- Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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Generalized probabilism: Dutch books and accuracy domi- nation.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):811-840.details
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Gradational accuracy and nonclassical semantics.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):513-537.details
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You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.details
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The new Tweety puzzle: arguments against monistic Bayesian approaches in epistemology and cognitive science.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1407-1435.details
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Replies to commentators on Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):784-800.details
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Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.details
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The intrinsic probability of theism.Calum Miller - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (10):e12523.details
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Representation theorems and the foundations of decision theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.details
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On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement.Barry Lam - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (2):207-245.details
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An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Branden Fitelson Kenny Easwaran - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):425-433.details
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Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology.Matt Jope - 2019 - Synthese (Suppl 15):1-11.details
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Reciprocity as a Foundation of Financial Economics.Timothy C. Johnson - 2015 - Journal of Business Ethics 131 (1):43-67.details
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Duty and knowledge.Yoaav Isaacs - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):95-110.details
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The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions.Franz Huber - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):299-329.details
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Calibration: Being in Tune with Frequencies.Carl Hoefer - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):435-452.details
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Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320.details
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An 'evidentialist' worry about Joyce's argument for Probabilism.Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.details
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Solving the Problem of Logical Omniscience.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):107-128.details
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Knowing our degrees of belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.details
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Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3579-3610.details
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Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.details
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Constraints on Rational Theory Choice.Seamus Bradley - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):639-661.details
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On de Finetti’s instrumentalist philosophy of probability.Joseph Berkovitz - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2):25.details
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Objectivity and Bias.Gordon Belot - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):655-695.details
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Bayesian Epistemology and Having Evidence.Jeffrey Dunn - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherstdetails
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Challenges to Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John D. Norton - 2011 - In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm R. Forster (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 7: Philosophy of Statistics. Elsevier B.V.. pp. 391-440.details
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Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.details
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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Probability and scepticism.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - In Dylan Dodd Elia Zardini (ed.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. Oxford University Press. pp. 71-86.details
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The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPaper Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
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Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 57-106.details
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Comparative Probabilities.Jason Konek - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 267-348.details
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