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Anil Gupta (1982). Truth and Paradox.

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1 — 50 / 73
  1.  6
    Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-9.
  2.  5
    Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-29.
    The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of grounded true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to (...)
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  3.  24
    Truth and Generalized Quantification.Bruno Whittle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All—that is, All ϕs are ψ—or Most. Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. (...)
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  4.  26
    How to Find an Attractive Solution to the Liar Paradox.Mark Pinder - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1661-1680.
    The general thesis of this paper is that metasemantic theories can play a central role in determining the correct solution to the liar paradox. I argue for the thesis by providing a specific example. I show how Lewis’s reference-magnetic metasemantic theory may decide between two of the most influential solutions to the liar paradox: Kripke’s minimal fixed point theory of truth and Gupta and Belnap’s revision theory of truth. In particular, I suggest that Lewis’s metasemantic theory favours Kripke’s solution to (...)
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  5.  15
    Some Notes on Truths and Comprehension.Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):449-479.
    In this paper we study several translations that map models and formulae of the language of second-order arithmetic to models and formulae of the language of truth. These translations are useful because they allow us to exploit results from the extensive literature on arithmetic to study the notion of truth. Our purpose is to present these connections in a systematic way, generalize some well-known results in this area, and to provide a number of new results. Sections 3 and 4 contain (...)
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  6. Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
    We argue that distinct conditionals—conditionals that are governed by different logics—are needed to formalize the rules of Truth Introduction and Truth Elimination. We show that revision theory, when enriched with the new conditionals, yields an attractive theory of truth. We go on to compare this theory with one recently proposed by Hartry Field.
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  7.  18
    Unified Grounding.Casper Storm Hansen - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):993-1010.
    This paper offers a unification and systematization of the grounding approaches to truth, denotation, classes and abstraction. Its main innovation is a method for “kleenifying” bivalent semantics so as to ensure that the trivalent semantics used for various linguistic elements are perfectly analogous to the semantics used by Kripke, rather than relying on intuition to achieve similarity. The focus is on generalizing strong Kleene semantics, but one section is devoted to supervaluation, and the unification method also extends to weak Kleene (...)
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  8. Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
    An important question for proponents of non-contractive approaches to paradox is why contraction fails. Zardini offers an answer, namely that paradoxical sentences exhibit a kind of instability. I elaborate this idea using revision theory, and I argue that while instability does motivate failures of contraction, it equally motivates failure of many principles that non-contractive theorists want to maintain.
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  9.  65
    Axiomatizing Semantic Theories of Truth?Martin Fischer, Volker Halbach, Jönne Kriener & Johannes Stern - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (2):257-278.
    We discuss the interplay between the axiomatic and the semantic approach to truth. Often, semantic constructions have guided the development of axiomatic theories and certain axiomatic theories have been claimed to capture a semantic construction. We ask under which conditions an axiomatic theory captures a semantic construction. After discussing some potential criteria, we focus on the criterion of ℕ-categoricity and discuss its usefulness and limits.
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  10.  7
    Cofinally Invariant Sequences and Revision.Edoardo Rivello - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (3):599-622.
    Revision sequences are a kind of transfinite sequences which were introduced by Herzberger and Gupta in 1982 as the main mathematical tool for developing their respective revision theories of truth. We generalise revision sequences to the notion of cofinally invariant sequences, showing that several known facts about Herzberger’s and Gupta’s theories also hold for this more abstract kind of sequences and providing new and more informative proofs of the old results.
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  11.  5
    Periodicity and Reflexivity in Revision Sequences.Edoardo Rivello - 2015 - Studia Logica 103 (6):1279-1302.
    Revision sequences were introduced in 1982 by Herzberger and Gupta as a mathematical tool in formalising their respective theories of truth. Since then, revision has developed in a method of analysis of theoretical concepts with several applications in other areas of logic and philosophy. Revision sequences are usually formalised as ordinal-length sequences of objects of some sort. A common idea of revision process is shared by all revision theories but specific proposals can differ in the so-called limit rule, namely the (...)
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  12. On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.
    In Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field presents and defends a theory of truth with a new conditional. In this paper, I present two criticisms of this theory, one concerning its assessments of validity and one concerning its treatment of truth-preservation claims. One way of adjusting the theory adequately responds to the truth-preservation criticism, at the cost of making the validity criticism worse. I show that in a restricted setting, Field has a way to respond to the validity criticism. I (...)
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  13.  27
    Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
  14.  68
    Sets and Plural Comprehension.Keith Hossack - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):517-539.
