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- On the Claim That a Table-Lookup Program Could Pass the Turing Test.Drew McDermott - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (2):143-188.The claim has often been made that passing the Turing Test would not be sufficient to prove that a computer program was intelligent because a trivial program could do it, namely, the “Humongous-Table (HT) Program”, which simply looks up in a table what to say next. This claim is examined in detail. Three ground rules are argued for: (1) That the HT program must be exhaustive, and not be based on some vaguely imagined set of tricks. (2) That the HT (...)
- Updating the Turing Test. Wittgenstein, Turing and Symbol Manipulation.Carlo Penco - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):189-194.
- The Externalist Foundations of a Truly Total Turing Test.Paul Schweizer - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (3):191-212.The paper begins by examining the original Turing Test (2T) and Searle’s antithetical Chinese Room Argument, which is intended to refute the 2T in particular, as well as any formal or abstract procedural theory of the mind in general. In the ensuing dispute between Searle and his own critics, I argue that Searle’s ‘internalist’ strategy is unable to deflect Dennett’s combined robotic-systems reply and the allied Total Turing Test (3T). Many would hold that the 3T marks the culmination of the (...)
- The Well-Tested Young Scientist.Colin Hales - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (1):35-39.
- A Partial Implementation of the Bica Cognitive Decathlon Using the Psychology Experiment Building Language.Shane T. Mueller - 2010 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (2):273-288.
- Thought Translation, Tennis and Turing Tests in the Vegetative State.John F. Stins & Steven Laureys - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):361-370.Brain damage can cause massive changes in consciousness levels. From a clinical and ethical point of view it is desirable to assess the level of residual consciousness in unresponsive patients. However, no direct measure of consciousness exists, so we run into the philosophical problem of other minds. Neurologists often make implicit use of a Turing test-like procedure in an attempt to gain access to damaged minds, by monitoring and interpreting neurobehavioral responses. New brain imaging techniques are now being developed that (...)
- Ethical Robots: The Future Can Heed Us. [REVIEW]Selmer Bringsjord - 2008 - AI and Society 22 (4):539-550.Bill Joyâs deep pessimism is now famous. Why the Future Doesnât Need Us, his defense of that pessimism, has been read by, it seems, everyoneâand many of these readers, apparently, have been converted to the dark side, or rather more accurately, to the future-is-dark side. Fortunately (for us; unfortunately for Joy), the defense, at least the part of it that pertains to AI and robotics, fails. Ours may be a dark future, but we cannot know that on the basis of (...)
- The Turing Test: The First Fifty Years.Robert French - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):115-121.The Turing Test, originally proposed as a simple operational definition of intelligence, has now been with us for exactly half a century. It is safe to say that no other single article in computer science, and few other articles in science in general, have generated so much discussion. The present article chronicles the comments and controversy surrounding Turing's classic article from its publication to the present. The changing perception of the Turing Test over the last fifty years has paralleled the (...)
- Computation, Among Other Things, is Beneath Us.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):469-88.What''s computation? The received answer is that computation is a computer at work, and a computer at work is that which can be modelled as a Turing machine at work. Unfortunately, as John Searle has recently argued, and as others have agreed, the received answer appears to imply that AI and Cog Sci are a royal waste of time. The argument here is alarmingly simple: AI and Cog Sci (of the Strong sort, anyway) are committed to the view that cognition (...)
- Computation is Just Interpretable Symbol Manipulation; Cognition Isn't.Stevan Harnad - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):379-90.Computation is interpretable symbol manipulation. Symbols are objects that are manipulated on the basis of rules operating only on theirshapes, which are arbitrary in relation to what they can be interpreted as meaning. Even if one accepts the Church/Turing Thesis that computation is unique, universal and very near omnipotent, not everything is a computer, because not everything can be given a systematic interpretation; and certainly everything can''t be givenevery systematic interpretation. But even after computers and computation have been successfully distinguished (...)
- Words Lie in Our Way.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):421-37.The central claim of computationalism is generally taken to be that the brain is a computer, and that any computer implementing the appropriate program would ipso facto have a mind. In this paper I argue for the following propositions: (1) The central claim of computationalism is not about computers, a concept too imprecise for a scientific claim of this sort, but is about physical calculi (instantiated discrete formal systems). (2) In matters of formality, interpretability, and so forth, analog computation and (...)
