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  1. The Idea of Will.M. M. Dorenbosch Drs - unknown
    This article presents a new conceptual view on the conscious will. This new concept approaches our will from the perspective of the requirements of our neural-muscular system and not from our anthropocentric perspective. This approach not only repositions the will at the core of behavior control, it also integrates the studies of Libet and Wegner, which seem to support the opposite. The will does not return as an instrument we use to steer, but rather as part of the way we (...)
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  • The Role of Consciousness in Memory.S. Franklin, B. J. Baars, U. Ramamurthy & M. Ventura - 2005 - Brains, Minds and Media 1.
    Conscious events interact with memory systems in learning, rehearsal and retrieval (Ebbinghaus 1885/1964; Tulving 1985). Here we present hypotheses that arise from the IDA computional model (Franklin,Kelemen and McCauley 1998; Franklin 2001b) of global workspace theory (Baars 1988, 2002). Our primary tool for this exploration is a flexible cognitive cycle employed by the IDA computational model and hypothesized to be a basic element of human cognitive processing. Since cognitive cycles are hypothesized to occur five to tentimes a second and include (...)
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  • How Are Qualia Coupled to Functions?Jeffrey Gray - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (5):192-194.
  • Representation, Consciousness, and Time.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (1):137-155.
    I criticize Bourget’s intuitive and empirical arguments for thinking that all possible conscious states are underived if intentional. An underived state is one of which it is not the case that it must be realized, at least in part, by intentional states distinct from itself. The intuitive argument depends upon a thought experiment about a subject who exists for only a split second while undergoing a single conscious experience. This, however, trades on an ambiguity in "split second." Meanwhile, Bourget's empirical (...)
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