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The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science

Cambridge University Press (1991)

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  1. Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
    The comment addresses central issues of a "theory theory" approach as exemplified in Gopnik' and Goldman's BBS-articles. Gopnik, on the one hand, tries to demonstrate that empirical evidence from developmental psychology supports the view of a "theory theory" in which common sense beliefs are constructed to explain ourselves and others. Focusing the informational processing routes possibly involved we would like to argue that his main thesis (e.g. idea of intentionality as a cognitive construct) lacks support at least for two reasons: (...)
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  • The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.
  • Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.
  • Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.
  • The fallacy of misplaced intentionality in social representation research.Wolfgang Wagner - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (3):243–165.
    This paper argues that social representations cannot be used as independent variables in causal explanations of social behaviour. It is shown that the structure of investigations often follows a causally explanatory design despite explicit statements to the contrary by the researchers. This fact is analyzed with three investigations. It is argued that verbal data used to assess the contents of a representation as independent variable are logically equivalent to data obtained from the “dependent” overt behaviour. Therefore these two kinds of (...)
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  • Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.
    A commentary on a target article by Alison Gopnik (1993) How we know our minds: the illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality. Focusing on evidence of how children acquire a theory of mind, this commentary argues that there are internal inconsistencies in theories that both argue for the functional role of conscious experiences and the irreducibility of those experiences to third-person viewable information processing.
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  • Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.
  • Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.
  • Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.
  • The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.
  • Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.
  • Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.
  • Do the right thing! Rule finitism, rule scepticism and rule following.Wes Sharrock & Graham Button - 1999 - Human Studies 22 (2-4):193-210.
    Rule following is often made an unnecessary mystery in the philosophy of social science. One form of mystification is the issue of 'rule finitism', which raises the puzzle as to how a learner can possibly extend the rule to applications beyond those examples which have been given as instruction in the rule. Despite the claim that this problem originated in the work of Wittgenstein, it is clear that his philosophical method is designed to evaporate, not perpetuate, such problems. The supposed (...)
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  • Causally efficacious intentions and the sense of agency: In defense of real mental causation.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):135-160.
    Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical evidence (...)
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  • Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.
  • On leaving your children wrapped in thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.
  • Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.
  • Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.
  • Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.
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  • Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.
  • Mental Concepts as Natural Kind Concepts.Diana I. Pérez - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):201-225.
  • Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.
  • Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.
  • Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.
  • First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.
  • The end of plasticity.Herman Philipse - 1997 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):291-306.
    Paul Churchland has become famous for holding three controversial and interrelated doctrines which he put forward in early papers and in his first book. Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (1979): eliminative materialism, the doctrine of the plasticity of perception, and a general network theory of language. In his latest book, The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul (1995), Churchland aims to make some results of connectionist neuroscience available to the general public and explores the philosophical and (...)
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  • A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.
  • The role of concepts in perception and inference.David R. Olson & Janet Wilde Astington - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):65-66.
  • Developmental evidence and introspection.Shaun Nichols - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):64-65.
  • Mismatching categories?William Edward Morris & Robert C. Richardson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):62-63.
  • Heuristics and counterfactual self-knowledge.Adam Morton - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):63-64.
  • Responsible choices, desert-based legal institutions, and the challenges of contemporary neuroscience.Michael S. Moore - 2012 - Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):233-279.
    Research Articles Michael S. Moore, Social Philosophy and Policy, FirstView Article.
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  • Knowledge of the psychological states of self and others is not only theory-laden but also data-driven.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61-62.
  • Reporting on Past Psychological States: Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions.Alfred Mele - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):61.
  • The fallibility of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60-60.
  • Functionalism can explain self-ascription.Brian Loar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):58-60.
  • Three inferential temptations.Alexander Levine & Georg Schwarz - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):57-58.
  • Even a theory-theory needs information processing: ToMM, an alternative theory-theory of the child's theory of mind.Alan M. Leslie, Tim P. German & Francesca G. Happé - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):56-57.
  • Self-attributions help constitute mental types.Bernard W. Kobes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-56.
  • Common sense and adult theory of communication.Boaz Keysar - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):54-54.
  • “Good developmental sequence” and the paradoxes of children's skills.Brian D. Josephson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):53-54.
  • Gopnik's invention of intentionality.Carl N. Johnson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-53.
  • Qualia for propositional attitudes?Frank Jackson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):52-52.
  • Limited engagements and narrative extensions.Daniel D. Hutto - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):419 – 444.
    E-approaches to the mind stress the embodied, embedded and enactive nature of mental phenomena. In their more radical, non-representational variants these approaches offer innovative and powerful new ways of understanding fundamental modes of intersubjective social interaction: I-approaches. While promising, E and I accounts have natural limits. In particular, they are unable to explain human competence in making sense of reasons for actions in folk-psychological terms. In this paper I outline the core features of the 'Narrative Practice Hypothesis' (NPH), showing how (...)
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  • Perception and action: Alternative views.Susan Hurley - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):3-40.
    A traditional view of perception and action makestwo assumptions: that the causal flow betweenperception and action is primarily linear or one-way,and that they are merely instrumentally related toeach other, so that each is a means to the other.Either or both of these assumptions can be rejected. Behaviorism rejects the instrumental but not theone-way aspect of the traditional view, thus leavingitself open to charges of verificationism. Ecologicalviews reject the one-way aspect but not theinstrumental aspect of the traditional view, so thatperception and (...)
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  • Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.
  • Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.
  • Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.
  • First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.
  • Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.