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  1. Epistemic Competence.David K. Henderson - 1994 - Philosophical Papers 23 (3):139-167.
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  • Boolos and the Metamathematics of Quine's Definitions of Logical Truth and Consequence.Günther Eder - 2016 - History and Philosophy of Logic 37 (2):170-193.
    The paper is concerned with Quine's substitutional account of logical truth. The critique of Quine's definition tends to focus on miscellaneous odds and ends, such as problems with identity. However, in an appendix to his influential article On Second Order Logic, George Boolos offered an ingenious argument that seems to diminish Quine's account of logical truth on a deeper level. In the article he shows that Quine's substitutional account of logical truth cannot be generalized properly to the general concept of (...)
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  • Is de Re Belief Reducible to de Dicto?Nathan Salmon - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):85-110.
  • Conceptual Realism Versus Quine on Classes and Higher-Order Logic.Nino B. Cocchiarella - 1992 - Synthese 90 (3):379 - 436.
    The problematic features of Quine's set theories NF and ML are a result of his replacing the higher-order predicate logic of type theory by a first-order logic of membership, and can be resolved by returning to a second-order logic of predication with nominalized predicates as abstract singular terms. We adopt a modified Fregean position called conceptual realism in which the concepts (unsaturated cognitive structures) that predicates stand for are distinguished from the extensions (or intensions) that their nominalizations denote as singular (...)
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  • Intentionality and Modern Philosophical Psychology I: The Modern Reduction of Intentionality.William E. Lyons - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):247-69.
    In rounded terms and modem dress a theory of intentionality is a theory about how humans take in information via the senses and in the very process of taking it in understand it and, most often, make subsequent use of it in guiding human behaviour. The problem of intentionality in this century has been the problem of providing an adequate explanation of how a purely physical causal system, the brain, can both receive information and at the same time understand it, (...)
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  • Marcus, Kripke, and Names.John P. Burgess - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (1):1 - 47.
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  • Quine on Explication and Elimination.Martin Gustafsson - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):57-70.
  • Quine's Philosophy of Language and Polish Logic.Eli Dresner - 1999 - History and Philosophy of Logic 20 (2):79-96.
    The Polish logicians' propositional calculi, which consist in a distinct synthesis of the Fregean and Boolean approaches to logic, influenced W. V. Quine's early work in formal logic. This early formal work of Quine's, in turn, can be shown to serve as one of the sources of his holistic conception of natural language.
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  • Russell on Incomplete Symbols.Bryan Pickel - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):909-923.
    Russell's notion of an incomplete symbol has become a standard against which philosophers compare their views on the relationship between language and the world. But Russell's exact characterization of incomplete symbols and the role they play in his philosophy are still disputed. In this paper, I trace the development of the notion of an incomplete symbol in Russell's philosophy. I suggest – against Kaplan, Evans, and others – that Russell's many characterizations of the notion of an incomplete symbol are compatible. (...)
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  • Moral Epistemology: The Mathematics Analogy.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):238-255.
    There is a long tradition comparing moral knowledge to mathematical knowledge. In this paper, I discuss apparent similarities and differences between knowledge in the two areas, realistically conceived. I argue that many of these are only apparent, while others are less philosophically significant than might be thought. The picture that emerges is surprising. There are definitely differences between epistemological arguments in the two areas. However, these differences, if anything, increase the plausibility of moral realism as compared to mathematical realism. It (...)
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  • Platonism and Anti‐Platonism: Why Worry?Mary Leng - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (1):65 – 84.
    This paper argues that it is scientific realists who should be most concerned about the issue of Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematics. If one is merely interested in accounting for the practice of pure mathematics, it is unlikely that a story about the ontology of mathematical theories will be essential to such an account. The question of mathematical ontology comes to the fore, however, once one considers our scientific theories. Given that those theories include amongst their laws assertions that imply (...)
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  • Current Philosophy of Science.J. Agassi - 2011 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 41 (2):278-294.
    This Companion to the philosophy of science reflects fairly well the gloomy state of affairs in this subfield at its best—concerns, problems, prejudices, and all. The field is still stuck with the problem of justification of science, refusing to admit that there is neither need nor possibility to justify science and forbid dissent from it.
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  • Henry M. Sheffer and Notational Relativity.Alasdair Urquhart - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (1):33 - 47.
    Henry M. Sheffer is well known to logicians for the discovery (or rather, the rediscovery) of the ?Sheffer stroke? of propositional logic. But what else did Sheffer contribute to logic? He published very little, though he is known to have been carrying on a rather mysterious research program in logic; the only substantial result of this research was the unpublished monograph The General Theory of Notational Relativity. The main aim of this paper is to explain, as far as possible (given (...)
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