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  1. Capacity Updating Rules and Rational Belief Change.Matthew J. Ryan - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (1):73-87.
    Choquet expected utility substitutes capacities for subjective probabilities to explain uncertainty aversion and related phenomena. This paper studies capacities as models of belief. The notions of inner and outer acceptance context are defined. These are shown to be the natural acceptance contexts when belief expansion is described by naïve Bayesian and Dempster–Shafer updating of capacities respectively. We also show that Eichberger and Kelsey's use of Dempster–Shafer updating as a model of belief revision may lead to violations of the AGM axioms (...)
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  • The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism, and Complete Ignorance.Burkhard C. Schipper - 2021 - Theory and Decision 90 (3-4):417-454.
    We seek an evolutionary explanation for why in some situations humans maintain either optimistic or pessimistic attitudes toward uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of their environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents’ actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility with respect to neo-additive capacities allowing for both an optimistic or pessimistic attitude toward uncertainty as well as ignorance to strategic dependencies. An optimist overweighs good outcomes. A complete ignorant never reacts to opponents’ changes of (...)
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  • The Right to Remain Silent.Joseph Greenberg - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (2):193-204.
    The paper points out that in dynamic games a player may be better-off if other players do not know his choice of strategy. That is, a player may benefit by not revealing (or not pre-determining) the choice of his action in an information set he (thereby) hopes will not be reached. He would be better-off by exercising his ``right to remain silent'' if he believes –- as the empirical evidence shows –- that players display aversion to ``Knightian uncertainty''. In this (...)
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  • Non-Additive Beliefs in Solvable Games.Hans Haller - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (4):313-338.
    This paper studies how the introduction of non-additive probabilities (capacities) affects the solvability of strategic games.
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  • Granny Versus Game Theorist: Ambiguity in Experimental Games. [REVIEW]Jürgen Eichberger, David Kelsey & Burkhard C. Schipper - 2008 - Theory and Decision 64 (2-3):333-362.
    We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, (...)
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