    The state of affairs of some things falling under a predicate is supposedly a single entity that collects these things as its constituents. But whether we think of a state of affairs as a fact, a proposition or a possibility, problems will arise if we adopt a plural logic. For plural logic says that any plurality include themselves, so whenever there are some things, the state of affairs of their plural self-inclusion should be a single thing that collects them all. (...)
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  15.  10
    Tarski's Theorem and Liar-Like Paradoxes.Ming Hsiung - 2014 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 22 (1):24-38.
    Tarski's theorem essentially says that the Liar paradox is paradoxical in the minimal reflexive frame. We generalise this result to the Liar-like paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ for all ordinal $\alpha\geq 1$. The main result is that for any positive integer $n = 2^i(2j+1)$, the paradox $\lambda^n$ is paradoxical in a frame iff this frame contains at least a cycle the depth of which is not divisible by $2^{i+1}$; and for any ordinal $\alpha \geq \omega$, the paradox $\lambda^\alpha$ is paradoxical in a frame (...)
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  16.  43
    Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):597-645.
    Although there has been a recent swell of interest in theories of truth that attempt solutions to the liar paradox and the other paradoxes affecting our concept of truth, many of these theories have been criticized for generating new paradoxes, called revenge paradoxes. The criticism is that the theories of truth in question are inadequate because they only work for languages lacking in the resources to generate revenge paradoxes. Theorists facing these objections offer a range of replies, and the matter (...)
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  17.  35
    Modality and Axiomatic Theories of Truth I: Friedman-Sheard.Johannes Stern - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):273-298.
    In this investigation we explore a general strategy for constructing modal theories where the modal notion is conceived as a predicate. The idea of this strategy is to develop modal theories over axiomatic theories of truth. In this first paper of our two part investigation we develop the general strategy and then apply it to the axiomatic theory of truth Friedman-Sheard. We thereby obtain the theory Modal Friedman-Sheard. The theory Modal Friedman-Sheard is then discussed from three different perspectives. First, we (...)
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  18.  40
    Montague's Theorem and Modal Logic.Johannes Stern - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):551-570.
    In the present piece we defend predicate approaches to modality, that is approaches that conceive of modal notions as predicates applicable to names of sentences or propositions, against the challenges raised by Montague’s theorem. Montague’s theorem is often taken to show that the most intuitive modal principles lead to paradox if we conceive of the modal notion as a predicate. Following Schweizer (J Philos Logic 21:1–31, 1992) and others we show this interpretation of Montague’s theorem to be unwarranted unless a (...)
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  19.  21
    Alternative Ways for Truth to Behave When There's No Vicious Reference.Stefan Wintein - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):665-690.
    In a recent paper, Philip Kremer proposes a formal and theory-relative desideratum for theories of truth that is spelled out in terms of the notion of ‘no vicious reference’. Kremer’s Modified Gupta-Belnap Desideratum (MGBD) reads as follows: if theory of truth T dictates that there is no vicious reference in ground model M, then T should dictate that truth behaves like a classical concept in M. In this paper, we suggest an alternative desideratum (AD): if theory of truth T dictates (...)
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  20.  37
    Notes on Ω-Inconsistent Theories of Truth in Second-Order Languages.Eduardo Barrio & Lavinia Picollo - 2013 - Review of Symbolic Logic 6 (4):733-741.
    It is widely accepted that a theory of truth for arithmetic should be consistent, but -consistency is a highly desirable feature for such theories. The point has already been made for first-order languages, though the evidence is not entirely conclusive. We show that in the second-order case the consequence of adopting -inconsistent theories of truth are considered: the revision theory of nearly stable truth T # and the classical theory of symmetric truth FS. Briefly, we present some conceptual problems with (...)
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  21.  68
    Variations on a Montagovian Theme.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3377-3395.
    What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”) propositions, and that all (...)
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  22. More on 'A Liar Paradox'.Richard Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):270-280.
    A reply to two responses to an earlier paper, "A Liar Paradox".
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  23. A Framework for Riddles About Truth That Do Not Involve Self-Reference.Stefan Wintein - 2011 - Studia Logica 98 (3):445-482.
    In this paper, we present a framework in which we analyze three riddles about truth that are all (originally) due to Smullyan. We start with the riddle of the yes-no brothers and then the somewhat more complicated riddle of the da-ja brothers is studied. Finally, we study the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever (HLPE). We present the respective riddles as sets of sentences of quotational languages , which are interpreted by sentence-structures. Using a revision-process the consistency of these sets is established. (...)
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  24.  50
    How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference.Philip Kremer - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):345-367.
