ABSTRACTStanley Hauerwas's contribution to the study of Christian ethics is analyzed in the course of offering an overview of his work, including his early reflections on “vision,”“narrative,” and moral agency; his continuing focus on Christian virtues and practices in contrast to the ethos of moral and political liberalism; and his specific attention to the meaning of peaceableness and the rejection of violence. The essay concludes by considering Hauerwas's legacy as a postliberal theologian, a critical participant in American Protestant ethics, and (...) a conversation partner with Roman Catholics. (shrink)

In this review essay, I consider the recent work of students of Stanley Hauerwas on matters related to political theology. Eight books (and scattered articles) are treated in two groups: one more theoretical, the other more practically oriented. Of special interest is whether and how Jeffrey Stout's concerns about Hauerwas's negative political "influence" apply. I suggest that while sometimes narratives of decline dominate overmuch, these works rightly and creatively seek to expand our political imagination beyond the narrowness of modern nation-state (...) politics and its attending capitalist assumptions. Moreover, in all cases, Hauerwas's students stress a kind of political embodiment of Christ in the practices of particular communities, beginning with the Christian Church, but including also medicine, economy, and family. Spread out, this embodiment combats a pervasive modern Gnosticism, trains us in patience and hope, and gives room for a more truthful description of Church and world. (shrink)

In her effort to recast moral realism in the style of the later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, Sabina Lovibond seeks to ground moral knowledge in a historical community and its rules of language. In Stanley Hauerwas’ writings, we find an account of Christian ethics that is similarly modeled on Wittgensteinian realism. The main problem with Wittgensteinian moral realism, as it is appropriated by both Lovibond’s and Hauerwas’ society-dependent accounts of morality, is that they are unable to resolve difficult issues created (...) by epistemic relativism. Both thinkers are vulnerable to epistemic relativism in two ways. First, with its contextualist approach to the justification of moral beliefs, their conception of moral realism makes any historical community the ultimate authority in all matters of morality. Second, their conception of moral realism also turns moral truth into a social property of a historical community, while denying the exclusive ownership of truth by one particular community. (shrink)

Despite the fact that Stanley Hauerwas has not taken up many of the topics normally associated with virtue ethics, has explicitly distanced himself from the enterprise known as “virtue ethics,” and throughout his career has preferred other categories of analysis, ranging from character and agency to practices and liturgy, it is nevertheless clear that his work has had a deep and transformative impact on the recovery of virtue within Christian ethics, and that this impact has largely to do with the (...) ways in which his thought resists normalization. This essay traces the evolution of Hauerwas's reflections on virtue and the virtues over the course of his career, with special attention to how this has been bound up with an increasingly emphatic theological particularism that has remained ambivalent between what I term “comprehensive” versus “exclusive” particularism. I argue that it is important to distinguish between these, and suggest that grasping the destructive tendencies of “exclusive” particularism should cement our commitment to shouldering the responsibilities associated with comprehensive particularism. (shrink)