La posición sistemática de la Metafísica de las costumbres de Kant y en concreto de su segunda parte, la Doctrina de la virtud, es análoga a la del Sistema de la doctrina de las costumbres según los principios de la Doctrina de la Ciencia de Fichte. Sin embargo, en dicha obra, Fichte califica la ética kantiana de “formalista” y pretende que la suya es más concreta y aplicable por su teoría de la conciliación entre el impulso natural y el impulso (...) moral. En este artículo se explica y discute dicha postura de Fichte, mostrando que la crítica a Kant es injusta, dado que precisamente la Doctrina de la virtud ofrece, de un modo metódicamente diverso pero sólido y coherente con la ética de la autonomía, la “ética material” kantiana. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s major book on his legal and political philosophy, the Doctrine of Right, appears in 1797. Therefore, many scholars have argued that Kant’s entire legal philosophy has only been developed in the late 1790s and that it is for the most part independent from his critical writings on moral philosophy dating in the 1780s. This article, however, tries to proof the contrary by analyzing the1784 lecture notes Moral-Mrongovius II given by Christoph Coelestin Mrongovius, who attended Kant’s lecture on moral (...) philosophy at that time. Those lecture notes not only proof that Kant’s concept of right has already been worked out in 1784. Even more: Moral-Mrongovius II indicates that Kant considered his legal philosophy as an integral part of his overall critical moral philosophy. (shrink)

Durante décadas, los teóricos interesados en la discusión de Kant sobre el bienestar han estudiado la postura de Kant sobre la cuestión de la redistribución de bienes en la sociedad. Lo han hecho tanto para aclarar su postura como para una fuente de inspiración para problemas conceptuales actuales, frente a filósofos políticos contemporáneos que intentan reconciliar el ideal de la libertad igualitaria con la necesaria interferencia asimétrica para la redistribución y la provisión social. En este artículo, comienzo por la breve (...) discusión kantiana sobre el estado del bienestar en la Doctrina del derecho e identifico cuatro premisas que Kant afirmó con claridad como características de su postura. Posteriormente, propongo las cinco vías interpretativas principales en la interpretación de la obra de Kant, las evalúo y las ordeno. La interpretación más acertada de la justificación kantiana del bienestar, que llamo la postura “genuinamente kantiana” no llega a explicar, sin embargo, la naturaleza del deber del bienestar que propone. Propongo una solución, retrotrayéndome en los textos kantianos, que unida a otras consideraciones y cuestiones, se puede entender como el punto de partida de una nueva vía de interpretar este tema. (shrink)

Looking at two well-known discussions of Kant’s discourse on friendship, namely, the second half of Doctrine of Virtue and his Lecture on Friendship, this paper traces the points of overlap and separation whereby, through the paradigm of friendship, the morals and politics of Kant’s discourse are reconsidered. In what follows, I will show first, how Kant’s theory of friendship plays a role in his conception of social relations and morality and second, how the nature of his concerns with friendship reveals (...) both an insistence on moral duties and, in the spirit of Derrida, a difficult, if not paradoxical, politicization of these same duties. In doing so, I argue that Kant’s ideas on friendship are part of a necessary yet irreconcilable tension between political and ethical obligations. Friendship is thought necessary for the well-being of political states at the same time that its instrumentalization undermines the heterogeneous nature of ethical responsibilities and the call to particularity which distinguishes it from other forms of associations. In the end, I argue that Kant’s theory of friendship is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence whose contradictions do not pave the way for new possibilities for association, community, nationhood etc., but only highlight its aporetic underpinnings. (shrink)

This dissertation is intended as an intervention in the interminable and apparently antinomical philosophical exchange between political theories of radical democracy descended from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and liberal democracy descended from John Rawls. Radical democrats have deployed the friend-enemy distinction of Carl Schmitt to criticize liberal democracy as hypocritical and ultimately undemocratic in its refusal to critique its own ground; liberal democrats have riposted by characterizing radical democracy as dangerously anarchic. In this project, I read Immanuel Kant in (...) dialog with the work of Ingeborg Maus to show in a novel way that contemporary radical democratic theories ultimately fall to the very critique upon which they indict liberal democracy, that they degenerate into the valorization of mere war, and that it was in fact in full recognition of this dynamic that Kants theory of liberal democracy begins. Kants theory of countervailing liberalism is ultimately discovered to be a politics of love over barbarism. The project ranges over a wide ground, from a close reading of Kant, to the 19th Century Pantheismusstreit, to works by Arendt, Hardt and Negri, Žižek, and Strauss. (shrink)