    In The Revision Theory of Truth (MIT Press), Gupta and Belnap (1993) claim as an advantage of their approach to truth "its consequence that truth behaves like an ordinary classical concept under certain conditions—conditions that can roughly be characterized as those in which there is no vicious reference in the language." To clarify this remark, they define Thomason models, nonpathological models in which truth behaves like a classical concept, and investigate conditions under which a model is Thomason: they argue that (...)
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  25. Supervaluations Debugged.Nicholas Asher, Josh Dever & Chris Pappas - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):901-933.
    Supervaluational accounts of vagueness have come under assault from Timothy Williamson for failing to provide either a sufficiently classical logic or a disquotational notion of truth, and from Crispin Wright and others for incorporating a notion of higher-order vagueness, via the determinacy operator, which leads to contradiction when combined with intuitively appealing ‘gap principles’. We argue that these criticisms of supervaluation theory depend on giving supertruth an unnecessarily central role in that theory as the sole notion of truth, rather than (...)
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  26.  45
    Jump Liars and Jourdain’s Card Via the Relativized T-Scheme.Ming Hsiung - 2009 - Studia Logica 91 (2):239-271.
    A relativized version of Tarski's T-scheme is introduced as a new principle of the truth predicate. Under the relativized T-scheme, the paradoxical objects, such as the Liar sentence and Jourdain's card sequence, are found to have certain relative contradictoriness. That is, they are contradictory only in some frames in the sense that any valuation admissible for them in these frames will lead to a contradiction. It is proved that for any positive integer n, the n-jump liar sentence is contradictory in (...)
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  27. The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
    The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...)
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  28.  42
    Reference, Paradoxes and Truth.Michał Walicki - 2009 - Synthese 171 (1):195 - 226.
    We introduce a variant of pointer structures with denotational semantics and show its equivalence to systems of boolean equations: both have the same solutions. Taking paradoxes to be statements represented by systems of equations (or pointer structures) having no solutions, we thus obtain two alternative means of deciding paradoxical character of statements, one of which is the standard theory of solving boolean equations. To analyze more adequately statements involving semantic predicates, we extend propositional logic with the assertion operator and give (...)
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  29.  59
    Two Types of Deflationism.Aladdin Yaqub - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):77-106.
    It is a fundamental intuition about truth that the conditions under which a sentence is true are given by what the sentence asserts. My aim in this paper is to show that this intuition captures the concept of truth completely and correctly. This is conceptual deflationism, for it does not go beyond what is asserted by a sentence in order to define the truth status of that sentence. This paper, hence, is a defense of deflationism as a conceptual account of (...)
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  30.  49
    Complexity, Hypersets, and the Ecological Perspective on Perception-Action.Anthony Chemero & M. T. Turvey - 2007 - Biological Theory 2 (1):23-36.
    The ecological approach to perception-action is unlike the standard approach in several respects. It takes the animal-in-its-environment as the proper scale for the theory and analysis of perception-action, it eschews symbol based accounts of perception-action, it promotes self-organization as the theory-constitutive metaphor for perception-action, and it employs self-referring, non-predicative definitions in explaining perception-action. The present article details the complexity issues confronted by the ecological approach in terms suggested by Rosen and introduces non-well-founded set theory as a potentially useful tool for (...)
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  31.  80
    Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW]Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.
    Tim Maudiin’s Truth and Paradox (Maudlin 2004, cited here as T&P), a book that is richly endowed with interesting analyses and original theses, chooses to ignore both the prosentential theory of truth from Grover, Camp and Belnap 1975 and the revision theory in its book form, Gupta and Belnap 1993 (The Revision Theory of Truth, henceforth RTT).1 There is no discussion of either theory, nor even any mention of them in the list of references. I offer a pair of quotes (...)
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  32.  61
    Maudlin's Truth and Paradox. [REVIEW]Hartry Field - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):713–720.
    Tim Maudlin’s Truth and Paradox is terrific. In some sense its solution to the paradoxes is familiar—the book advocates an extension of what’s called the Kripke-Feferman theory (although the definition of validity it employs disguises this fact). Nonetheless, the perspective it casts on that solution is completely novel, and Maudlin uses this perspective to try to make the prima facie unattractive features of this solution seem palatable, indeed inescapable. Moreover, the book deals with many important issues that most writers on (...)
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  33.  32
    The Rationale Behind Revision-Rule Semantics.Lionel Shapiro - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):477 - 515.
    According to Gupta and Belnap, the “extensional behavior” of ‘true’ matches that of a circularly defined predicate. Besides promising to explain semantic paradoxicality, their general theory of circular predicates significantly liberalizes the framework of truth-conditional semantics. The authors’ discussions of the rationale behind that liberalization invoke two distinct senses in which a circular predicate’s semantic behavior is explained by a “revision rule” carrying hypothetical information about its extension. Neither attempted explanation succeeds. Their theory may however be modified to employ a (...)
