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  1. The Subject-as-Object Problem.Lisa Doerksen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Thinking about oneself as a subject leaves unanswered fundamental questions about one’s identity as an object: about which thing one is, about what kind of thing one is, and about whether one exists at all. I put forward a new way of thinking about these questions by outlining the subject-as-object problem, a problem for inquiry directed at oneself qua subject. I argue that the source of the problem lies in the relationship between a basic precondition for inquiry – that something (...)
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  • Gupta on Sellars’s Theory of Perception.Byeong D. Lee - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (4):701-724.
    RÉSUMÉRécemment, Anil Gupta a soulevé plusieurs objections importantes à l’encontre de la théorie de la perception de Wilfrid Sellars. Cet article se donne pour objectif de défendre la théorie de Sellars contre ces objections. J’admets que certains aspects de sa théorie posent problème. Il y a, par exemple, de bonnes raisons de rejeter la thèse de Sellars selon laquelle le référent ultime d’une saisie perceptive est une impression sensible. Néanmoins, je soutiens qu’une explication sellarsienne de la perception reste une approche (...)
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  • Outline of an Account of Experience.Anil Gupta - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):33-74.
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  • Two Theories of Transparency.Edward W. Averill & Joseph Gottlieb - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):553-573.
    Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experience we seem to be aware of properties of the objects around us, and never seem to be aware of properties of the experience itself. This is a introspective fact. It is also often said that we can infer a metaphysical fact from this introspective fact, e.g. a fact about the nature of perceptual experience. A transparency theory fills in the details for these two facts, (...)
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  • Projectivism and phenomenal presence.Derek H. Brown - 2018 - In F. And Macpherson Dorsch (ed.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press. pp. 226-251.
    Projectivism is the thesis that we project at least some subjective aspects of perception into what we experience as the world outside ourselves. It is familiar from various phantom pains, afterimages, and hallucinations. Strong Projectivism asserts that all perceptual experiences involve and only involve direct awareness of projected elements. Strong Projectivism is an unpopular and I argue underappreciated variety of intentionalism (or representationalism). It straightforwardly explains the transparency of experience (section 2) and phenomena qualia theorists offer to avoid intentionalism such (...)
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