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John Hawthorne & Ofra Magidor (2009). Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.

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  1.  25
    Higher Order Ignorance Inside the Margins.Sam Carter - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    According to the KK-principle, knowledge iterates freely. It has been argued, notably in Greco, that accounts of knowledge which involve essential appeal to normality are particularly conducive to defence of the KK-principle. The present article evaluates the prospects for employing normality in this role. First, it is argued that the defence of the KK-principle depends upon an implausible assumption about the logical principles governing iterated normality claims. Once this assumption is dropped, counter-instances to the principle can be expected to arise. (...)
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  2.  3
    Uniformity Motivated.Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini - forthcoming - Linguistics and Philosophy:1-20.
    Can rational communication proceed when interlocutors are uncertain which contents utterances contribute to discourse? An influential negative answer to this question is embodied in the Stalnakerian principle of uniformity, which requires speakers to produce only utterances that express the same content in every possibility treated as live for the purposes of the conversation. The principle of uniformity enjoys considerable intuitive plausibility and, moreover, seems to follow from platitudes about assertion; nevertheless, it has recently proven controversial. In what follows, I defend (...)
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  3. Hope, Knowledge, and Blindspots.Jordan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2):531-543.
    Roy Sorensen introduced the concept of an epistemic blindspot in the 1980s. A proposition is an epistemic blindspot for some individual at some time if and only if that proposition is consistent but unknowable by that individual at that time. In the first half of this paper, I extend Sorensen work on blindspots by arguing that there exist blindspots that essentially involve hopes. In the second half, I show how such blindspots can contribute to and impair different pursuits of self-understanding. (...)
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  4.  38
    Assertions, Joint Epistemic Actions and Social Practices.Seumas Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):71-94.
    In this paper I provide a theory of the speech act of assertion according to which assertion is a species of joint action. In doing so I rely on a theory of joint action developed in more detail elsewhere. Here we need to distinguish between the genus, joint action, and an important species of joint action, namely, what I call joint epistemic action. In the case of the latter, but not necessarily the former, participating agents have epistemic goals, e.g., the (...)
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  5.  50
    Iteration Principles in Epistemology I: Arguments For.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):754-764.
    Epistemic iteration principles are principles according to which some or another epistemic operator automatically iterates---e.g., if it is known that P, then it is known that P, or there is evidence that P, then there is evidence that there is evidence that P. This article provides a survey of various arguments for and against epistemic iteration principles, with a focus on arguments relevant to a wide range of such principles.
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  6.  85
    Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):496-520.
    This paper argues for an account of insincerity in speech according to which an utterance is insincere if and only if it communicates something that does not correspond to the speaker's conscious attitudes. Two main topics are addressed: the relation between insincerity and the saying-meaning distinction, and the mental attitude underlying insincere speech. The account is applied to both assertoric and non-assertoric utterances of declarative sentences, and to utterances of non-declarative sentences. It is shown how the account gives the right (...)
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  7. Indexical Reliabilism and the New Evil Demon.Brian Ball & Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1317-1336.
    Stewart Cohen’s New Evil Demon argument raises familiar and widely discussed concerns for reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification. A now standard response to this argument, initiated by Alvin Goldman and Ernest Sosa, involves distinguishing different notions of justification. Juan Comesaña has recently and prominently claimed that his Indexical Reliabilism (IR) offers a novel solution in this tradition. We argue, however, that Comesaña’s proposal suffers serious difficulties from the perspective of the philosophy of language. More specifically, we show that the two (...)
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  8. Context, Content, and Epistemic Transparency.Mahrad Almotahari & Ephraim Glick - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):1067-1086.
    We motivate the idea that presupposition is a transparent attitude. We then explain why epistemic opacity is not a serious problem for Robert Stalnaker's theory of content and conversation. We conclude with critical remarks about John Hawthorne and Ofra Magidor's alternative theory.
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  9. Assertion and Epistemic Opacity.John Hawthorne & Ofra Magidor - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):1087-1105.
    In Hawthorne and Magidor 2009, we presented an argument against Stalnaker’s meta-semantic framework. In this paper we address two critical responses to our paper: Stalnaker 2009, and Almotahari and Glick 2010. Sections 1–4 are devoted to addressing Stalnaker’s response and sections 5–8 to addressing Almotahari and Glick’s. We pay special attention (Sect. 2) to an interesting argument that Stalnaker offers to bolster the transparency of presupposition (an argument that, if successful, could also form the basis of a defence of the (...)
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  10. Natural Language and How We Use It: Psychology, Pragmatics, and Presupposition.Ofra Magidor - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):160-174.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
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