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  34. A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox.Michael Glanzberg - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):27-88.
    This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad (...)
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  35.  97
    Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates.Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb & Philip Welch - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):179-223.
    If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of (...)
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  36.  6
    Significatividade E Verdade.Celso R. Braida - 2002 - Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia 43 (105):43-66.
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  37.  32
    On Gupta-Belnap Revision Theories of Truth, Kripkean Fixed Points, and the Next Stable Set.P. D. Welch - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3):345-360.
    We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.
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  38.  34
    The Analytic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Arithmetic.Peter Apostoli - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):33-102.
  39.  32
    Property Theory and the Revision Theory of Definitions.Francesco Orilia - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):212-246.
    Russell’s type theory has been the standard property theory for years, relying on rigid type distinctions at the grammatical level to circumvent the paradoxes of predication. In recent years it has been convincingly argued by Bealer, Cochiarella, Turner and others that many linguistic and ontological data are best accounted for by using a type-free property theory. In the spirit of exploring alternatives and “to have as many opportunities as possible for theory comparison”, this paper presents another type-free property theory, to (...)
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  40.  48
    Tarski on “Essentially Richer” Metalanguages.David DeVidi & Graham Solomon - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
    It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an object language for which we are defining truth and a metalanguage in which the definition occurs. An obvious question then is: under what conditions can we construct a definition of truth for a given object language. Tarski claims that (...)
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  41.  71
    What the Liar Taught Achilles.Gary Mar & Paul St Denis - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):29-46.
    Zeno's paradoxes of motion and the semantic paradoxes of the Liar have long been thought to have metaphorical affinities. There are, in fact, isomorphisms between variations of Zeno's paradoxes and variations of the Liar paradox in infinite-valued logic. Representing these paradoxes in dynamical systems theory reveals fractal images and provides other geometric ways of visualizing and conceptualizing the paradoxes.
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  42.  16
    Burge on Epistemic Paradox.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):337 - 348.
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  43.  43
    A Theory of Truth That Prefers Falsehood.Melvin Fitting - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (5):477-500.
    We introduce a subclass of Kripke's fixed points in which falsehood is the preferred truth value. In all of these the truthteller evaluates to false, while the liar evaluates to undefined (or overdefined). The mathematical structure of this family of fixed points is investigated and is shown to have many nice features. It is noted that a similar class of fixed points, preferring truth, can also be studied. The notion of intrinsic is shown to relativize to these two subclasses. The (...)
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  44.  37
    What's in a Function?Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1996 - Synthese 107 (2):167 - 204.
    In this paper we argue that Revision Rules, introduced by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap as a tool for the analysis of the concept of truth, also provide a useful tool for defining computable functions. This also makes good on Gupta's and Belnap's claim that Revision Rules provide a general theory of definition, a claim for which they supply only the example of truth. In particular we show how Revision Rules arise naturally from relaxing and generalizing a classical construction due (...)
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  45.  45
    Non-Well-Founded Sets Via Revision Rules.Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (6):633 - 679.
  46. Property Theory: The Type-Free Approach V. The Church Approach.George Bealer - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (2):139 - 171.
    In a lengthy review article, C. Anthony Anderson criticizes the approach to property theory developed in Quality and Concept (1982). That approach is first-order, type-free, and broadly Russellian. Anderson favors Alonzo Church’s higher-order, type-theoretic, broadly Fregean approach. His worries concern the way in which the theory of intensional entities is developed. It is shown that the worries can be handled within the approach developed in the book but they remain serious obstacles for the Church approach. The discussion focuses on: (1) (...)
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  47. Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic: Notre Dame, 1993.Steven Buechler - 1994 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (2):696-719.
  48.  53
    Dynamic Semantics and Circular Propositions.Willem Groeneveld - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (3):267 - 306.
  49.  47
    Partial Worlds and Paradox.Elke Brendel - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (2):191 - 208.
    Since universal language systems are confronted with serious paradoxical consequences, a semantic approach is developed in whichpartial worlds form the ontological basis. This approach shares withsituation semantics the basic idea that statements always refer to certain partial worlds, and it agrees with the extensional and model-theoretic character ofpossible worlds semantics. Within the framework of the partial worlds conception a satisfactory solution to theLiar paradox can be formulated. In particular, one advantage of this approach over those theories that are based on (...)
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  50.  9
    Quantified Quinean S.Paul Schweizer - 1993 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (6):589 - 605.
1 — 50 / 73