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  1. Aristotle on Joint Perception and Perceiving That We Perceive.Rosemary Twomey - 2019 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 13 (1):147-180.
    While most interpreters take the opening of De Anima III 2 to be an oblique reference to some sort of conscious awareness, I argue that Aristotle intends to explain what I call ‘joint perception’: when conjoined with Aristotle’s subsequent claim that perceiving and being perceived are the same activity, the metaperception underpins the perception of a unified object. My interpretation is shown to have a more satisfactory account of the aporiai that follow. While I argue that the immediate focus of (...)
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  • Perceiving That We See and Hear in Aristotle’s De Anima III 2.Roberto Grasso - 2019 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 13 (1):120-146.
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  • Aristotle on Illusory Perception: Phantasia Without Phantasmata.Noell Birondo - 2001 - Ancient Philosophy 21 (1):57-71.
    In De Anima III.3 Aristotle presents his official discussion of phantasia (“imagination” in most translations). At the very outset of the discussion Aristotle offers as an endoxon that “phantasia is that in virtue of which we say that a phantasma occurs to us” (428a1-2). Now a natural reading of this claim, taken up by many commentators, can pose a problem for Aristotle’s overall account of perception. Here I argue that, although it would be silly to deny that Aristotle considers phantasia (...)
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  • When and Why Understanding Needs Phantasmata: A Moderate Interpretation of Aristotle’s De Memoria and De Anima on the Role of Images in Intellectual Activities.Caleb Cohoe - 2016 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 61 (3):337-372.
    I examine the passages where Aristotle maintains that intellectual activity employs φαντάσματα (images) and argue that he requires awareness of the relevant images. This, together with Aristotle’s claims about the universality of understanding, gives us reason to reject the interpretation of Michael Wedin and Victor Caston, on which φαντάσματα serve as the material basis for thinking. I develop a new interpretation by unpacking the comparison Aristotle makes to the role of diagrams in doing geometry. In theoretical understanding of mathematical and (...)
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  • Desire and Reason in Plato's Republic.Hendrik Lorenz - 2004 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27:83-116.
  • Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - forthcoming - Discusiones Filosóficas.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
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  • Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle.Krisanna M. Scheiter - 2012 - Phronesis 57 (3):251-278.
    Abstract Aristotle's account of Phantasia in De Anima 3.3 is notoriously difficult to decipher. At one point he describes Phantasia as a capacity for producing images, but then later in the same chapter it is clear Phantasia is supposed to explain appearances, such as why the sun appears to be a foot wide. Many commentators argue that images cannot explain appearances, and so they claim that Aristotle is using Phantasia in two different ways. In this paper I argue that images (...)
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  • Aristotle on Various Types of Alteration in De Anima II 5.John Bowin - 2011 - Phronesis 56 (2):138-161.
    In De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes a number of distinctions between types of transitions, affections, and alterations. The objective of this paper is to sort out the relationships between these distinctions by means of determining which of the distinguished types of change can be coextensive and which cannot, and which can overlap and which cannot. From the results of this analysis, an interpretation of 417a21-b16 is then constructed that differs from previous interpretations in certain important respects, chief among (...)
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  • Aristotle’s Model of Animal Motion.Pavel Gregoric & Klaus Corcilius - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (1):52-97.
    In this paper we argue that Aristotle operates with a particular theoretical model in his explanation of animal locomotion, what we call the ‘centralized incoming and outgoing motions’ model. We show how the model accommodates more complex cases of animal motion and how it allows Aristotle to preserve the intuition that animals are self-movers, without jeopardizing his arguments for the eternity of motion and the necessary existence of one eternal unmoved mover in Physics VIII. The CIOM model helps to elucidate (...)
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  • Two Ways of Being for an End.Jessica Gelber - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):64-86.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 1, pp 64 - 86 Five times in the extant corpus, Aristotle refers to a distinction between two ways of being a ‘that for the sake of which’ that he sometimes marks by using genitive and dative pronouns. Commentators almost universally say that this is the distinction between an aim and beneficiary. I propose that Aristotle had a quite different distinction in mind, namely: that which holds between something and the aim or objective it is (...)
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  • Movement Versus Activity: Heidegger’s 1922/23 Seminar on Aristotle’s Ontology of Life.Francisco J. Gonzalez - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (3):615-634.
    ABSTRACTThe important role played by Aristotle in Martin Heidegger’s path towards Being and Time during the 1920's is now well documented. Yet an important chapter of this story remains mostly unexplored: Heidegger's early attempt to develop an ontology of life in dialogue with Aristotle. This is because the early seminars in which Heidegger developed his important and highly original interpretation of Aristotle's De Anima remain unpublished : one seminar from the summer of 1921 and one spanning the winter semester of (...)
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  • Aristotle on the Perception of Universals.Marc Gasser-Wingate - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (3):446-467.
    Aristotle claims that "although we perceive particulars, perception is of universals; for instance of human being, not of Callias-the-human-being" (APo II.19 100a16-b1). I offer an interpretation of this claim and examine its significance in Aristotle's epistemology.
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  • Aristotle on Perceptual Discrimination.Mika Perälä - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (3):257-292.
    _ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 257 - 292 It is commonly assumed that Aristotle defines a sense by reference to its ability to perceive the items that are proper to that sense, and that he explains perceptions of unities of these items, and discriminations between them, by reference to what is called the ‘common sense’. This paper argues in contrast that Aristotle defines a sense by reference, not only to its ability to perceive the proper items, but also (...)
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  • Colloquium 1: Aristotle’s Psychological Theory.David Charles - 2009 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 24 (1):1-49.
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  • II—Christopher Shields: The Peculiar Motion of Aristotelian Souls.Christopher Shields - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):139-161.
  • Colloquium 7: In Defense of Inner Sense: Aristotle on Perceiving That One Sees.Thomas Johansen - 2006 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 21 (1):235-285.
  • Vasiliou/Madigan Bibliography.Editors Proceedings of the Boston Ar - 2013 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 28 (1):185-186.
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  • Commentary on Sisko.Michael Pakaluk - 2000 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 (1):199-206.
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  • Commentary on Polansky.Martin Andic - 1999 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 15 (1):87-100.
  • Commentary on Miller.Victor Caston - 1999 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 15 (1):214-230.
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  • Making Things Better: The Art of Changing Things (Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ 2).Richard King - 1998 - Phronesis 43 (1):63-83.
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  • Colloquium 5.Victor Caston - 2000 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 16 (1):135-175.
  • Why the View of Intellect in De Anima I 4 Isn’T Aristotle’s Own.Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2):241-254.
    In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The passage’s (...)
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  • Pleasure, Tragedy and Aristotelian Psychology.Elizabeth Belfiore - 1985 - Classical Quarterly 35 (2):349-361.
    Aristotle's Rhetoric defines fear as a kind of pain or disturbance and pity as a kind of pain. In his Poetics, however, pity and fear are associated with pleasure: ‘ The poet must provide the pleasure that comes from pity and fear by means of imitation’. The question of the relationship between pleasure and pain in Aristotle's aesthetics has been studied primarily in connection with catharsis. Catharsis, however, raises more problems than it solves. Aristotle says nothing at all about the (...)
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  • Aristotle and the Spheres of Motivation: De Anima III.11.D. S. Hutchinson - 1990 - Dialogue 29 (1):7-.
  • The Parmenides and De Anima in Hegel's Perspective.Allegra de Laurentiis - 2006 - Hegel Bulletin 27 (1-2):51-68.
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  • Aristotle on Action: The Peculiar Motion of Aristotelian Souls.Christopher Shields - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):139–161.