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The normativity of Lewis Conventions

Synthese 190 (15):3107-3122 (2013)

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  1. Walking the Tightrope: Unrecognized Conventions and Arbitrariness.Megan Henricks Stotts - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (8):867-887.
    Unrecognized conventions—practices that are conventional even though their participants do not recognize them as such—play central roles in shaping our lives. They range from the indispensable (e.g. unrecognized linguistic conventions) to the insidious (e.g. some of our gender conventions). Unrecognized conventions pose a challenge for accounts of conventions because it is difficult to incorporate the distinctive arbitrariness of conventions—the fact that conventions always have alternatives—without accidentally excluding many unrecognized conventions. I develop an Accessibility Requirement that allows us to account for (...)
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  • When and Why Conventions Cannot Be Social Institutions.Vojtěch Zachník - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1235-1254.
    The paper focuses on the issue of compatibility of social institution and convention. At first, it introduces the modest account of conventionality building on five distinctive features – interdependence, arbitrariness, mind-independence, spontaneity, and normative-neutrality – which constitute conventional behaviour, then it presents the two major theories of social institutions that explain them in terms of rules, or equilibria. The argument is that conventions cover a wide-ranging area and cannot be identified with the category of institutions because it would be too (...)
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  • Normativity in Lewis' and Bicchieri's Accounts of Conventions and Norms.Martina Valković - 2018 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):47-60.
    Lewis [3] argues that, generally, we ought to conform to conventions because that answers (1) our own preferences, and (2) the preferences of others. While (1) is based on instrumental rationality, (2) is based on a moral principle or norm: other things being equal, we should do what answers others’ preferences. Bicchieri [1] claims there is a third kind of normativity, neither rational nor moral, that applies to social norms. I argue that conventions draw their normativity from instrumental rationality and (...)
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  • Strategic Interdependence, Hypothetical Bargaining, and Mutual Advantage in Non-Cooperative Games.Mantas Radzvilas - unknown
    One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable outcomes. This prompted the emergence of goal-directed theories of reasoning – the team reasoning theory and the theory of hypothetical bargaining. Both theories suggest that people resolve non-cooperative games by using a reasoning algorithm which allows them to identify mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games. The primary aim of this thesis is to enrich (...)
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  • Experimental Economics for Philosophers.Hannah Rubin, Cailin O'Connor & Justin Bruner - unknown
    Recently, game theory and evolutionary game theory - mathematical frameworks from economics and biology designed to model and explain interactive behavior - have proved fruitful tools for philosophers in areas such as ethics, philosophy of language, social epistemology, and political philosophy. This methodological osmosis is part of a trend where philosophers have blurred disciplinary lines to import the best epistemic tools available. In this vein, experimental philosophers have drawn on practices from the social sciences, and especially from psychology, to expand (...)
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  • Rule-Following as Coordination: A Game-Theoretic Approach.Giacomo Sillari - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):871-890.
    Famously, Kripke has argued that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. Solving the paradox involves the element of the community, which determines correctness conditions for rule-following behavior. What do such conditions precisely consist of? Is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the matter of rule following? How are the correctness conditions sustained in the community? My answers to these questions revolve around the idea that a rule (...)
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  • A Cognitive Explanation of the Perceived Normativity of Cultural Conventions.Marc Slors - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
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  • Rules as the Impetus of Cultural Evolution.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):531-545.
    In this paper I put forward a thesis regarding the anatomy of “cultural evolution”, in particular the way the “cultural” transmission of behavioral patterns came to piggyback, through us humans, on the transmission effected by genetic evolution. I claim that what grounds and supports this new kind of transmission is a complex behavioral “meta-pattern” that makes it possible to grasp a pattern as something that “ought to be”, i.e. that transforms the pattern into what we can call a rule. (Here (...)
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