In Federalist 10 James Madison drew a functional distinction between “parties” (advocates for factional interests) and “judgment” (decision-making for the public good) and warned of the corrupting effect of combining both functions in a “single body of men.” This paper argues that one way of overcoming “Madisonian corruption” would be by restricting political parties to an advocacy role, reserving the judgment function to an allotted (randomly-selected) microcosm of the whole citizenry, who would determine the outcome of parliamentary debates by secret (...) ballot—a division of labour suggested by James Fishkin’s experiments in deliberative polling. The paper then defends this radical constitutional proposal against Bernard Manin’s (1997) claim that an allotted microcosm could not possibly fulfil the “consent” requirement of Natural Right theory. Not only does the proposal challenge Manin’s thesis, but a 28 th Amendment implementing it would finally reconcile the competing visions that have bedevilled representative democracy since the Constitutional Convention of 1787. (shrink)

The paper argues that Leviathan can be interpreted as employing a constructionist approach in several important respects. It takes issue with commentators who think that, if for Hobbes man is not naturally social, then man must be naturally unsocial or naturally purely individual. First, Hobbes's key conceptions of the role of artifice and nature-artifice relations are identified, and uncontroversially constructionist elements outlined, most notably Hobbes's conceptualisation of the covenant. The significance of crucial distinctions in Leviathan, between the civil and the (...) social, between science and philosophy, between mankind's nature and the human condition, is developed. A constructionist reading of the argument of Leviathan is then advanced. The interpretation focuses on the contribution of nature-artifice relations, and of Hobbes's notion of civil philosophy, in understanding the critical issues of the state of nature and individual subjectivity. This reconstruction of the meaning of the text highlights the necessarily social character of human life in Leviathan, expressed in the way that the social' gives meaning to the 'natural', as well as because for Hobbes we live in a mind-affected world of perception and ideas. Leviathan can be interpreted as, in particular, a political social construction, because both social and individual identity logically require the social order and arrangements that only a strong government can supply. The social world, in Leviathan, cannot exist prior to the generation of a political framework, in civil society, the commonwealth, and law. (shrink)

What is commonly called a right has since about 1980 increasingly come to be called a subjective right. In this paper the origin and rise of this solecism is investigated. Its use can result in a lack of clarity and even confusion. Some aspects of rights-concepts and their history are also discussed. A brief postscript introduces Leibniz's Razor.

To be able to understand the history of bioethics, it is necessary to provide an overview of the mainstreams in philosophy which influenced them. That way one can clarify the theoretical origins of several ways of thought in bioethics as well as pinpoint certain problems within the field of bioethics. This paper will give a brief overview of moral theories in the history of philosophy and the way the have influenced ethical thought on biotechnology.

Constitutional liberal practices are capable of being normatively grounded by a number of different metaphysical positions. Kant provides one such grounding, in terms of the autonomously derived moral law. I argue that the work of Edmund Burke provides a resource for an alternative construal of constitutional liberalism, compatible with, and illumined by, a broadly Thomistic natural law worldview. I contrast Burke's treatment of the relationship between truth and cognition, prudence and rights, with that of his contemporary, Kant. We find that (...) in each case where Kant's system is constructed from the first principle of autonomy, Burke's thought is oriented toward an end that is not of our making. Readings of Burke as a natural law thinker are currently out of fashion among Burke commentators; without relying, for the main thesis, on historical claims about Burke's "Thomism," I nonetheless explore and challenge some of the assumptions that underlie the current orthodoxy. (shrink)

Due to the domain characteristics of business ethics, a contractarian theory for business ethics will need to be essentially different from the contract model as it is applied to other domains. Much of the current criticism of contractarian business ethics (CBE) can be traced back to autonomy, one of its three boundary conditions. After explaining why autonomy is so important, this article considers the notion carefully vis à vis the contracting partners in the contractarian approaches in business ethics. Autonomy is (...) too demanding a condition for the realm of CBE. But a less stringent version of the contract may be possible, a version which uses the contract as a heuristic device, which merely requires moral responsibility. Furthermore, it is argued that views of (human) agency and the moral subject should be made explicit in such a theory. (shrink)

Due to the domain characteristics of business ethics, a contractarian theory for business ethics will need to be essentially different from the contract model as it is applied to other domains. Much of the current criticism of contractarian business ethics (CBE) can be traced back to autonomy, one of its three boundary conditions. After explaining why autonomy is so important, this article considers the notion carefully vis à vis the contracting partners in the contractarian approaches in business ethics. Autonomy is (...) too demanding a condition for the realm of CBE. But a less stringent version of the contract may be possible, a version which uses the contract as a heuristic device, which merely requires moral responsibility. Furthermore, it is argued that views of (human) agency and the moral subject should be made explicit in such a theory. (shrink)

An ongoing point of contention within political philosophy—particularly among those on the Left—is to what extent, if at all, Marxist theory is useful in addressing certain forms of oppression found under capitalism, such as racist oppression. Leftist critics of orthodox Marxism, prominently including Nancy Fraser, often claim that Marx’s critique of capitalism is class-essentialist and unduly narrow and that his theory of exploitation—which these critics allege is the essence of Marx’s theory—is inadequate for the purposes of understanding “extra-economic” forms of (...) oppression. I disagree with these critics. Focusing on Fraser, my aim is to show precisely why the critics are wrong and, moreover, to offer at least an outline for a positive account of a Marxist theory of race and racism, particularly as situated within capitalism. (shrink)

Difficult questions regarding the so-called limits of toleration or accommodation are inevitable in today’s diverse, immigration societies. Such questions cannot be satisfactorily answered through simple assertions of the majority’s will or by retreating to a defense of ‘core liberal values.’ Rather, dealing with the challenges of diversity in a manner consistent with liberal-democratic principles requires that decision-making concerning the terms of collective life be informed by sincere and respectful deliberation. But how and where do we go about engaging in such (...) deliberation? This essay suggests that the courts seem to offer an arena that is more conducive than other traditional democratic institutions in terms of enabling the type of dialogue and analysis essential to realizing meaningful deliberation. Paradoxically, then, the judicialization of politics can be understood to be an ally, not an enemy, of meaningful deliberation in diverse democracies. (shrink)

Helen Frowe has recently offered what she calls a “practical” account of self-defense. Her account is supposed to be practical by being subjectivist about permissibility and objectivist about liability. I shall argue here that Frowe first makes up a problem that does not exist and then fails to solve it. To wit, her claim that objectivist accounts of permissibility cannot be action-guiding is wrong; and her own account of permissibility actually retains an objectivist (in the relevant sense) element. In addition, (...) her attempt to restrict subjectivism primarily to “urgent” situations like self-defense contradicts her own point of departure and is either incoherent or futile. Finally, the only actual whole-heartedly objectivist account she criticizes is an easy target; while those objectivist accounts one finds in certain Western European jurisdictions are immune to her criticisms. Those accounts are also clearly superior to hers in terms of action-guidingness. (shrink)

Antisemitism has long been found on both the political far-right and farleft. The recent rise in antisemitism worldwide raises the question of whether current antisemitism is found more with the far-right or far-left, the former a function of right-wing populism and the latter with what has been termed the new antisemitism. This paper uses data from the 2014 round of the European Social Survey in 20 nations to test for the connection between ideological selfplacement and antisemitic attitudes in mass publics. (...) Analysis finds greater levels of antisemitism with the extreme far-right compared to the far-left, but extreme leftists appear slightly more antisemitic than moderate leftist. Further, there is less antisemitism than anti-Muslim and anti-Roma attitudes at all positions on the left-right continuum. The conclusion puts the findings into context and suggests directions for future research. (shrink)