Philosophers of science have developed an account of causal-mechanical explanation that captures regularity, but this account neglects variation. In this article I amend the philosophy of mechanisms to capture variation. The task is to explicate the relationship between regular causal mechanisms responsible for individual development and causes of variation responsible for variation in populations. As it turns out, disputes over this relationship have rested at the heart of the nature–nurture debate. Thus, an explication of the relationship between regular causal mechanisms (...) and causes of variation and between individual development and variation offers both the necessary amendment to the philosophy of mechanisms and the resources to mediate the dispute. (shrink)

Humans in diverse cultures develop a capacity to recognize and share others’ emotional states. In this article, studies in adult and developmental populations are reviewed and synthesized to build a framework for understanding the neural bases and development of emotion recognition. It is proposed that foundations for the development of emotion recognition are provided by an experience-expectant neural circuitry that emerges early in life, biases infants to attend to biologically salient information, and is refined and specialized through experience for processing (...) species-typical signals of emotions. It is also discussed how genetic variations and experiences during sensitive periods of development can affect the developmental process and give rise to subtle individual differences in emotion recognition. (shrink)

This paper discusses the representation and explanation of relationships between phenomena that are important in psychiatric contexts. After a general discussion of complexity in the philosophy of science, I distinguish zooming-out approaches from zooming-in approaches. Zooming-out has to do with seeing complex mental illnesses as abstract models for the purposes of both explanation and reduction. Zooming-in involves breaking complex mental illnesses into simple components and trying to explain those components independently in terms of specific causes. Connections between existing practice and (...) zooming-out are drawn, and zooming-in is criticised. (shrink)