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  1. Statistics and Probability Have Always Been Value-Laden: An Historical Ontology of Quantitative Research Methods.Michael J. Zyphur & Dean C. Pierides - forthcoming - Journal of Business Ethics.
    Quantitative researchers often discuss research ethics as if specific ethical problems can be reduced to abstract normative logics. Such approaches overlook how values are embedded in every aspect of quantitative methods, including ‘observations,’ ‘facts,’ and notions of ‘objectivity.’ We describe how quantitative research practices, concepts, discourses, and their objects/subjects of study have always been value-laden, from the invention of statistics and probability in the 1600s to their subsequent adoption as a logic made to appear as if it exists prior to, (...)
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  • Hume on Probability.Barry Gower - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (1):1-19.
  • Hume's Attack on Human Rationality.Idan Shimony - 2005 - Dissertation, Tel Aviv University
  • A New Look at Hume’s Theory of Probabilistic Inference.Mark Collier - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (1):21-36.
    We must rethink our assessment of Hume’s theory of probabilistic inference. Hume scholars have traditionally dismissed his naturalistic explanation of how we make inferences under conditions of uncertainty; however, psychological experiments and computer models from cognitive science provide substantial support for Hume’s account. Hume’s theory of probabilistic inference is far from obsolete or outdated; on the contrary, it stands at the leading edge of our contemporary science of the mind.
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  • Kant's Transcendental Strategy.John J. Callanan - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):360–381.
    The interpretation of transcendental arguments remains a contentious issue for contemporary epistemology. It is usually agreed that they originated in Kant's theoretical philosophy and were intended to have some kind of anti-sceptical efficacy. I argue that the sceptic with whom Kant was concerned has been consistently misidentified. The actual sceptic was Hume, questioning whether the faculty of reason can justify any of our judgements whatsoever. His challenge is a sceptical argument regarding rule-following which engenders a vicious regress. Once this sceptical (...)
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