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Russell Hardin (2002). Street-Level Epistemology and Democratic Participation.

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  1.  32
    Justifying Deliberative Democracy: Are Two Heads Always Wiser Than One|[Quest]|.Zsuzsanna Chappell - 2011 - Contemporary Political Theory 10 (1):78.
    Democracy is usually justified either on intrinsic or instrumental, particularly epistemic, grounds. Intrinsic justifications stress the values inherent in the democratic process itself, whereas epistemic ones stress that it results in good outcomes. This article examines whether epistemic justifications for deliberative democracy are superior to intrinsic ones. The Condorcet jury theorem is the most common epistemic justification of democracy. I argue that it is not appropriate for deliberative democracy. Yet deliberative democrats often explicitly state that the process will favour the (...)
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    Justifying Deliberative Democracy: Are Two Heads Always Wiser Than One?Zsuzsanna Chappell - 2011 - Contemporary Political Theory 10 (1):78-101.
    Democracy is usually justified either on intrinsic or instrumental, particularly epistemic, grounds. Intrinsic justifications stress the values inherent in the democratic process itself, whereas epistemic ones stress that it results in good outcomes. This article examines whether epistemic justifications for deliberative democracy are superior to intrinsic ones. The Condorcet jury theorem is the most common epistemic justification of democracy. I argue that it is not appropriate for deliberative democracy. Yet deliberative democrats often explicitly state that the process will favour the (...)
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  3. Climate Change and Causal Inefficacy: Why Go Green When It Makes No Difference?James Garvey - 2011 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69:157-174.
    Reflection on personal choices and climate change can lead to the thought that nothing an individual does can possibly make a difference to the planet’s future. So why bother going green? This is a version of the problem of causal inefficacy, and it is a particular problem for those with consequentialist leanings. Voters and vegetarians are consulted for help, and a suggestive thought about consistency is pursued. Consequentialist arguments for governmental action are shored up with reflection on consistency, and, hopefully, (...)
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    Ideology and Dystopia.Jon Elster & Hélène Landemore - 2008 - Critical Review 20 (3):273-289.
    Bryan Caplan’s Myth of the Rational Voter is deeply ideological and conceptually confused. His book is shaped by pro‐market and pro‐expert biases and anti‐democratic attitudes, leading to one‐sided and conclusion‐driven arguments. His notion that voters are rationally irrational when they hold anti‐market and anti‐trade beliefs is incoherent, as is his idea that sociotropic voting can be explained as the rational purchase of a good self‐image.
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    If It Rained Knowledge.Russell Hardin - 2003 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (1):3-24.
    The author applies an economic theory of ordinary knowledge—street-level epistemology—to the popular understanding of science. Street-level theory is essentially economic and pragmatic. If it is very costly to learn something, you are less likely to learn it. If you need to know it, you are more likely to find out about it (although what you find out might be wrong). For most of what you know, you essentially rely on others as sources (some of these others might be "experts," but (...)
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