicit statement; or by a non-conventionally mediated one-off signal from which the audience is able to work out the intended message; or by conversational implicature. I investigate whether the last two are equivalent to explicit testifying, as communicative act and epistemic source. I find that there are important differences between explicit statement and insinuation; only with the first does the utterer assume full responsibility for the truth (...)
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  10. Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.
    What is the best account of process reliabilism about epistemic justification, especially epistemic entitlement? I argue that entitlement consists in the normal functioning (proper operation) of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Etiological functions involve consequence explanation: a belief-forming process has forming true beliefs reliably as a function just in case forming-true beliefs reliably partly explains the persistence of the process. This account paves the way for avoiding standard objections to process (...)
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  11.  49
    Trust and Testimony.Philip J. Nickel - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):301-316.
    Some recent accounts of testimonial warrant base it on trust, and claim that doing so helps explain asymmetries between the intended recipient of testimony and other non-intended hearers, e.g. differences in their entitlement to challenge the speaker or to rebuke the speaker for lying. In this explanation ‘dependence-responsiveness’ is invoked as an essential feature of trust: the trustor believes the trustee to be motivationally responsive to the fact that the trustor is relying on the trustee. I argue that dependence-responsiveness is (...)
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  12.  46
    Fricker on Testimonial Justification.Igor Douven & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):36-44.
    Elizabeth Fricker has recently proposed a principle aimed at stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for testimonial justification. Her proposal entails that a hearer is justified in believing a speaker’s testimony only if she recognizes the speaker to be trustworthy, which, given Fricker’s internalist commitments, requires the hearer to have within her epistemic purview grounds which justify belief in the speaker’s trustworthiness. We argue that, as it stands, Fricker’s principle is too demanding, and we propose some amendments to it. We (...)
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  13. The Theoretical Diagnosis of Skepticism.Peter J. Graham - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):19-39.
    Radical skepticism about the external implies that no belief about the external is even prima facie justified. A theoretical reply to skepticism has four stages. First, show which theories of epistemic justification support skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, entail skepticism). Second, show which theories undermine skeptical doubts (show which theories, given other reasonable assumptions, do not support the skeptic’s conclusion). Third, show which of the latter theories (which non-skeptical theory) is correct, and in so doing show (...)
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  14. Knowing From Testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (5):432–448.