- Reaping the Whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds. [REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-37.Harnad''s proposed robotic upgrade of Turing''s Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguisticand sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is no evidence of consciousness besides private experience. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from as if thought on the basis of (...)
- The Sense of Thinking.Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):21-29.It will be found that the great majority, given the premiss that thought is not distinct from corporeal motion, take a much more rational line and maintain that thought is the same in the brutes as in us, since they observe all sorts of corporeal motions in them, just as in us. And they will add that the difference, which is merely one of degree, does not imply any essential difference; from this they will be quite justified in concluding that, (...)
- Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind.Patrick Hayes, Stevan Harnad, Donald R. Perlis & Ned Block - 1992 - Minds and Machines 2 (3):217-238.When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaningful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called "virtual" systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a "virtual (...)
- A Curious Coincidence? Consciousness as an Object of Scientific Scrutiny Fits Our Personal Experience Remarkably Well.Bernard J. Baars - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):669-670.
- Evidence Against Epiphenomenalism.Ned Block - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
- Conscious Influences in Everyday Life and Cognitive Research.Kenneth S. Bowers - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):672-673.
- Consciousness and Content in Learning: Missing or Misconceived?Richard A. Carlson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):673-674.
- Consciousness and Making Choices.Raymond S. Corteen - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):674.
- On the Premature Demise of Causal Functions for Consciousness in Human Information Processing.Dale Dagenbach - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):675.
- Hydrocephalus and “Misapplied Competence”: Awkward Evidence for or Against?N. F. Dixon - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):675-676.
- Conscious Acts and Their Objects.Fred Dretske - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):676-677.
- Observing Protocol.Judith Economos - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):677.
- Dream Processing.David Foulkes - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):678.
- Memory with and Without Recollective Experience.John M. Gardiner - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):678-679.
- What is the Relation Between Language and Consciousness?Jeffrey A. Gray - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):679.
- Has Consciousness a Sharp Edge?Robert A. M. Gregson - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):679-680.
- Consciousness May Still Have a Processing Role to Play.Robert Van Gulick - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):699-700.
- Epiphenomenalism and the Reduction of Experience.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680.
- Limits of Preconscious Processing.Albrecht Werner Inhoff - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):680-681.
- Consciousness, Analogy and Creativity.Mark T. Keane - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):682.
- Velmans's Overfocused Perspective on Consciousness.Marcel Kinsbourne - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):682-683.
- Is Consciousness Information Processing?Raymond Klein - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):683.
- Understanding Awareness at the Neuronal Level.Christof Koch & Francis Crick - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):683-685.
- Conscious Functions and Brain Processes.Benjamin Libet - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):685-686.
- Consciousness: Only Introspective Hindsight?Dan Lloyd - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):686-687.
- Consciousness is King of the Neuronal Processors.William A. MacKay - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):687-688.
- The Processing of Information is Not Conscious, but its Products Often Are.George Mandler - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):688-689.
- Epi-Arguments for Epiphenomenalism.Bruce Mangan - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):689-690.
- The Function of Consciousness or of Information?David Navon - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):690-691.
- Reasons for Doubting the Existence of Even Epiphenomenal Consciousness.Georges Rey - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):691-692.
- A Limitation of the Reflex-Arc Approach to Consciousness.J. Steven Reznick & Philip David Zelazo - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692.
- Isn't the First-Person Perspective a Bad Third-Person Perspective?W. Schaeken & G. D'Ydewalle - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):692-693.
- A Lawful First-Person Psychology Involving a Causal Consciousness: A Psychoanalytic Solution.Howard Shevrin - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):693-694.
- Developing Concepts of Consciousness.Aaron Sloman - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):694-695.
- Dissociating Consciousness From Cognition.David Spiegel - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):695-696.
- Damn! There Goes That Ghost Again!Keith E. Stanovich - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):696-698.
- Attention is Necessary for Word Integration.Geoffrey Underwood - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):698.
- Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective.Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.This paper replies to the first 36 commentaries on my target article on “Is human information processing conscious?” (Behavioral and Brain Sciences,1991, pp.651-669). The target article focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output, while discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was relatively brief. The commentaries reversed this emphasis, and so, correspondingly, did the reply. The sequence of topics (...)
- Is Human Information Processing Conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed (...)
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