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On some arguments for the necessity of necessity

Mind 108 (429):23-52 (1999)

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  1. * Real Necessity: A Reply to Barnes.Bob Hale - 2002 - Disputatio 1 (13):1 - 7.
  • Hale’s Necessity: It’s Indispensable, But is It Real?Gordon Barnes - 2002 - Disputatio 1 (13):3 - 10.
  • Hale's Necessity: It's Indispensable, But is It Real?Gordon Barnes - 2002 - Disputatio 1 (13):2-10.
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  • Why Essentialism Requires Two Senses of Necessity.Stephen K. McLeod - 2006 - Ratio 19 (1):77–91.
    I set up a dilemma, concerning metaphysical modality de re, for the essentialist opponent of a ‘two senses’ view of necessity. I focus specifically on Frank Jackson's two-dimensional account in his From Metaphysics to Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). I set out the background to Jackson's conception of conceptual analysis and his rejection of a two senses view. I proceed to outline two purportedly objective (as opposed to epistemic) differences between metaphysical and logical necessity. I conclude that since one (...)
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  • Robert Lorne Victor Hale FRSE May 4, 1945 – December 12, 2017.Roy T. Cook & Stewart Shapiro - 2018 - Philosophia Mathematica 26 (2):266-274.
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  • A Dilemma About Necessity.Peter W. Hanks - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):129 - 148.
    The problem of the source of necessity is the problem of explaining what makes necessary truths necessarily true. Simon Blackburn has presented a dilemma intended to show that any reductive, realist account of the source of necessity is bound to fail. Although Blackburn's dilemma faces serious problems, reflection on the form of explanations of necessities reveals that a revised dilemma succeeds in defeating any reductive account of the source of necessity. The lesson is that necessity is metaphysically primitive and irreducible.
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  • El nihilismo modal frente al argumento de McFretidge a favor de la necesidad de la creencia en la necesidad.José Edgar González Varela - 2013 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 45:269-298.
    En este trabajo examino el argumento de McFetridge a favor de la necesidad de la creencia en la necesidad. El argumento pretende establecer un dilema fatal para el “nihilista” modal, aquel que no cree que al menos alguna proposición es necesaria. Mi objetivo principal es mostrar que el dilema que presenta el argumento de McFetridge no es sólido, pues tiene una limitación muy importante con respecto al segundo de sus cuernos, el cual es el más interesante. El segundo cuerno del (...)
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  • Modality and Anti-Metaphysics.Stephen K. McLeod - 2001 - Ashgate.
    Modality and Anti-Metaphysics critically examines the most prominent approaches to modality among analytic philosophers in the twentieth century, including essentialism. Defending both the project of metaphysics and the essentialist position that metaphysical modality is conceptually and ontologically primitive, Stephen McLeod argues that the logical positivists did not succeed in banishing metaphysical modality from their own theoretical apparatus and he offers an original defence of metaphysics against their advocacy of its elimination. -/- Seeking to assuage the sceptical worries which underlie modal (...)
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  • Logical Constants.John MacFarlane - 2008 - Mind.
    Logic is usually thought to concern itself only with features that sentences and arguments possess in virtue of their logical structures or forms. The logical form of a sentence or argument is determined by its syntactic or semantic structure and by the placement of certain expressions called “logical constants.”[1] Thus, for example, the sentences Every boy loves some girl. and Some boy loves every girl. are thought to differ in logical form, even though they share a common syntactic and semantic (...)
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  • Hale on Some Arguments for the Necessity of Necessity.Arif Ahmed - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):81-91.
    The paper argues against Bob Hale's (1999) argument that enquirers must regard some truths as necessary truths. Hale's argument against Quinean skepticism. like many similar arguments due to McFetridge, Wright and others, involves a quantifier shift fallacy.
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  • Manifesting Belief in Absolute Necessity.John Divers & Daniel Y. Elstein - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):109-130.
    McFetridge (in Logical necessity and other essays . London: Blackwell, 1990 ) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary—to believe a proposition logically necessary, and to manifest that belief—is a matter of preparedness to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In Sect. 2, we explain the (...)
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  • Knowledge of Possibility and of Necessity.Bob Hale - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):1-20.
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  • Against the Reduction of Modality to Essence.Nathan Wildman - 2018 - Synthese:1-17.
    It is a truth universally acknowledged that a claim of metaphysical modality, in possession of good alethic standing, must be in want of an essentialist foundation. Or at least so say the advocates of the reductive-essence-first view, according to which all modality is to be reductively defined in terms of essence. Here, I contest this bit of current wisdom. In particular, I offer two puzzles—one concerning the essences of non-compossible, complementary entities, and a second involving entities whose essences are modally (...)
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  • Belief in Absolute Necessity.John Divers & José Edgar González-Varela - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):358-391.
    We outline a theory of the cognitive role of belief in absolute necessity that is normative and intended to be metaphysically neutral. We take this theory to be unique in scope since it addresses simultaneously the questions of how such belief is (properly) acquired and of how it is (properly) manifest. The acquisition and manifestation conditions for belief in absolute necessity are given univocally, in terms of complex higher-order attitudes involving two distinct kinds of supposition (A-supposing and C-supposing). It is (...)
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  • The Bearable Lightness of Being.Bob Hale - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (4):399-422.
    How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories—such as object, property, and relation—are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth and logical form: for example, (...)
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  • The Bearable Lightness of Being (Vol 20, Pg 399, 2010).Bob Hale - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (4):597 - 597.
    How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories—such as object , property , and relation —are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth and logical (...)
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  • Necessity and Apriority.Gordon Prescott Barnes - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):495-523.
    The classical view of the relationship between necessity and apriority, defended by Leibniz and Kant, is that all necessary truths are known a priori. The classical view is now almost universally rejected, ever since Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam discovered that there are necessary truths that are known only a posteriori. However, in recent years a new debate has emerged over the epistemology of these necessary a posteriori truths. According to one view – call it the neo-classical view – knowledge (...)
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  • On A Neglected Path to Intuitionism.Ian Rumfitt - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):101-109.
    According to Quine, in any disagreement over basic logical laws the contesting parties must mean different things by the connectives or quantifiers implicated in those laws; when a deviant logician ‘tries to deny the doctrine he only changes the subject’. The standard semantics for intuitionism offers some confirmation for this thesis, for it represents an intuitionist as attaching quite different senses to the connectives than does a classical logician. All the same, I think Quine was wrong, even about the dispute (...)
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  • Basic Logical Knowledge.Bob Hale - 2002 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51:279-304.
    At least some of us, at least some of the time—when not in the grip of radical sceptical doubt—are inclined to believe that we know, for example, that if we infer a conclusion from two true premises, one a conditional whose consequent is that conclusion and the other the antecedent of that conditional, then our conclusion must be true, or that we know similar things about other simple patterns of inference. If we do indeed have knowledge of this sort, it (...)
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  • Making Modal Distinctions: Kant on the Possible, the Actual, and the Intuitive Understanding.Jessica Leech - 2014 - Kantian Review 19 (3):339-365.
    One striking contrast that Kant draws between the kind of cognitive capacities that humans have and alternative kinds of intellect concerns modal concepts. Whilst , the very distinction between possibility and actuality would not arise for an intuitive understanding. The aim of this paper is to explore in more detail how the functioning of these cognitive capacities relates to modal concepts, and to provide a model of the intuitive understanding, in order to draw some general lessons for our ability to (...)
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  • Logical Non‐Cognitivism.Crispin Wright - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):425-450.
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