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  1. The Small Improvement Argument, Epistemicism and Incomparability.Edmund Tweedy Flanigan & John Halstead - 2018 - Economics and Philosophy 34 (2):199-219.
  • Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):854-864.
    Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.
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  • Modality, Scale Structure, and Scalar Reasoning.Daniel Lassiter - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):461-490.
    Epistemic and deontic comparatives differ in how they interact with disjunction. I argue that this difference provides a compelling empirical argument against the semantics of Kratzer, which predicts that all modal comparatives should interact with disjunction in the same way. Interestingly, an identical distinction is found in the semantics of non-modal adjectives: additive adjectives like ‘heavy’ behave logically like epistemic comparatives, and intermediate adjectives like ‘hot’ behave like deontic comparatives. I characterize this distinction formally and argue that the divergence between (...)
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  • ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’.Erik Carlson - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):213-223.
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