Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. How to Make Correct Predictions in False Belief Tasks Without Attributing False Beliefs: An Analysis of Alternative Inferences and How to Avoid Them.Ricardo Perera & Sofia Albornoz Stein - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (2):10.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Constructivist Connectionist Model of Transitions on False-Belief Tasks.Vincent G. Berthiaume, Thomas R. Shultz & Kristine H. Onishi - 2013 - Cognition 126 (3):441-458.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Path to Fully Representational Theory of Mind: Conceptual, Executive, and Pragmatic Challenges.Annelise Pesch, Andrei D. Semenov & Stephanie M. Carlson - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Children’s Difficulty with True Belief Tasks: Competence Deficit or Performance Problem?Nese Oktay-Gür & Hannes Rakoczy - 2017 - Cognition 166:28-41.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Il test della falsa credenza.Marco Fenici - 2013 - Analytical and Philosophical Explanation 8:1-56.
    La ricerca empirica nelle scienze cognitive può essere di supporto all’indagine filosofica sullo statuto ontologico e epistemologico dei concetti mentali, ed in particolare del concetto di credenza. Da oltre trent’anni gli psicologi utilizzano il test della falsa credenza per valutare la capacità dei bambini di attribuire stati mentali a se stessi e a agli altri. Tuttavia non è stato ancora pienamente compreso né quali requisiti cognitivi siano necessari per passare il test né quale sia il loro sviluppo. In questo articolo (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Perceptual Access Reasoning: Developmental Stage or System 1 Heuristic?Joseph Hedger - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):207-226.
    In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Mindreading with Ease? Fluency and Belief Reasoning in 4- to 5-Year-Olds.Anika Fiebich - 2014 - Synthese 191 (5):1-16.
    For decades, philosophers and psychologists have assumed that children understand other people’s behavior on the basis of Belief Reasoning (BR) at latest by age 5 when they pass the false belief task. Furthermore, children’s use of BR in the true belief task has been regarded as being ontogenetically prior. Recent findings from developmental studies challenge this view and indicate that 4- to 5-year-old children make use of a reasoning strategy, which is cognitively less demanding than BR and called perceptual access (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • In Defense of a Developmental Dogma: Children Acquire Propositional Attitude Folk Psychology Around Age 4.Hannes Rakoczy - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):689-707.
    When do children acquire a propositional attitude folk psychology or theory of mind? The orthodox answer to this central question of developmental ToM research had long been that around age 4 children begin to apply “belief” and other propositional attitude concepts. This orthodoxy has recently come under serious attack, though, from two sides: Scoffers complain that it over-estimates children’s early competence and claim that a proper understanding of propositional attitudes emerges only much later. Boosters criticize the orthodoxy for underestimating early (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations